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Abstract
Data-driven Graph Analysis
Qingyun Liu
The ever-expanding demands for network utilities today have greatly changed
people’s lives. We are all around by various networks, from Internet, social net-
works, to World Wide Web. Graphs are fundamental abstraction for networks,
which set the basis to systematically analyze and understand networks. Analyzing
graphs is critical to provide insights on the fundamental process that drive the
evolution of networks, and the essence for many real world applications, e.g., so-
cial recommendations. Despite years of research in graph analysis, there has been
little opportunity to study graphs from an empirical perspective. Prior studies are
often limited by the size and granularity of public available datasets, which can-
not accurately capture real graph complexity. In recent years, things are changing
with the proliferation of online social networks (OSNs), which provides access to
large traces of network dynamics.
In this dissertation, we take the opportunity by OSNs and seek to understand-
ing graphs from a data-driven perspective. Following this goal, we address several
graph problems which are of high impact, and also with great challenges in terms
of scalability, high level of graph dynamics and privacy. We use empirical large-
ix
scale datasets to study new graph topics, step back to reassess how far we have
come in analyzing fundamental graph problems, and also investigate how we can
improve by leveraging real graph datasets.
Specifically, we first work on how to analyze and model graph dynamics, and
we focus on the perspective of self-similar properties. Self-similarity is a fun-
damental property which defines hard limits on network modeling. Our work
identifies the presence of self-similarity in the time dynamics of social graphs, and
we incorporate the findings into a complete graph evolutionary model that can
accurately capture key properties from both temporal and structural aspects. We
validate our model against network dynamics in two real large-scale graphs, and
show that it produced desired properties in both temporal patterns and graph
structural features.
In our second work, we step back and reassess the space of the fundamental
graph problem, i.e., link prediction. Link prediction is the problem of predicting
formation of new edges on a given graph, and applies to networking in numerous
contexts. We perform an empirical study using different large traces of network
growth to reassess the predictive power of current proposals, and augment them
by leverage graph dynamic data.
Finally, we are concerned with graph privacy issues, i.e., how to securely share
large-scale datasets to trusted collaborators without data leakage. Current tools
x
can provide limited protection, and we provide a new alternative in the form of
graph watermarks. Graph watermarks are small graphs tailor-made for a given
graph dataset, which are difficult to remove, and serve to associate to a particular
user. In this work, we identify the goals and requirements of a graph water-
mark system, propose our basic and improved implementation, and evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiency on various large graphs.
In summary, our research work demonstrates that data-driven graph analysis
provides great insights, and is key to better understanding graph properties. We
have addressed important graph problems in terms of scalability, high level of
graph dynamics and graph privacy, and validated our proposals on large-scale
real graphs.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The proliferation of networks have changed people’s lives today more than
ever before [73, 134]. There are ever-expanding demands for network utilities,
from technology networks like the Internet and telephone networks, social net-
works like Twitter and Facebook where people share their everyday life, infor-
mation networks like World Wide Web, to even biological networks like neural
networks. As fundamental abstraction for networks, graphs model the connec-
tions in a network and set the basis to systematically analyze and understand
networks. Graphs are applicable to various of networks, and many of today’s
datasets are captured in large dynamic graphs. Such datasets can include maps
of autonomous systems in the Internet, social networks representing billions of
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friendships, connected records of patent citations, and interaction of proteins in
personal health care.
Analyzing graphs is critical to provide insights on the fundamental process
that drive the evolution of networks, and the basis for many real world applica-
tions. For example, studying dynamic social graphs is key to accurately predicting
resource needs and system behavior in online social networks, and important for
various applications including system design, resource allocation, anomaly de-
tection, demand forecasting and advertising [29, 62, 131]. Another prominent
example is that graph analysis has set the foundation for social recommendation
systems [53, 89], which is widely used in social networks and applications, e.g.,
ranging from Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn, to photo sharing on Instagram and
Pinterest, personal streaming on Periscope and Q&A sites like Quora.
Despite years of research in this space and hundreds of or maybe even thou-
sands of publications [7, 10, 11, 17, 22, 31, 39, 53, 62, 89, 90, 91, 109, 111, 129,
130, 133, 150, 153] (only a small subset of which is cited in this dissertation),
there has been little opportunity to study graphs from an empirical perspective,
and prior studies are often hampered by limitations in the size and granularity of
public available datasets, which cannot accurately capture real graph complexity.
For example, most work in graph dynamics study graphs via static snapshots,
which capture graph dynamics only at discrete points in time, and lack time in-
2
Introduction Chapter 1
formation about events that occur between snapshots. Even for those that have
analyzed graph traces in more fine granularity, they are often limited to moder-
ate sized networks like co-authorship studies and patent citation graphs, which
scale up to around 20K nodes and 200K edges [15, 130]. In contrast, graph algo-
rithms/systemsdeveloped using and validated by these datasets are often targeting
dynamic networks that are two or more orders of magnitude larger, with millions
or billions of nodes and billions of edges [161].
Thankfully, things are changing with the arrival of network traces from on-
line social networks (OSNs). We are taking advantage of this opportunity and
availability to large traces of network dynamics to understand graphs from a
data-driven perspective. We can use empirical datasets to study new graph top-
ics, step back and reassess how far we have come in analyzing certain problems,
and also investigate how we can improve by leveraging real graph datasets. At the
same time, we are also faced with great challenges, since real large graph traces
may have quite different properties. We list three primary challenges as follows:
1. Scalability. Many current graph tools have too high computational complex-
ity to be scaled to empirical graphs [32, 119, 142], since they are developed
or validated by small or moderate sized graphs. How can we adapt them or
design new graph tools that are applicable to graphs with millions or billions
of nodes is quite challenging.
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2. High level of dynamics. Real graph traces often have high volume of dy-
namics, which prior studies have seldom dealt with. For example, Facebook
has over 890 million login events and 4.5 billion likes every day [59], and
Instagram has more than 80 million photos uploaded daily and 3.5 billion
daily likes [118]. We need to understand and model such dynamics.
3. Graph privacy. There are huge concerns for graph privacy [14, 91, 107] since
graph topology may represent very sensitive information from real world,
e.g., users’ social relationship or even the strength of such relationship. It
is a difficult and necessary task to fight against potential data leakage.
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1.1 Dissertation Overview
Motivated by the new opportunities and challenges by large-scale empirical
graph datasets, I have focused on graph research from data-driven perspective,
and formalized the following statement of this dissertation:
Using large traces of network dynamics, we can build graph tools to
meet challenges from scalability, dynamics, and data privacy.
Driven by this statement, we have tackled problems from three aspects. First,
we work on how to analyze and model detailed graph dynamics, and we focus on
the perspective of self-similar properties. Self-similarity is a fundamental property
which defines hard limits on network modeling [75]. Our work identifies the pres-
ence of self-similarity in the time dynamics of social graphs, and we incorporate
the findings into a complete graph evolutionary model that can accurately capture
key properties from both temporal and structural aspects. Second, we step back
and reassess the space of the fundamental graph problem, i.e., link prediction.
Link prediction is the problem of predicting formation of new edges on a given
graph, and applies to networking in numerous contexts [68, 70, 53]. We perform
an empirical study using large traces of network growth to reassess the predictive
power of current proposals, and augment them by leverage dynamic data. Finally,
we are concerned with graph privacy issues, i.e., how to securely share large-scale
datasets to trusted collaborators without data leakage. Current tools [91, 54, 128]
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can provide limited protection, and we provide a new alternative in the form of
graph watermarks. Graph watermarks are small graphs tailor-made for a given
graph dataset, which are difficult to remove, and serve to associate to a particular
user. In this work, we identify the goals and requirements of a graph watermark
system, propose our implementation, and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency
on various large graphs.
In the following, we briefly describe works included in this dissertation.
1.2 Analyzing and modeling graph dynamics
Analyzing and modeling social network dynamics are key to accurately predict-
ing resource needs and system behavior in online social networks. The presence
of statistical scaling properties, i.e., self-similarity, is critical for determining how
to model network dynamics. Self-similarity refers to the invariance behavior of a
time series under rescalings, i.e., the relative variance or volatility of traffic traces
stays similar across different time scales [20, 75]. It is a fundamental statistical
property which defines hard limits on traditional network models like Poisson [75].
In this work, we study the role that self-similarity scaling plays in a social
network edge creation (i.e., links created between users) process, through analysis
of two detailed, time-stamped traces, a 199 million edge trace over two years in
the Renren social network, and 876K interactions in a four year trace of Facebook.
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We find that traditional R/S and Variance methods are unsuitable for measuring
self-similarity in real traces of social graphs. Using the more advanced tool, i.e.,
wavelet-based analysis, we find that the edge creation process in both networks is
consistent with self-similarity scaling, once we account for periodic user activity
that makes edge creation process non-stationary.
Using these findings, we build a complete model of social network dynam-
ics that combines temporal and spatial components. Specifically, the temporal
behavior of our model reflects self-similar scaling properties, and accounts for cer-
tain deterministic non-stationary features. The spatial side accounts for observed
long-term graph properties, such as graph distance shrinkage and local decluster-
ing. We validate our model against network dynamics in Renren and Facebook
datasets, and show that it succeeds in producing desired properties in both tem-
poral patterns and graph structural features.
1.3 Reassessing current status of link prediction
In this work, we seek to understand current status of fundamental graph prob-
lem, i.e., link prediction. Link prediction is the problem to of predicting formation
of new edges on a given graph. It is a fundamental problem that applies to net-
working in numerous contexts, and has tons of applications [68, 70, 53]. However,
there has been little opportunity to study various link prediction proposals from
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an empirical perspective due to the limitation of publicly available datasets. Until
recently, validation of algorithms have been hampered by limitations in the size
and realism of empirical datasets. More specifically, such public datasets are of-
ten limited to co-authorship studies and patent citation graphs, moderate sized
networks that lack dynamic details [15, 130]. In contrast, algorithms developed
using and validated by these datasets are targeting dynamic networks that are
many orders of magnitude larger, and much more dynamic [161].
With our access to several large, detailed traces of dynamics in online social
networks (Facebook, Renren, YouTube), we seek to revisit and reassess the value
and accuracy of current prediction methods. Our goals are to understand the ab-
solute and comparative accuracy of existing prediction algorithms, and to develop
techniques to improve them using insights from analysis of network dynamics.
We implement and evaluate 18 link prediction algorithms, labeled as either
“metric-based” (those that predict potential links using a single similarity or prox-
imity metric) or “classification-based” (those that use machine learning classifiers
with multiple metrics as input features). Despite poor performance in absolute
terms, SVM classifiers consistently perform the best across all our traces. Its ac-
curacy is occasionally matched by metric-based algorithms, but never consistently
across datasets.
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Finally, we dig sources for overall low accuracy of today’s prediction algo-
rithms, and use our observations of network dynamics to build “filters” that dra-
matically reduce the search space for link candidates. Augmenting current algo-
rithms with our filters dramatically improves prediction accuracy across all traces
and algorithms, even for algorithms that were already designed to capture network
dynamics [37].
1.4 Secure graph sharing system
From network topologies to online social networks, many of today’s most sensi-
tive datasets are captured in large graphs. A significant challenge facing the data
owners is how to share sensitive graphs with collaborators or authorized users, e.g.,
ISP’s network topology graphs with a third party networking equipment vendor.
Current tools like building strong access control mechanisms, or modifying data
to reduce the impact of potential leakages [91, 54, 128] can provide limited node
or edge privacy, but significantly modify the graph reducing its utility.
In this work, we propose a new alternative in the form of graph watermarks.
Graph watermarks are small graphs tailor-made for a given graph dataset, which
are difficult to remove, and serve to associate to a particular user. When a data
owner wants to share her graph with multiple users, she first generates a special
subgraph, i.e., a graph watermark, for each user. She then embeds each watermark
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into the original graph to get a watermarked graph separately, and distributes
this graph to the corresponding user. If any watermarked graph is leaked, data
owner uses the original graph to extract the embedded watermark, and identify
who is responsible for the leakage. Then data owner can use this proof to seek
potential damages against that user. Knowing the existence of such a way to
track for responsibility, users would be more cautious with the shared data. Our
graph watermarks serve both as a deterrent against data leakage and a method
of recourse after a leak.
We provide robust schemes for embedding and extracting watermarks, and use
analysis and experiments on large real graphs to show that they are unique and
difficult to forge. We study the robustness of graph watermarks against both single
and powerful colluding attacker models, then propose and evaluate mechanisms
to dramatically improve resilience.
1.5 Contributions
In this dissertation, the key contribution is to carry out data-driven graph
analysis from large-scale real datasets, where we have built graph tools to meet
challenges from scalability, dynamics, and data privacy. We have provided novel
algorithms, models, and systems to capture properties of large-scale real graphs,
guided by our measurements. We have also revisited and evaluated the current
10
Introduction Chapter 1
status of fundamental graph problem to understand how far existing work has
gone in this area. Besides, we have verified our solutions using rigorous theoretical
analysis, experiments on a range of big real graphs and detailed simulations. In
the following, we list our detailed contributions.
Novel Algorithms, Models and System Designs. We have designed
novel algorithms/models/systems to address the key challenges from data-driven
graph analysis on big real graphs. In Chapter 2, when we try to explore the ex-
istence of self-similarity property, we explored different detection algorithms and
identified a reliable tool for dynamic social graphs. Based on our findings, we
have proposed a novel dynamic graph model, which combines a temporal com-
ponent that accounts for “when” and “how many” edges are created, and also a
spatial component that captures “where” those edges are distributed. This is the
first model to comprehensively capture the evolutionary dynamics of graphs from
different aspects at fine granularity. Also, in Chapter 3, after we have evaluated
the predictive power of existing link prediction algorithms and studied the causes
for overall low prediction, we have provided “temporal filters” that can greatly
improve the prediction, by pruning the search space for potential links. And in
Chapter 4, to securely share graphs, we have overcome the limitations of current
solutions by providing a new alternative in terms of graph watermarks. We are
the first to identify the goals and requirements of a graph watermark system. We
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have also described an initial design that efficiently embeds watermarks into and
extracts out of large graphs, and with low distortion of the graph data.
Identifying Fundamental Challenges/Limitations. We have revisited
the fundamental graph problem, i.e., link prediction, and explored the existence
of fundamental statistical property in graph dynamics, i.e., self-similarity. We
have identified some fundamental/practical challenges faced by those problems.
In Chapter 3, we are the first to evaluate existing link prediction solutions from
an empirical angel, i.e., on large-scale dynamic graph traces. We have found the
overall low predictive power of all existing solutions, and dug sources of such low
prediction accuracy from both structural and temporal aspects. We have found
that one fundamental contributing factor is that current prediction algorithms take
a purely static approach to network analysis, and do not take in account temporal
patterns exhibited by an evolving network. In Chapter 2, we have proved when
detecting self-similar property on real traces in social graph dynamics, how tradi-
tional tools produce inconclusive results because of the underlying deterministic
trends by human behaviors. We have also validated the suitability of a more
advanced and robust tool in such scenario.
Theoretical and Experimental Validation. We have validated our pro-
posed solutions using theoretical analysis, experiments on various large-scale graph
datasets, and also simulated attacks if needed. In Chapter 2, both our measure-
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ment for the existence of self-similarity property, and our proposed model for
graph dynamics are based on two large-scale datasets: Renren, with 200M edges
and 11M nodes at the end of the trace, and Facebook, with 877K edges and 47K
nodes over a four-year period. By showing that our model produces dynamic
traces that match key properties of the two original traces, we have proved that
our model provides a practical method for generating realistic traces and has filled
an existing void in this research community. In Chapter 3, we have applied our
proposed “temporal filter” to existing solutions, and tested on different large-scale
graphs, including Renren, Facebook and YouTube. We show that by leveraging
temporal information on network dynamics using our filters, we can effectively
improve link prediction accuracy. And we have also confirmed the generality of
our filtering method. In Chapter 4, we have provided a strict theoretical proof of
uniqueness of graph watermarks, showing that it is extremely difficult for attack-
ers to forge watermarks. We have also tested the suitability of watermarking to 48
of today’s real network graphs, which represent vastly different types of networks
and a wide range of structural topologies with size ranging from 10K nodes and
39K edges, to 5M nodes and 48M edges. Results support our assertion that our
watermarking mechanism is applicable to most of today’s network graphs with
low detection risk. Besides applicability, we have also validated our watermark
13
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system in terms of robustness agains attacks, distortion, uniqueness, and efficiency
on several larger network graphs.
1.6 Thesis organization
The rest part of this dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we elaborate our efforts to analyze and model graph dynamics.
Following the background and description of datasets, we carry out preliminary
analysis with two traditional tools to detect the existence of self-similarity. From
the initial analysis, we find the edge creation process in social graphs display a
typical periodical pattern in user activity, and potential self-similarity properties
at certain time scales. However, because of the existence of periodical patterns,
both traditional tools fail to provide reliable detection results. We then apply
a more rigorous method to systematically study potential self-similar properties,
and validate its obvious existence over smaller time scales and fading away at
larger time scales. Motivated by the self-similarity analysis, we next seek to build
a complete model of graph dynamics. We propose a model with two components:
a temporal component that produces a sequence of time-stamped events defining
when and how many new edges are formed in a given time interval, and a spatial
component defining where in the graph these new edge creations take place. Fi-
nally, we validate the proposed model on different datasets, where we calibrate the
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model using real data and use it to generate synthetic dynamics graphs, and then
compare these synthetic graphs to the original data in terms of both temporal
and spatial properties.
In Chapter 3, we present our work on revisiting the fundamental graph prob-
lem, i.e., link prediction. We first introduce different categories of link prediction
algorithms: metric-based and classification-based algorithms. We then present two
key questions we want to ask in our efforts to study this problem, our proposed
graph sequence based framework for evaluation, and 18 implemented algorithms.
The empirical evaluation begins with metric-based prediction algorithms, where
we seek to understand their prediction accuracy, and they key factors that lead
to prediction errors. Later we evaluate classification-based algorithms in practi-
cal scenarios and compare their results to metric-based algorithms. Finally, we
improve existing algorithms by integrating them with dynamic network analysis,
where we propose temporal filters to drastically reduce the search space for link
candidates. Our proposed solution can even augment algorithms that are already
designed to capture network dynamics.
In Chapter 4, we introduce the design of graph watermark system. To set
the context for the design, we first introduce the framework of graph watermark
systems, define the attack models we target, and use them to guide our design
goals. We then describe in details the basic design, which seeks to embed and
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extract watermarks on graphs to achieve watermark uniqueness while minimizing
distortion on graph structure. Later we present detailed analysis on two funda-
mental properties: watermark uniqueness, where each watermark must be unique
to the corresponding user, and watermark detectability, where the presence of a
watermark should not be easily detectable by external users. Because in prac-
tice, attackers can seek to detect or destroy watermarked graphs, we propose
advanced features to defend against corresponding attacks. We finally use real
network graphs to evaluate the performance of the graph watermarking system in
terms of key metrics: false positives, graph distortion, watermark robustness, and
computational efficiency.
Finally in Chapter 5, we conclude the dissertation with future directions.
16
Chapter 2
Analyzing and Modeling Graph
Dynamics
2.1 Introduction
1 Studying graph dynamics, i.e. graph evolution including detailed timings of
when nodes arrive and edges are created, is important for many network appli-
cations, from system design, resource allocation, anomaly detection, to demand
forecasting. Prior studies of graph dynamics are typically based on randomized,
generative graph models that produce sequences of events leading to an observed
1 ©ACM, (2016). This is the authors version of the work. It is posted here by permission of
ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The abbreviated version of content in this
chapter was published in Journal ACM Transactions on Modeling and Performance Evaluation
of Computing Systems (TOMPECS) [93], http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2994142.2342440.
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network structure [65, 84, 10, 9, 109, 155]. Focusing primarily on producing a
graph with some desired structural properties, they do not model or match the
sequence of dynamic events that lead to that structure. With the proliferation of
online social networks (OSNs) and thus access to real, large-scale traces of graph
evolution, there are increasing number of literature in analyzing and modeling
social graphs [133, 153, 62, 130, 39, 31, 22]. However, graph dynamics are still
poorly understood. Current methods often study them via static snapshots, which
capture graph dynamics only at discrete points in time, and lack time information
about events that occur between snapshots.
Our work seeks to address this need by studying detailed dynamics in “time-
stamped” traces of network growth. While most/all existing work analyze and
model dynamics using logical clocks, we examine the relationship between net-
work dynamics and real physical clock time. Specifically, the use of physical time
allows us to tackle two significant challenges in the modeling of network dynam-
ics. First, physical time allows us to determine if social network dynamics exhibit
self-similarity, an invariance of behavior at different time scales. Self-similarity
is a fundamental statistical property, that if discovered, defines hard limits on
how such dynamics can be modeled using traditional means, e.g. Poisson. Its
detection in contexts such as network traffic and web traffic has led to significant
shifts in how such datasets were analyzed and modeled.
18
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Second, analysis of a physical time trace allows us to build a model of OSN
dynamics that captures not only structural properties of the network, but also
the sequence of dynamic events leading to that structure. This type of dynamic
graph model would address several practical OSN problems. First, the research
community has repeatedly expressed a need for real dynamic graph traces. Using a
real trace for calibration, our model can generate “realistic” dynamic graphs with
a complete list of time-stamped network events. Next, our model can be used
to perform “interpolation,” i.e. construct complete dynamic graph traces that
approximate the continuous network evolution between successive static snapshots
of OSNs. Finally, our model can be used to detect abnormal events (attacks or
changes in user behavior) in real networks, i.e. events that disrupt expected
network dynamics.
In this chapter, we perform an empirical study of network dynamics by examin-
ing of network events over multiple years. For this Our work relies on two detailed,
time-stamped traces of social networks, the Renren dataset [161] (complete, time-
stamped trace of 199 million social links over 2 years) and the Facebook wall post
dataset [72] (876K wall posts between users over 4 years in a Facebook regional
network). To the best of our knowledge, these are the only datasets available
today with sufficient granularity and event frequency to provide accurate analysis
on network dynamics and self-similarity.
19
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Self-similarity based Network Analysis. Self-similarity refers to the in-
variance behavior of a time series under rescalings, i.e. the relative variance or
volatility of traffic traces stays similar across different time scales2. Successful
detection of self-similar properties is a very meaningful result (for network model-
ing), because it defines fundamental limits on how such datasets can be modeled
using traditional means. Due to its very different statistical properties, e.g. signif-
icantly higher burstiness, self-similar traffic cannot be easily captured or modeled
by popular traffic models. In recent years, self-similarity has been found and led
to changes in data modeling in variety of contexts, including local network traf-
fic, wide-area network traffic, file system accesses, disk-level I/O, messaging and
email communications and web traffic requests [75, 115, 36, 50, 122, 44, 126, 41].
In each case, the discovery of self-similar scaling properties led to a noteworthy
shift in how such datasets were analyzed and modeled.
It is challenging to detect and quantify self-similar scaling properties in real
network traces in a statistically rigorous manner. This is partially due to the likely
presence of patterns (e.g. deterministic trends and diurnal or weekly cycles) that
introduce non-stationarity. The edge creation process may be consistent with self-
similar scaling over time scales ranging from seconds to hours. But patterns like
2Self-similarity can be used to describe scale invariance of certain properties of an object in
space and/or time. In this paper, we adopt the temporal meaning, i.e. self-similarity along the
time dimension.
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diurnal or weekly user cycles likely dominate over larger time scales like days and
weeks, and need to be accounted for before any self-similarity analysis. Intuitively,
we seek to not only detect self-similar scaling properties in edge creation process,
but also determine time scales where self-similarity is visible and can be quantified.
Thus we use a range of techniques including R/S analysis, the variance fitting
method, and a wavelet-based method. And our analysis focuses on edge creation,
mainly because an exploratory analysis of the Renren data revealed no particular
structure underlying the observed node creation events.
A Model of Social Network Edge Dynamics. We incorporate the find-
ings from our self-similarity analysis into a complete evolutionary network model,
including a temporal component that determines “when” new edge creations occur
in time, and a spatial component that specifies “where” these new edges form.
Together, this model produces a sequence of time-stamped events that uniquely
define the formation and evolution of a social network or graph in time and space.
By tuning a small number of parameters, our model can be calibrated to “fit”
traces of measured graph dynamics exhibiting self-similar properties. We vali-
date the model by comparing the model-generated edge creations to that of the
real data (Renren and Facebook). Our results on both datasets show that the
synthetic edge creation matches both the self-similar scaling behavior and the di-
urnal patterns exhibited by the real data. Furthermore, successive snapshots of
21
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the graph structure generated by our model match the corresponding snapshots
of the original data on a variety of metrics, including average path length and
average clustering coefficient.
We summarize our five key contributions in this chapter as follows:
First, we find that Renren’s edge creation process is non-stationary over long-
term periods. Even after removing the impact of node arrivals, traditional R/S
and variance methods still produce inconclusive results on self-similar scaling.
Thus, the two methods are unsuitable for measuring self-similarity in real traces
in social networks. (see Section 2.3)
Second, by applying the more robust wavelet-based method for examining
self-similarity, we find the edge creation process in Renren does exhibit properties
consistent with self-similarity over time scales ranging from seconds to hours. We
find the wavelet-based method to be highly robust detecting self-similarity in the
presence of non-stationary trends. (see Section 2.4)
Third, We cross-validate our observations by repeating the above analyses on
the Facebook wall post dataset, and confirm that it exhibits similar self-similarity
properties observed from the Renren dataset. (see Section 2.5)
Forth, we propose a detailed model of social network dynamics that captures
both the temporal properties of graph dynamics, in terms of self-similar scaling
and deterministic non-stationary periodic patterns like diurnal or weekly cycles
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of user activity, and its spatial properties, including long-term graph distance
shrinkage and reduction in local clustering. (see Section 2.6)
Finally, we validate our model by showing that it produces dynamic traces
that match key properties of the original Renren and Facebook datasets, both
temporally and spatially. Thus, by providing a practical method for generating
realistic traces of time-stamped network events, our model fills an existing void in
the research community. (see Section 2.7)
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to empirically study the
presence of self-similarity in the time dynamics of online social networks (OSNs).
Our findings highlight that instead of traditional Poisson models, the dynamics of
real-world networks such as Renren social graph can often be adequately captured
by a combination of a non-stationary component, e.g. long-term deterministic
trends, and a stationary component, e.g. self-similar process. We believe that
our model is the first to explicitly account for both temporal and spatial features
in network dynamics and addresses an urgent need for accurate models of graph
dynamics.
2.2 Background and Datasets
In this section, we introduce briefly the notion of self-similarity, and describe
the Renren and Facebook dataset used in our study.
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Self-similarity. For a time process, self-similarity refers to an invariance be-
havior, where certain statistical properties are similar under appropriately rescaled
versions of the process [20, 75, 35]. Self-similarity has been observed in a variety
of contexts in computing systems and networks, including web traffic [36], file
system accesses [50], and traffic in both wide area networks [115] and local Ether-
net networks [75]. For self-similar traffic, the aggregation of many bursty sources
remains bursty across a wide range of time scales. This behavior is quite different
from conventional Poisson processes that tend to produce traffic that smoothes
out when observed over large time scales. While self-similarity can also be asso-
ciated with geometry and describe the invariance in hierarchical structures [136],
this work focuses on the temporal domain3.
To formally define self-similarity, let X = {Xi : i = 1, 2, ...} be a covariance
stationary stochastic process whose autocorrelation function r(k) ∝ k−β (0 <
β < 1) as k → ∞. For each integer m (m > 0), we form a new process X(m)
representing the averaged values of X over disjoint blocks of size m. That is, the
jth element of X(m) is:
X
(m)
j =
1
m
(X(j−1)m+1 +X(j−1)m+2 + ...+Xjm), j = 1, 2, ... (2.1)
3Throughout the paper we refer to temporal self-similarity as self-similarity.
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If X is self-similar, then r(m)(k), the autocorrelation function of X(m), should
satisfy [50, 75]:
r(m)(k) = r(k), or r(m)(k)→ r(k), m→∞. (2.2)
An effective and commonly used metric to detect the existence or quantify the
degree of self-similarity is the Hurst parameter H, measurable in multiple ways [5,
75]. Intuitively, H helps to capture the “burstiness” of a covariance stationary
process, where a higherH corresponds to a process with more pronounced “bursts”,
i.e. large observations have a tendency to be followed by large observations, and
small observations by small ones. Formally, H = 1−β/2, where β is defined by the
process X’s autocorrelation function r(k) ∝ k−β. A process exhibits self-similarity
if H falls in the range of (0.5, 1).
Ideally, the finite-dimensional distributions of a self-similar process should stay
invariant across all time scales. In reality, this property often exists at smaller
time scales, but breaks down at large time scales due to non-stationary patterns
and finite datasets [46, 50]. For example, diurnal user activity breaks stationarity
and interferes with self-similarity at time scales larger than a few hours. Thus,
analyzing for self-similarity requires determining the range of time scales over
which it is visible [5, 46, 50].
Datasets. An Online Social Network (OSN) is an online platform to build
social relations among people who share similar interests, opinions or have real-
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Graph Trace Start Date Trace End Date Granularity # of Nodes # of Edges
Renren (Non-sampled) [161] 11/21/05 12/31/07 Seconds 10,572,832 199,564,006
Facebook (New Orleans) [72] 09/14/04 01/22/09 Seconds 46,952 876,993
Table 2.1: Statistics of the two OSN datasets, with the start/end date of the traces, the
granularity of time stamps in the traces, the total count of nodes that have been involved in
edge creation, and the total count of edges that have been newly created in the traces.
life connections4. While many have diverse features, they typically share features
that allow individuals to construct an own page or profile, and build connection
with other users, e.g., friending others. When modeling OSNs, an individual user
is usually regarded as a “node”, while the relationship between a pair of users as
an “edge”, or a “link”.
Our analysis is based on OSNs: Facebook and Renren, where our work is
the first to empirically study the presence of self-similarity in the time dynamics
of OSNs. Facebook is the world’s most popular online social network with over
1.5 billion users5, while Renren is the Chinese version of Facebook, the largest
and oldest OSN in China with more than 220 million users [62]. For both sites,
a registered user can create her profile, add other users as “friends”, and post
messages on others’ wall (called “wall posts”), an area on each user’s own profile
where others (usually friends) can make comments.
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_networking_service
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook.
26
Analyzing and Modeling Graph Dynamics Chapter 2
101
104
107
0 200 400 600 800
# 
of
 E
dg
es
 C
re
at
ed
Time (Day)
Figure 2.1: Daily edge growth in Renren.
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Figure 2.2: Daily edge growth in Facebook.
We show the summarized statistics of the two datasets in Table 3.2. The first
and primary is an anonymized dataset from Renren [161], with a detailed time-
stamped (down to the second) trace of the creation of all nodes (10,572,832) and
all edges (199,564,006) over a 25-month period from Nov. 21, 2005 (the launch of
Renren) to Dec. 31, 2007. Here an edge is created when two users become friends.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the largest time-stamped datasets on
social network evolution studied to date.
Figure 2.1 plots the daily edge growth of the Renren social network, where
data points represent the number of new edges created on each day. This plot
shows that the dataset covers both the initial explosive growth (from day 1 to
around day 200) and the stabilized evolution of the Renren network [161]. Note
the unusually large spike on day 386 (Dec. 12, 2006). This is the result of a
merging event - Renren merged with 5Q, its largest Chinese competitor at that
time. The network doubled in size in a single day, growing from 624K users and
8.2M links to 1.3M users with 11.2M links. Given it is a one-time event, we
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exclude it from our analysis, and focus in our study on continuous data segments
before or after the merge.
The second dataset is the Facebook wall post dataset6 [72]. It contains wall
posts produced by users from the Facebook New Orleans regional network, i.e.
46, 952 users and 876, 993 posts created over a four-year period from Sep. 14th,
2004 till Jan. 22nd, 2009. Each post is also time-stamped to the granularity
of a second. Like [153], we consider each wall post as an edge representing an
interaction between two users. Figure 3.6 plots the daily edge growth of the
Facebook social network. Like Renren, this dataset also covers periods where
edge creation events increase significantly at the beginning, and then stabilize
(around day 750). Compared to Renren, this dataset is much more sparse.
2.3 Preliminary Analysis
Our goal is to determine if Renren and Facebook’s network evolution display
any property consistent with self-similarity, and if so, over what range of time
scales. For clarity we first describe our analysis for Renren, which we repeat on the
Facebook dataset in Section 2.5. Our analysis focuses on the edge creation process,
since initial analysis showed no particular structure underlying the observed node
creation events. The key challenge we face is how to identify and isolate the
6http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/facebook-wosn-wall
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impact of non-stationary patterns in the edge creation data. As a first step, we
limit the impact of new node arrivals on edge creation, by focusing our analysis
on edges created between members of a fixed user population. We remove this
restriction and extend our analysis for all edge creation events in Section 2.4.3.
Next, we start by briefly describing how we sample the original dataset by
removing certain node arrival and other obvious non-stationary events. We then
discuss the methods for detecting self-similarity, our initial analytical findings and
key insights.
2.3.1 Experiment Setup
Data Sampling. We begin our analysis with a conservatively sampled sub-
set of our data to remove obvious non-stationary factors that may impede any
direct analysis of self-similar scaling property. Specifically, we limit our sample
to include only existing users as of December 1, 2007, and study all edge creation
events between them during December 2007, i.e. days 741 to 771. This sampling
eliminates three factors. First, by studying only edges created between members
of a fixed user population, we minimize the impact of new node arrivals. Second,
this month avoids the abnormal expansion of new edges around day 386 as a result
of the one-time merge event of two social networks (Renren and 5Q). Finally, this
time period is sufficiently late in the history of Renren that it avoids the initial
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exponential network growth experienced by most social networks [161]. This data
sample represents a stable growth period in Renren, which contains 18, 714, 712
edges created between 6, 219, 531 existing users. In the following we refer to this
sampled dataset as “sampled dataset of Renren” to differ from the entire dataset
without sampling as “full Renren”.
Estimating H. The two most popular (and simple) methods to estimate H
are variance analysis and R/S analysis [46, 50, 75]. Our initial analysis efforts
consist of applying these two methods in addition to directly visualizing the raw
data.
Variance fitting method [75, 115] analyzes the decaying behavior of variances
of the aggregated processes X(m) introduced earlier, with m the block size. From
Equation 2.2 in Section 2.2, a self-similar process X satisfies:
log(V ar(X(m))) ∝ −β log(m),m→∞ (2.3)
where β = 2(1 − H). Thus by linearly fitting the plot of log(V ar(X(m))) versus
log(m), this method can estimate β and then H = 1− β/2.
R/S analysis computes H by measuring how apparent the variability of a time
series changes with the length of the time-period being considered, which can be
formally captured by the R/S statistic [50, 75]. To compute H, it divides the
process X into blocks of size n, and computes the corresponding R/S statistic
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R(n)/S(n). Because there is
E[R(n)/S(n)] ∝ nH , , n→∞ (2.4)
for self-similar processes [50], H is estimated using the slope of log(E[R(n)/S(n)])
versus log(n).
2.3.2 Measurement Results
We now present the results using three heuristics: visualization of raw data,
variance analysis and R/S analysis.
A Long-term Diurnal Pattern. Figure 2.3 visualizes the edge creation
process by plotting the number of new edges created in each second over the
one month (Day 741-771). We can clearly observe a diurnal pattern in the edge
creation process. This non-stationary behavior precludes any direct analysis of
self-similarity. We confirm this from the results of the variance and R/S analysis.
Figure 2.4 plots the values of log(V ar(X(m))) against log(m). The curve maintains
a linear shape until m reaches 104 seconds (≈ 3 hours), and then its slope changes
significantly. Similarly, Figure 2.5 plots in log-log scale individual R/S statistics
as a function of the block size n (in seconds). The red straight line shows the best
linear fit and its slope results in an H-estimate of H = 1.19, clearly outside the
allowed range of (0.5 < H < 1).
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Figure 2.3: Edge growth in sampled dataset of Renren, in terms of the number of new edges
created per second. It shows a clear diurnal pattern.
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Figure 2.4: Variance analysis of sampled
dataset of Renren: the slope changes greatly
when m>104 seconds (≈ 3 hours), preventing
direct analysis on self-similarity.
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Figure 2.5: R/S analysis of sampled dataset
of Renren: H estimation is beyond range of
self-similarity, and data shape changes
significantly for n>104 seconds (≈ 3 hours).
The appearance of such a pronounced diurnal pattern has a direct impact on
subsequent efforts to model our dataset. It suggests that models should include a
component that accounts for this expected user-generated periodic behavior.
Self-similar Fluctuations. An interesting observation from Figure 2.3 is
that the fluctuations on top of the diurnal component display a bursty behavior.
Similarly, Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show that the curve only starts to lose its line shape
when m or n exceeds 104 seconds (≈ 3 hours). Figure 2.6 shows the edge creation
events of a randomly chosen 3-hour segment (6pm-9pm, December 16, 2007). It is
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Figure 2.6: An example of edge growth of a
randomly chosen 3-hour segment in the
sampled dataset of Renren. It is highly bursty,
appears stationary and suggests further
exploration for self-similar scaling behavior.
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Figure 2.7: Estimates of H by both
Variance and R/S analysis on disjoint 3-hour
segments in the sampled dataset of Renren,
where 98%+ of H estimates fall within (0.5,1).
highly bursty, appears stationary and could therefore exhibit self-similar scaling
behavior. Together, these observations suggest that over time scales not signifi-
cantly impacted by the observed diurnal patterns (i.e. a few hours and below),
the edge creation process may be consistent with self-similar scaling behavior.
We confirm this intuition by performing variance and R/S analysis on each 3-
hour log segment and computing its H value. Figure 2.7 plots the results over the
entire month as 248 disjoint 3-hour segments. H estimates based on the variance
analysis method vary across segments, with a mean of 0.89 and variance of 0.01,
while R/S analysis remains stable, with mean of 0.68 and variance 0.001. For both
methods, overwhelming majority of segments (98.4% for variance, 99.5% for R/S)
estimate H within (0.5 < H < 1). These results suggest that the Renren edge
creation process exhibits self-similarity over time scales ranging from seconds to
hours.
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2.3.3 The Reliability of our H Estimates
In our analysis, we encountered potential issues regarding the reliability of
H-estimates using the variance and R/S analysis methods. For some segments,
the methods produced poorly-fitting linear regression lines, which in turn resulted
in highly questionable estimates of H. Figure 2.8 shows an example of such a
“problematic” segment (6-9am, December 6, 2007), where the line fitting is poor
via variance analysis. We also plot as an inset in the figure the raw edge growth
during the time period, which shows a clearly non-stationary event. We further
study these events in Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 2.8: An example of poor line fitting in variance analysis, which has poor R2=0.0458.
This is also confirmed by the inset which displays the raw edge growth during the
corresponding time period, and shows a clearly non-stationary event.
To quantify the impact of such poor data fitting on the obtained H estimates,
we compute the coefficient of determination R2 for each segment. R2 measures
how well the observed data points are represented by a straight line. Like [50],
we use the criterion of R2 > 0.9 to indicate that the fitting is sufficiently good to
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provide a reliable H estimate. 38.3% of all segments have unreliable H estimates
by R/S analysis vs. 71.0% by variance analysis! Prior studies have reported
similar reliability issues [64, 141].
2.3.4 Summary of Observations
Our initial analysis led to three main findings. First, the Renren edge creation
displays a typical diurnal pattern in user activity that makes the process inherently
non-stationary, preventing a direct analysis of self-similarity. This suggests that
any accurate model of Renren’s edge creation process must include a component
that explicitly account for this periodic behavior. Second, local fluctuations on top
of the periodic component display behavior that indicates potential self-similarity.
Finally, we find that two commonly-used methods, i.e. variance and R/S analysis
methods, cannot provide reliable H-estimates for real data that displays non-
stationary patterns.
Thus, our next step is to avoid most of the encountered problems by applying
a more rigorous method for systematically analyzing data with potential scaling
behavior that has strong robustness properties with respect to underlying non-
stationary patterns, and results in H-estimates with known statistical properties
(e.g., confidence intervals).
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2.4 Wavelet-based Analysis
Following our initial analysis, in this section we apply a more rigorous wavelet-
based method to systematically study potential self-similar scaling behavior ex-
hibited by our dataset. This method has strong robustness against underlying
non-stationary patterns and can provide H-estimates with confidence intervals.
To this end, we first briefly introduce the wavelet method and then present our
findings.
2.4.1 The Wavelet Method
Estimation errors of the variance and R/S analysis methods can be attributed
to their “eyeballing” approach when attempting to identify self-similarity in highly
variable data. In contrast, the wavelet-based method offers a principled and rig-
orous analysis of a given dataset’s scaling property by isolating characteristics of
data via a combined scale-time presentation. In turn, it provides a more reliable
self-similarity analysis [5].
In short, wavelet-based analysis represents a process X by a sequence of sub-
spaces {Wj}j∈Z where Wj is at a finer scale than Wj−1 (Wj ⊂ Wj−1). This way,
it can reveal detailed properties of X at different time scales. If X is self-similar,
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its projection on the Wj subspace Γj, satisfies:
E[Γj] ∼ |2−jv0|1−2H (2.5)
Here 2−jv0 represents the reference frequency of the jth subspace Wj while v0 is
the reference frequency of the root subspace W0. One can estimate the Hurst
parameter H by plotting E[Γj] vs. j on a log-log scale and applying linear regres-
sion.
We estimate H using the wavelet software developed [5] for self-similarity anal-
ysis. By carefully choosing the number of vanishing moments N that controls v0,
the tool can systematically detect and remove the impact of various types of de-
terministic trends in the dataset. Furthermore, it also relies on known theoretical
properties of the resulting H-estimate to provide confidence interval (CI) for H.
In the analysis of our dataset, we choose the value of N that produces both a
good fit and the smallest confidence interval.
2.4.2 Measurement Results
We seek to confirm and substantiate our preliminary results that show prop-
erties consistent with self-similar scaling in our Renren dataset. We divide our
sampled dataset into disjointed segments of lengths between 3 and 12 hours and
apply the wavelet-based analysis to each segment. In our analysis, we refer to a
segment as “abnormal” if its H estimate (including its 95% confidence interval)
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Figure 2.9: Wavelet analysis on data
segments with segment length = 3 hours
(sampled dataset of Renren).
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Figure 2.10: Wavelet analysis on data
segments with segment length = 6 hours
(sampled dataset of Renren).
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
H
 V
al
ue
# of Segments
Figure 2.11: Wavelet analysis on data
segments with segment length = 9 hours
(sampled dataset of Renren).
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Figure 2.12: Wavelet analysis on data
segments with segment length = 12 hours
(sampled dataset of Renren).
does not completely fall within the self-similar range (0.5, 1). Our analysis leads
to two key findings.
Self-similarity Over Time Scales from Seconds to Hours. Our analysis
confirms that over time scales ranging from seconds to a few hours, Renren’s
edge creation process exhibit properties consistent with self-similar scaling. As
an example, Figure 2.9 shows the H-estimates with their 95% confidence interval
for all 248 3-hour long segments. Only 5 segments are abnormal, while the rest
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Start Time Shift
Normal Segments Abnormal Segment
H mean H variance Portion
0 hour 0.631 0.002 2.02%
1 hour 0.633 0.002 2.43%
2 hours 0.629 0.002 2.02%
Table 2.2: Statistics of wavelet analysis on 3-hour segments with start time shifts. (sampled
dataset of Renren)
(98%) consistently produces H-estimates within (0.5, 1), and tightly clustered
around H = 0.63.
To examine the robustness of our results, we check different segment compo-
sitions by shifting the start time of each segment by 0, 1, and 2 hours separately.
From the summarized results in Table 2.2, we notice the stability in the mean
(0.63) and variance (0.002) of H-estimates for normal segments, and also the por-
tion of segments deemed abnormal (2.02% ∼ 2.43%) These results provide further
evidence that Renren’s edge creation process behaves properties consistent with
self-similar scaling over time scales from seconds to a few hours.
Scaling Behavior over Larger Time Scales. We observe that the num-
ber of abnormal segments increases as the segment size increases. Figure 2.10
to Figure 2.12 plot the H-estimates across all segments for segment lengths of
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6, 9 and 12 hours. The ratio of abnormal segments increases to 8.1% for 6-hour
segments, and up to 32.3% for 12-hour ones. It confirms our earlier conclusion
that the properties consistent with self-similar scaling weaken in Renren’s edge
creation process, when viewed over larger time scales. This phenomenon is per-
haps due to the presence of harder-to-account-for non-stationary patterns, such
as heteroscedasticity (i.e. edge creation in Renren is more variable during peak
hours than during low hours).
Patterns of Abnormal Segments. We also wish to understand patterns and
potential causes for the observed abnormal segments. We find that these abnormal
segments are randomly distributed across days, and within a day, around 60% of
them appear during 6pm-9pm when Renren users are most active (the number of
edges created account for 23% of the whole day).
We also find that abnormal segments are caused by sudden changes in the
edge growth process. Based on the edge growth patterns, we are able to clas-
sify abnormal segments into three types, shown in Figure 2.13 to Figure 2.15.
These include level shift, where the volume of edge growth suddenly increases (or
decreases), momentary drop where the growth experiences a short period of ex-
tremely low activity, and ramp up/down where the edge activity quickly increases
or decreases in the segment.
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Figure 2.13: Examples of abnormal
segments in terms of level shift, where the
red dot boxes show the unusual edge creation
events (sampled dataset of Renren).
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Figure 2.14: Examples of abnormal segments
in terms of momentary outage, where the
red dot boxes show the unusual edge creation
events (sampled dataset of Renren).
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
# 
of
 E
dg
es
 C
re
at
ed
Time (Second)
Figure 2.15: Examples of abnormal segments in terms of ramp up/down, where the red
dot boxes show the unusual edge creation events (sampled dataset of Renren).
Our collaborators at Renren have confirmed that while per hour identification
is difficult, it is possible that at least some of these abnormal events match changes
to the site and its features. Intuitively, level shifts and momentary drops might
be caused by new features or localized failures, and ramp up/down events might
correspond to ad promotions to increase user membership. We are working with
Renren to further confirm this.
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Figure 2.16: The H-estimates of all the disjoint 3-hour segments between September -
December 2007 of the Renren dataset, after performing wavelet analysis on the entire dataset
without sampling (full Renren). The results align with those with sampling (labeled as
“sampled dataset of Renren” in caption).
2.4.3 Analysis Without Sampling
Finally, we expand our analysis to consider the full, unsampled dataset. This
is to examine whether the observed property consistent with self-similar scaling
on the sampled data still present after including new nodes with rapid (and non-
stationary) edge growth.
We first consider the complete dataset from the month of December 2007. In-
terestingly, 97% of the 3-hour segments produce H estimates within the self-similar
range, with mean H = 0.65. We show detailed H estimates in Figure 2.16, which
are highly consistent with our prior analysis on the sampled dataset (Figure 2.9).
The only minor difference is two additional abnormal segments, possibly caused
by non-stationary edge growth of the new nodes.
Next, we examine all edge events in the year of 2007. Again, we get consistent
results: H-estimates of 97% of the 3-hour segments fall into the self-similar range,
with mean H = 0.64. Figure 2.16 shows H-estimates for September-December
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2007 (due to the space limit), which are representative of all other months. To-
gether, these results suggest with high possibility, that the same self-similar prop-
erty is present consistently throughout time. These results also confirm the high
reliability of the wavelet method in self-similarity detection.
2.4.4 Summary
We apply the more reliable and accurate wavelet method to detect self-similarity
at different time scales in Renren’s edge creation process. The outcomes confirm
prior observations from R/S and variance results, with high confidence, that the
property consistent with self-similar scaling lasts to several hours. This property
also holds for our full, unsampled dataset (after the network merge).
2.5 Validation via Facebook Dataset
One reasonable question is whether our results are strongly biased by our choice
of dataset, i.e. property consistent with self-similarity is only present in Renren
network. Here, we validate our findings using the Facebook wall post dataset [72].
Recall that for self-similar property to be detectable, a dataset must cover tem-
poral events in fine granularity and have sufficient event frequency to provide
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Figure 2.17: An example of edge growth of a randomly chosen 3-week data (Facebook).
meaningful statistics. To our knowledge, the Facebook wall post dataset [72] is
the only dataset aside from our Renren dataset that meets these requirements.
As Figure 3.6 shows, like Renren, the number of edge creations in Facebook
dataset increases significantly at the beginning and stabilizes around day 750. To
eliminate the impact of this obvious non-stationary increasing trend, we focus
on the edge creation process after day 750 (for a total duration of 841 days).
Compared to Renren, this dataset is much more sparse, and per-second level
analysis does not show any meaningful statistics (only 1.15% of non-zero data
points). Thus we enlarge the time unit for analysis to 120 seconds, where the
resulting ratio of non-zero data points (61.18%) is comparable to that of Renren
(61.46%).
Following analysis in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, we start by visualizing the
raw data in Facebook dataset, and then apply the variance, R/S and wavelet
analysis methods to see whether any property consistent with self-similar scaling
exists across the whole time range. Figure 2.17 shows a random sample of three
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Figure 2.18: Variance analysis on the entire
data: doubtable fitting with curves around
103 units (Facebook).
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Figure 2.19: R/S analysis on the entire data:
doubtable fitting since the shape changes
greatly after 103 units (Facebook).
successive weeks (from day 762 - day 782) in the edge creation process, which
displays a clear weekly pattern. Similarly, this obvious non-stationary behavior
precludes any direct analysis on self-similarity. We also confirm this using the R/S
and variance analysis methods, where three successive weeks random the estimated
H values are 0.5779 and 0.8940 respectively. Although these H-estimates are
within the self-similar range (0.5, 1), Figure 2.18 and 2.19 show that the two
methods have poor data fitting, resulting in unreliable estimations on H. On
the other hand, the wavelet analysis produces a H value of 1.11, indicating that
there is no property consistent with self-similarity across the entire time range.
Together, all these results suggest over the time scale up to years, we cannot
reliably detect self-similarity properties in Facebook dataset.
Next, we explore whether the dataset displays self-similar scaling properties on
shorter time scales. We split the entire dataset into fixed size segments of length
varying between 1 to 7 days, and apply the wavelet analysis to each segment.
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Figure 2.20: Wavelet analysis on data
segments with segment length = 3.5 days
(Facebook).
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Figure 2.21: Wavelet analysis on data
segments with segment length = 5 days
(Facebook).
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Figure 2.22: Wavelet analysis on data segments with segment length = 7 days
(Facebook).
Figure 2.20 to Figure 2.22 plot the H-estimates with their 95% CI at segment
length of 3.5 days, 5 days and 7 days respectively.
We obtain two key observations. First, we observe strong self-similarity prop-
erties over the time scale between minutes and days. Figure 2.20 shows that
98.35% of 3.5-day segments have H values with 95% CI falling into range (0.5, 1),
centered around H = 0.61. And by shifting start times of segments, the consistent
results in Table 2.3 further confirm this observation.
Second, the portion of abnormal segments (whose H estimates are out of
(0.5, 1)) increases with segment length, i.e. 1.65% for 3.5 days, 5.95% for 5 days
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Start Time Shift
Normal Segments Abnormal Segment
H mean H variance Portion
0 day 0.612 0.001 1.65%
1 day 0.611 0.001 2.07%
2 days 0.611 0.001 2.07%
3 days 0.613 0.001 3.32%
Table 2.3: Statistics of wavelet analysis on 3.5-day segments with start time shifts
(Facebook).
and 26.45% for 7 days. A detailed analysis on the dataset shows that this is
mostly caused by a weekly pattern (as shown in Figure 2.17) of user activities
which dominates at larger time scales.
In summary, our results on the Facebook dataset align very well with our
observations from the Renren dataset. Due to the existence of non-stationary
patterns introduced by human behaviors, e.g. diurnal or weekly user activities,
properties consistent with self-similar scaling exist, but only hold over certain time
ranges, and gradually weaken at larger time scales.
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2.6 A Model of Network Dynamics
Motivated by our self-similarity analysis of Renren and Facebook’s edge cre-
ation process, we next seek to build a complete model of social network dynamics.
Our proposed model includes two components: a temporal component that pro-
duces a sequence of time-stamped events defining when and how many new edges
are formed in a given time interval, and a spatial component defining where in the
graph these new edge creations take place (i.e. which nodes are involved). Ideally,
the model should produce synthetic dynamic graphs whose edge creation will dis-
play deterministic non-stationary periodic patterns (e.g. diurnal or weekly user
activities) and properties consistent with self-similarity, and whose graph struc-
tural changes match those observed from the original data and account for key
spatial properties, e.g. graph densification, path shrinkage and local decluster-
ing [161]. Next, we explain the model in detail and provide validation in Section
2.7.
2.6.1 The Temporal Component
Our analysis in Section 2.3, Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 show that for both
Renren and Facebook datasets, the edge creation process displays a combination
of deterministic non-stationary periodic patterns, i.e. diurnal or weekly user ac-
tivities, and property consistent with self-similarity. These observations motivate
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designing the temporal component of our model as a combination of two sub-
modules: a non-stationary module that captures the predictable cycles in user
activities, e.g. daily or weekly cycles, and a self-similar module that parsimo-
niously accounts for the inherent burstiness in user edge creations over certain
time scales, e.g. from seconds to a few hours.
The Self-Similar Module. Prior work has demonstrated two effective meth-
ods for producing self-similar traffic. The first method aggregates many ON/OFF
processes and under certain conditions, the superposition process displays a self-
similar scaling [152, 50]. In particular, this construction requires statistical knowl-
edge of the ON and OFF periods and assumes that either of those periods are
modeled by a heavy-tailed distributions. The second method is based on the
M |G|∞ queuing model [35, 151]. Here, each source arrives according to a Poisson
process, and the distribution of its active time is assumed to be heavy-tailed, e.g.
the Pareto distribution. During its active time, each source is assumed to operate
at a constant rate. Then the resulting count process {Nt, t = 0, 1, 2, ...}, where
Nt is the number of active sources at time t, is self-similar. In other words, by
multiplexing sources with Poisson arrivals and heavy-tailed active times, one can
produce a self-similar process.
Examining our two datasets in more detail shows that the M |G|∞-based
method provides an intuitive way and a good fit for modeling edge creation. For
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Figure 2.23: CCDF of # of edges created per user in Dec. 2007 in Renren dataset.
one, we observe that over time, the number of edges created per user follows a
heavy-tailed distribution. For example, Figure 2.23 plots the distribution of the
number of edges created per Renren user during December 2007, which can be
approximated as a heavy-tailed pattern. Moreover, assuming each user creates
edges at a constant rate, the active time of a user is directly proportional to the
number of edges that user created. This in turn implies that each user’s active
time also follows a heavy-tailed distribution, consistent with the M |G|∞-based
construction of self-similar processes.
Based on this intuition, we build the self-similar module based on a standard
M |G|∞ process [35]. Users arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ.
Upon arrival, each user independently starts its active time duration Ti (seconds)
chosen from a Pareto distribution:
P (X > x) = (
xm
x
)α, x ≥ xm, 1 < α < 2 (2.6)
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Assuming that each user creates edges at a constant rate γ/s, we can calculate the
total expected number of edges created by user i by Ti · γ. Since an edge creation
involves two users, we derive the number of edges St created at time t from the
number of active users Nt:
St = γ ·Nt/2 (2.7)
The time series {St, t = 0s, 1s, 2s, ...} defines the self-similar module of the tem-
poral component of our model.
The Non-stationary Module. We extract the deterministic non-stationary
periodic component by subtracting the self-similar component from the original
edge creation process. Suppose the number of original edge creation is Ot at time
t. Then the subtraction produces a process:
Ut = Ot − St, t = 0s, 1s, 2s, ... (2.8)
Next we apply a sliding window over Ut to obtain a smooth deterministic process
and then fit it with a periodic function, i.e. Sine, to produceDt, the non-stationary
module of the temporal component of our model.
Integrating the Two Modules. We combine St and Dt and obtain our
targeted edge creation process Et:
Et = St +Dt, t = 0s, 1s, 2s, ... (2.9)
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Since the non-stationary periodic component Dt may generate negative values,
we set a minimum for the sum to be 0. Note that we designed this temporal
component to describe new edge creations aggregated across all the users.
Importantly, this temporal component only generates timestamps of new edges
(in terms of the total number of edges created in each second), but does not
associate any of these new edges to specific users. In other words, the temporal
component will produce the total number of edges created in each second, but
will not predict which nodes created these edges. This is because we design the
temporal component to specifically capture the edge dynamics aggregated across
all the users, i.e. property consistent with self-similar scaling and deterministic
non-stationary periodic user patterns. The actual distribution or mapping of edge
events across users is performed by the spatial component of our model, which we
will describe in Section 2.6.2.
2.6.2 The Spatial Component
To determine where each new edge is created as part of the overall network
evolution process, we first highlight two key observations made by our prior anal-
ysis on the Renren network [161]. First, after an initial bursty growth phase, new
edge creation was dominated by existing nodes (>80%). This empirical result
diverges from generative models, which assume that new node arrivals drive edge
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creation regardless of network size. Second, we observe three structural proper-
ties over time: graph densification, distance shrinkage, and high but decreasing
clustering coefficient (CC). Existing graph models [9, 10, 25, 84] capture only a
subset of them.
Intuition. We consider a stable social network in a state of ongoing growth7.
After a fast initial period of explosive growth, the arrival rate of new users becomes
relatively small compared to existing users. At this point, continuous friend dis-
covery between existing users dwarfs the initial bursts of edge creations triggered
by new user arrivals. Therefore, in our model, we use interarrival gaps between
new users as iterations to drive the formation of new edges between existing users.
With these in mind, our model will focus on the creation of edges between
existing users following the arrival of each new user. Specifically, we assume a
new user ui creates an edge before the arrival of the next user ui+1, and after this
edge creation ui immediately becomes an “existing user.” We hypothesize that
existing users are often introduced to groups of friends, either discovering the
presence of an oﬄine friend (and other mutual friends), or creating new groups
of friends via common interests or social applications. To capture this intuition,
in each iteration, our model selects two existing nodes u and v at random, and
connects u repeatedly to multiple users in v’s neighborhood. Here v can be an
7Note that our model explicitly targets the ongoing growth phase of a social network. We
leave the measurement, analysis, and modeling of a network in decline for future work.
53
Analyzing and Modeling Graph Dynamics Chapter 2
existing friend of u or a previously unknown “stranger.” The continuous formation
of random connections between existing users shrinks average path lengths and
lowers clustering coefficient by building shortcuts between nodes, while connecting
friends of friends slows the rate of declustering.
Model Details. The spatial component is strongly dependent on the temporal
component to determine the maximum number of edges created in any iteration
(i.e. between two node arrivals). Let F (n) represent the number of edges in the
network when the network contains n nodes. Then F (i + 1) − F (i) represents
the total number of edges created between the arrivals of ui and ui+1. With the
knowledge of node arrival time statistics, i.e. ti and ti+1, we can estimate the total
number of edges k created between ti and ti+1 as k = F (i+ 1)−F (i) =
∑ti+1
t=ti
Et.
Specifically, our proposed edge formation process is defined as follows. We
drive the process using a parameter p, which defines the probability a node is
selected in the recursive edge creation process between existing nodes.
Algorithm 2.1 Spatial Component of Network Growth.
1. When a new node ui joins the network, k = F (i+ 1)− F (i).
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2. Edge creation by the new node: The new node ui randomly select an
existing node uj to connect. Set k = k − 1. Now ui becomes an existing
node.
3. Edge creation between existing nodes: Randomly select two existing
nodes u and v. If they are not connected, connect them and set k = k − 1.
Then u starts steps (a)-(c) to connect neighbors of v and repeat them until
all the required edges have been created (i.e. k = 0) or there are no more
nodes to connect. Each time an edge is created, set k = k − 1.
(a) Generate a random number x following the geometric distribution with
mean (1− p)−1.
(b) Randomly select neighbors of v that do not connect u until reaching
any of the three situations:
i. x neighbors are selected;
ii. no more edges need to be created, i.e. k=0;
iii. all available neighbors of v are selected. Let R={r1, r2, . . . } be
the set of selected nodes.
(c) For each node ri ∈ R, u connects ri and repeats steps (a)-(b) on ri.
4. If more edges need to be created (k 6= 0), repeat step (3).
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Comparison to Existing Models. The existing model most similar to
our new model is the Forest Fire model [84], which simulates network growth
by creating edges between each new node to a set of existing nodes. A new
node joining the network randomly connects to an existing node and some of its
neighbors; this repeats across the network, like a fire burning through a forest.
This “burning process” and our recursive edge creation process between existing
nodes both act to produce high clustering coefficient, by recursively connecting to
neighbors of neighbors.
Three key differences separate our model from Forest Fire. First, our model
captures the observation that existing nodes drive edge creation in a stable growth
network. Second, our model produces decreasing clustering coefficient by connect-
ing pairs of random existing nodes. Forest Fire does not capture this property
because it always forms close triangles in each node’s neighborhood, leading to rel-
atively high clustering coefficient unlikely to decrease over time. Third, our model
can be accurately calibrated to the observed dynamics of an existing network
trace, by incorporating the network growth function from the temporal model.
This additional flexibility makes it more attractive for generating realistic dy-
namic network traces.
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2.7 Model Validation
Having described our proposed model for network edge dynamics in Sec-
tion 2.6, we next validate the proposed network dynamic model. We calibrate
the model using real data and use it to generate synthetic dynamic graphs, and
then compare these synthetic graphs to the original data in terms of both temporal
and spatial properties.
Since the temporal and spatial components are complementary and operate
at different scales, we validate them sequentially to examine their contributions
to network evolution. Because the output of the temporal component is used as
an input to the spatial component, the validation on the spatial component also
serves as validation of the complete model with both components.
Our validation results on the Renren and Facebook datasets lead to the same
observations. For brevity, we present the Renren results in detail in Section 2.7.1
and 2.7.2, and summarize the Facebook results briefly in Section 2.7.3.
2.7.1 Validating the Temporal Component
Our validation is first based on the Renren dataset of the month of Decem-
ber 2007, the same datasets used in our self-similarity analysis (Section 2.3 and
Section 2.4). We leave the validation of Facebook dataset to Section 2.7.3.
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To validate our model, we first describe how we calibrate the model using the
Renren dataset. As explained in Section 2.6.1, the temporal component consists
of two sub-modules: a self-similar module (i.e. stationary stochastic process) and
a non-stationary module (i.e. non-stationary deterministic function).
Calibrating the Self-Similar Module. We construct the self-similar module
according to the M |G|∞ model described earlier. That is, nodes arrive according
to a Poisson process with rate λ, and the length of each node’s active time is
chosen independently from a Pareto distribution with parameters α and xm.
Consider the Renren edge creation data collected in December 2007 where
7, 246, 621 nodes have created edges. We estimate the corresponding value of rate
λ in the Poisson process of this period by the average active node count per second,
i.e. λ ≈ 2.7/s.
To derive the active time (in seconds) statistics, we leverage a proven relation-
ship between H and α [35, 75]: H = (3 − α)/2. Since our measured H-estimate
for the December 2007 data is around 0.65, we set α = 1.7.
Finally, assuming a node creates edges at a constant rate of 1/s, the average
number of edges created per node is then equal to the average active time across
all the nodes, which can be calculated as the mean of the Pareto distribution, i.e.
xm ∗ α/(α − 1). By measuring the average edges created per node in December
2007, we get xm ≈ 3.2.
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Using the M |G|∞-based method with λ = 2.7/s, α = 1.7 and xm = 3.2, we
generate a synthetic trace that represents the edge creation process contributed
by the self-similar module. Figure 2.24 plots a randomly chosen 3-hour segment
in the synthetic trace, which displays burstiness similar to the original data. By
applying the earlier-described R/S, variance and wavelet analysis methods, we
get H-estimates 0.68, 0.63 (both with a good line fitting) and 0.69 (with the 95%
confidence interval 0.0099), respectively. The graphical fitting in Figure 2.25 and
Figure 2.26 show that both variance analysis and R/S method have good fit. All
these validate that the resulting trace is indeed consistent with the designed-for
self-similar scaling behavior (i.e. H = 0.65).
Calibrating the Non-stationary Module. To calibrate the non-stationary
module, we first subtract the synthetic trace generated by the self-similar module
from the original edge creation data. We then apply a sliding window (with a
window size of 1 hour and a step size of 1 second) to smooth the subtraction result
over time. One sample of the smoothed data (for December 2007) is shown by
the blue curve in Figure 2.27, displaying a daily pattern with almost 0 mean. The
blue curve is well-fitted by the sine function: 9.70 sin(7.27 · 10−5 t+ 3.56)− 0.003,
shown as the red curve.
Validation Results. We sum the synthetic traces produced by the above two
sub-modules to build a single synthetic edge creation trace, and then compare this
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Figure 2.24: An example of edge growth of a randomly chosen 3-hour segment in the
synthetic self-similar module (Renren).
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Figure 2.25: Variance analysis of synthetic
self-similar module: H estimation = 0.67, and
in good linear fitting (Renren).
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Figure 2.26: R/S analysis of synthetic
self-similar module: H estimation = 0.63, and
in good linear fitting (Renren).
combined trace to the original data. Repeating the process 5 times produces very
consistent outcomes, e.g. the total edge counts are similar, with an average ratio
between the synthetic and the original trace of 1.007 and variance < 10−6. Fig-
ure 2.28 plots a sample of one synthetic trace together with the original trace (for
December 2007) and illustrates that the synthetic data displays diurnal patterns
similar to the original data.
We further compare the synthetic and original traces by performing on the
synthetic trace the same self-similarity analysis that we applied in Section 2.3
and Section 2.4 on the original trace. Figures 2.29 (variance analysis) and 2.30
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Figure 2.27: The synthetic non-stationary
module (red curve) well captured the
smoothed diurnal pattern in the original
dataset (blue curve) (Renren).
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Figure 2.28: Synthetic trace by our
temporal component (red) vs. original edge
creation process (blue) (Renren).
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Figure 2.29: Variance analysis of the entire
synthetic trace: like the original data, slope
also changes for m>104 seconds (≈ 3 hours)
(Renren).
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Figure 2.30: R/S analysis of the entire
synthetic trace: like the original data,
H-estimate is beyond the self-similar range,
and data shape changes n>104 seconds (≈ 3
hours) (Renren).
(R/S analysis) demonstrate that the synthetic trace exhibits the very same issues
that plagued our preliminary analysis of the original data; e.g. scaling behavior
changes drastically for time scales larger than a few hours, H estimation is outside
the theoretical range (0.5, 1.0), and thus non-stationary diurnal patterns prevent
a direct scaling analysis of the data.
Next we apply the wavelet-based analysis method to examine the self-similar
nature of the synthetic trace over 3-hour segments. Figure 2.31 plots the resulting
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Figure 2.31: Wavelet analysis on 3-hour segments of synthetic trace. Like the original data,
the vast majority of segments have estimated H within (0.5,1) (Renren).
H-estimates for each segment with 95% CI. We see that the H-estimates for the
synthetic trace also fall consistently between (0.5, 1) with an exception of 4.03%,
which closely matches the 3% exception seen from the original data. The average
H value for the synthetic trace is around 0.75, again similar to that of the original
trace (mean H = 0.65) as shown in Figure 2.9. Finally, we evaluate the robustness
of our results by shifting the starting time of each segment by 0, 1, and 2 hours
separately, and find both the abnormal segment ratios and H estimates remain
stable (we omit the results for brevity). Thus we conclude that the original trace
and the synthetic traces are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
Together, these results demonstrate that the temporal component of our model
can accurately capture the diurnal patterns and self-similar scaling behavior dis-
played by the original Renren data. Furthermore, the contributions of the two
sub-modules illustrate why and how the presence of deterministic non-stationary
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Figure 2.32: Network growth of the synthetic trace generated by the temporal component vs.
the original data (Renren).
periodic trends like diurnal user activity patterns impacts any direct scaling anal-
ysis of such non-stationary data.
Connecting the Temporal and Spatial Components. Recall that the
spatial component of our model uses the temporal component to compute the
number of edges created between each pair of node arrivals. As a result, we need
to be able to accurately estimate the arrival time of each node. From our ex-
ploratory analysis, we noticed no specific properties of the node arrival process
other than that it is largely consistent with a Poisson process with rate λnew, where
λnew is estimated as the average number of new node arrivals per second.8 Fig-
ure 2.32 shows that our solution can accurately predict the network edge growth
in December 2007.
8This is analogous to the observation in [115] that while packet arrivals in network traffic
appear better modeled using self-similar processes, Poisson effectively captures user session
arrivals.
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Graph # of Nodes # of Edges Avg. Deg Avg. path Avg. CC
2006 Original 624,364 8,258,266 26.45 4.16 0.159
2006 Synthetic 624,364 8,721,927 27.93 4.46 0.183
2007 Original 1,751,146 18,203,520 20.79 4.87 0.156
2007 Synthetic 1,751,146 18,305,972 20.9 4.84 0.161
Table 2.4: Statistics of the original graph and the synthetic graph generated by our spatial
component for Renren dataset. The 2006 graphs are built before December 12, 2006; the 2007
graphs are built for January - February, 2007.
2.7.2 Validating the Spatial Component
Next, we validate our spatial component. Ideally, we would calibrate the
model using the entire Renren dataset (from November 21, 2005 to December
31, 2007) and produce synthetic traces for the entire 25-month period. However,
using the entire dataset is impractical for two reasons. First, due to the size
of the network at the end of the 25-month period (i.e. 10.6M nodes and 199M
edges), the calibration process would be computationally prohibitive. Second, the
merge event on December 12, 2006 introduced significant changes to the network,
impacting any analysis of the network’s dynamics.
As a viable practical alternative, we use two subsets of the Renren data for
validation. The first segment (referred to as 2006 Original) covers the period from
the launch of the network (November 21, 2005) till right before the merge event
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Figure 2.33: Fitting of network growth with the network edge growth function F (n)
(Renren).
(December 11, 2006). The corresponding last snapshot of the graph includes
624K nodes and 8M edges. This represents the “early” period of the network.
The second segment (2007 Original) covers the first two months of 2007, with
the snapshot on December 31, 2006 as the initial graph, and its last snapshot
has 1.75M nodes and 18M edges. This represents the “stable growth” period of
the network. Table 2.4 summarizes the observed network statistics for the two
segments.
Spatial Component Calibration. We calibrate the component for the two
segments separately. As discussed in Section 2.6.2, the spatial component has two
parameters: network edge growth function F (n) and node selection probability p.
For the 2007 segment, we derive F (n) from the temporal component. For the 2006
segment, however, we have to manually fit the network growth by a polynomial
function. This is because our measurement shows that in 2006 the network is
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not stable and large enough to display significant temporal patterns. Figure 2.33
shows the F (n) estimation results for both segments, which closely match the
original data.
Next, we follow the methodology by [127] to determine p. We generate a series
of synthetic graphs with p varying between (0.1, 0.9), and choose the best p value
that produces graphs with network distance and clustering coefficient most similar
to the original data. The resulting p values are different for the two segments: 0.7
for the 2006 segment and 0.5 for the 2007 segment.
Validation Results. Using the calibrated component, we generate syn-
thetic dynamic graphs for the two data segments. As shown in Table 2.4, the
synthetic graphs statistically match the original graphs in the corresponding last
snapshot, in term of average degree, average path length and average clustering
coefficient (CC). The emphasis of our validation is to understand whether syn-
thetic graphs display the three dynamic properties observed from the Renren social
network [161]: graph densification, average path length shrinkage and decreasing
clustering coefficient.
Using the network growth function F (n), Figure 2.33 confirms that the syn-
thetic graphs can accurately capture the densification property. Thus in the fol-
lowing, we focus on evaluating dynamics of average path length and average clus-
tering coefficient in synthetic graphs. As a reference, we also include the results
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Figure 2.34: Average path length on generated synthetic graphs and the original Renren
graph. Include two time periods from the very beginning to December 11, 2006 and in January
- February, 2007 (to avoid the one-time merge event in Renren with another OSN). (Original:
Renren graph; Spatial Component: graph generated by our spatial component; PA: graph
generated by the preferential attachment model; Forest Fire: graph generated by the Forest
Fire model).
using the Preferential Attachment model [17], which is the most popular static
graph model, and the Forest Fire model [84]9.
We repeated our experiments five times for all three models, and obtained con-
sistent results, with the variance across all runs at least three orders of magnitude
smaller than the average value. Thus for brevity we only show the result for a
single run.
Average Path Length Evolution: Figure 2.34 plots the average path length over
time using our spatial component, the Preferential Attachment model, the Forest
Fire model and the original data. For the 2006 segment, our spatial component
9Following a similar procedure described by [127], we modify the Forest Fire model to produce
undirected graphs by creating undirected edges and allowing the “burning” process to proceed in
both directions of an edge. To calibrate the model, i.e. determining the burning probability p,
we sample values between (0, 1) to find the best fit p where the corresponding synthetic graphs
match the original graph the most in terms of network distance and clustering coefficient.
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Figure 2.35: Average Clustering Coefficient on generated synthetic graphs and the
original Renren graph. Include two time periods from the very beginning to December 11,
2006 and in January - February, 2007 (to avoid the one-time merge event in Renren with
another OSN). (Original: Renren graph; Spatial Component: graph generated by our spatial
component; PA: graph generated by the preferential attachment model; Forest Fire: graph
generated by the Forest Fire model).
displays the most similar pattern to the original data, where the path length
decreases first and then increases slightly, while the Preferential Attachment and
Forest Fire models produce increasing path length. For the 2007 segment, while
all four graphs display a decreasing pattern over time, our spatial component is
the closest to the original graph. In this segment, behaviors of the Preferential
Attachment and Forest Fire models change because the snapshot of the original
data on December 31, 2006 is used as the initial graph, removing the long-term
impact of preferential attachment [161] that produces increasing average path
length over time.
Average Clustering Coefficient Evolution: Figure 2.35 plots the results for
the average clustering coefficient from the three models and the original data. For
the 2006 segment, only our spatial component behaves similarly to the original
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data, with an average clustering coefficient in (0.15, 0.22), while that of the Pref-
erential Attachment model stays closely to 0 and the Forest Fire model remains
above 0.4. For the 2007 segment, again our spatial component produces nearly
identical value of the original data, while the results of the Preferential Attach-
ment and Forest Fire model deviate largely. Together, these results confirm three
key findings. First, our spatial component can accurately capture the significant
local connectivity and the slowly decreasing clustering coefficient. Second, the
Preferential Attachment model is unable to maintain high clustering coefficient
over time, even when growing from a highly clustered graph. Finally, as indicated
by our earlier analysis, the Forest Fire model produces relatively high cluster-
ing coefficient, unable to capture the key properties of Renren such as decreasing
clustering coefficient.
Summary of Results. Our validation confirms that the spatial component
can accurately capture key dynamic features observed in Renren dataset. Since
our 2007 synthetic trace takes input from the temporal component of our model,
the spatial component validation also provides an overall validation of our pro-
posed model.
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2.7.3 Facebook Results
We now briefly summarize how we validate our model using the Facebook
dataset, since the methodology is very similar to what is applied to the Renren
dataset. Like Renren, our results on Facebook datasets also strongly validate the
effectiveness of our model.
First, we validate the temporal component by calibrating the self-similar mod-
ule and the non-stationary module, and then producing a synthetic edge creation
trace (repeated 5 times). The total edge count matches the original data, i.e.
the average ratio between the original and synthetic traces is 1.05 with variance
< 10−5. The wavelet-based analysis on the synthetic traces leads to results consis-
tent with that of the original trace. Specifically, for 3-day segments, H estimates
with 95% CI fall between (0.5, 1) with an exception of < 1%. The exception ratio
(the portion of abnormal segments whose H estimates are out of (0.5,1)) grows
to 25% for 15-day segments, and 100% for 20-day segments.
Second, the spatial component for Facebook is slightly different from that of
Renren because Facebook wall posts can lead to multiple edges between a node
pair (while Renren only has one per node pair). Thus we modify our model, as well
as the Forest Fire and Preferential Attachment models, to allow duplicated edges.
We grow the three models from 0 node to the total number of nodes 46, 952 in the
Facebook dataset. We compare the synthetic traces generated by the three models
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Graph
Avg. Avg. Avg. Final avg. Final avg. Final Final
Degree Path length CC Degree Path length CC # of Edges
Facebook Original 32.293 5.760 0.101 37.357 5.630 0.108 876,993
Synthetic (our model) 32.508 3.650 0.122 37.545 3.645 0.118 881,415
Forest Fire 70.273 3.836 0.469 69.509 4.030 0.446 1,631,792
Preferential Attachment 35.960 2.890 0.012 35.986 2.996 0.006 844,812
Table 2.5: Statistics of the original Facebook graph, the synthetic graph generated by our
spatial component, by the Forest Fire model and by the Preferential Attachment model. Path
length and clustering coefficient (CC) do not consider multiple edges between node pairs. All
standard deviations are less than 4%. Columns 2-4 refer to averaged results for intermediate
graph snapshots, Columns 5-8 refer to the final graph snapshot (Facebook).
and the original data (see Table 2.5). Again, our results show that our model can
accurately capture the growth of the Facebook trace. Its average node degree
and clustering coefficient, for both intermediate and final snapshots, are almost
identical to the original data, while the Forest Fire and Preferential Attachment
models produce large deviations.
2.7.4 Summary
Our results on the Renren and Facebook datasets consistently show that our
model can successfully capture both the temporal properties of graph dynamics,
in terms of self-similar scaling and deterministic non-stationary trends in terms of
periodic patterns, and its spatial properties observed, including long-term graph
distance shrinkage and reduction in local clustering.
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2.8 Related Work
2.8.1 Self-similarity Measurements and Models.
Self-similarity describes the phenomenon where a property is preserved with
respect to scaling in space and/or time. If an object is self-similar, its parts, when
magnified, resemble the shape of the whole [114]. Previous works have studied
structural self-similarity in networks [51, 136], i.e. the scale-invariance properties
of physical structures of a graph (e.g. node degree or community size distribution)
under coarse-graining of vertices. Our work differs by studying self-similar scaling
properties on time dynamics, i.e. “temporal” self-similarity, which has not been
studied in social networks.
Self-similarity Measurements. Temporal self-similarity describes the scal-
ing properties of certain statistics (e.g., variance, R/S, wavelet coefficients, finite-
dimensional distributions) of a time series when computed at different time scales [114].
It has been detected in diverse contexts such as ecology, life sciences and stock mar-
kets [44], and was first introduced to network traffic for the purpose of modeling
the bursty characteristics observed in Ethernet LAN traffic [76, 75]. Later stud-
ies show self-similarity has also been observed in other network traffic scenarios,
including wide-area traffic [115], world wide web traffic [36], disk-level I/O [122],
HTTP traffic traces [41], variable-bit-rate video [21, 46], blog posts [48], mes-
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sages [126] and emails [44] in communication networks. Note that these empirical
studies show that in practice, self-similar property is typically observed over a
finite range of time scales [5, 46, 50], and is difficult to discern at both very small
and very large time scales.
Self-similarity Models. Generally speaking, there are two classes of self-
similar models. The first are purely mathematical models, e.g. fractional Gaus-
sian noise [100], fractional Brownian motion (FBM) [100], fractional ARIMA pro-
cesses [61] and b-model [149]. They are strictly descriptive and cannot explain
the root cause underlying the formation of self-similarity. The second class seeks
to provide physical reasons behind self-similarity. Inspired by the renewal reward
process in economics [140], the superposition of many ON/OFF sources [152, 50]
captures the observed self-similar nature of Ethernet LAN traffic, if the durations
of the ON- or OFF-periods have a heavy-tailed distribution. TheM |G|∞ queuing
model [35, 115, 114], where sources arrive according to a Poisson process and each
source is active for a duration that is described by a heavy-tailed distribution, can
also successfully explain self-similar phenomena.
2.8.2 Graph Models
In general, graph models can be classified as static graph models or dynamic
graph models.
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Static Models. We further classify static models into three sets. One set
includes feature-driven models designed to capture one or more static graph fea-
tures, e.g. small-world [150], power-law degree distribution [17, 60], and high
clustering coefficients [60]. A second set includes intent-driven models that try
to explain the underlying process of graph formation. Nearest neighbor mod-
els [145, 38, 143], Random walk models [24, 145] and copying models [71, 145]
belong to this set. Finally, a third set of models generates graphs based on graph
structural statistics instead of graph features. Kronecker graphs [80] apply Kro-
necker multiplication to generate graphs similar to real graphs. The dK-series
model [99] uses subgraph degree distributions to capture increasingly detailed
representations of graph structures. Finally, [127] proposes a general technique to
produce “realistic” synthetic graphs by calibrating graph models using real graphs.
Dynamic Models. In contrast, dynamic models aim to capture dynamic
features of graphs. [18] modifies preferential attachment model to capture graph
densification. [84] proposes a Forest Fire model to capture both graph densifi-
cation and diameter shrinking properties in networks. Later models [101, 155]
captures similar properties. The dynamic copying model captures the property of
decreasing clustering coefficients, but not the power-law degree distribution [25].
Based on graph structure statistics, [10] proposes a 3D Kronecker model. [9] is
a model based on random typing statistics to capture several graph dynamic fea-
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tures. Unlike our work, [9] is not modeled after empirical data of graph dynamics.
[78] designs a model of network evolution, but focuses on reproducing desired
structural properties in the final snapshot. Finally, [109] tries to include captur-
ing the network harshness into the model, i.e., how likely a node will be lost, but
also cares about the final structural statistics only.
2.9 Summary
Starting from the exploration of self-similarity properties, which is critical of
determining how to model graph dynamics, our work in this chapter takes a con-
crete step towards studying the detailed dynamics of social networks. We focus
on “ time-stamped” traces of network growth, i.e., network includes detailed tim-
ings of when nodes arrive and edges are created. By performing empirical studies
of network dynamics over two detailed, time-stamped traces of social networks
over multiple years, i.e., Renren dataset and Facebook wall post dataset, we have
detected that the edge creation process in both networks does perform properties
consistent with self-similar scaling. We have also quantified that such properties
hold from seconds to hours, and gradually weaken at larger time scales due to the
existence of non-stationary patterns introduced by human behaviors, e.g., diurnal
or weekly user activities.
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Specifically, we find that edge creation process in the two OSNs is non-stationary
over long-term periods, and the two traditional techniques for self-similarity de-
tection, i.e., R/S and variance methods, produce inconclusive results and are un-
suitable for measuring self-similarity in real traces in social networks. By applying
the more robust wavelet-based method against underlying non-stationary trends,
we find the edge creation process in both network traces does exhibit properties
consistent with self-similarity over time scales ranging from seconds to hours.
We leverage this new result to propose a comprehensive model of graph dy-
namics, including a temporal component that defines when and how many new
edges are formed across all the users, and a spatial component that defines where
in the graph new edges form. Our temporal component captures the coexistence of
long-term non-stationary periodic structure, e.g. diurnal or weekly patterns, and
properties consistent with self-similarity at shorter time scales, while our spatial
component is a dynamic graph model that simulates edge creation process driven
primarily by existing users, and captures graph densification, shrinking network
diameter, and decreasing local clustering.
Our detailed validation efforts on both datasets consistently show that our
model accurately captures both the temporal properties of graph dynamics, in
terms of self-similar scaling and certain deterministic non-stationary features, and
also many key dynamic structural properties of the two social graphs over time.
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By providing such a practical method for generating a realistic sequence of
time-stamped events that uniquely define the formation and evolution of a social
network in time and space, our model fills an existing void in network dynamics,
and addresses an urgent need for accurate models that account for both temporal
and spatial features in network dynamics.
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Chapter 3
Reassessing Current Status of Link
Prediction
3.1 Introduction
1 The access to real, large-scale traces of network dynamics brings us great
opportunity to rethink about some fundamental graph problems. Have they been
well addressed, or how far have we come in understanding them in real-world
scenario? What lessons can we draw from the successes (and failures) of current
studies? Can we improve them by leveraging more data? In this dissertation, we
1 ©ACM, (2016). This is the authors version of the work. It is posted here by
permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. Abbreviated version
of content in this chapter can be found in paper “Network Growth and Link Prediction
Through an Empirical Lens” [92], Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC’16),http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2987443.2987452.
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focus on the link prediction problem, i.e., the problem of predicting formation of
new edges on a given network.
Link prediction is a fundamental problem that applies to networking in nu-
merous contexts, including the Internet, the web, and online social networks. The
sheer number of studies, including proposals for algorithms and models [7, 11, 32,
52, 53, 69, 89, 90, 95, 110, 111, 120, 142, 148], underscores the importance of the
problem to a variety of applications, ranging from resource allocation in online
services to oﬄine efforts in counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism [68, 70].
As a technical problem, the efficacy of link prediction is generally not well
understood. Today, link prediction algorithms are the basis for social recommen-
dations in a wide range of social networks and applications, ranging from Facebook
and Pinterest to personal streaming on Periscope and Q&A sites like Quora. The
success of these sites and the sheer volume of prior literature lead many to be-
lieve the problem is well addressed. Only evidence to the contrary comes from
anecdotes of failed recommendations that trigger potential privacy concerns [58].
Despite years of research in this space and hundreds of publications (only a
small subset of which is cited here), there has been little opportunity to study these
proposals from an empirical perspective. Until recently, public datasets of network
dynamics have been limited to co-authorship studies and patent citation graphs,
moderate sized networks which scale up to 20K nodes and 200K edges [15, 130]. In
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contrast, algorithms developed using and validated by these datasets are targeting
dynamic networks that are two or more orders of magnitude larger, with millions
or billions of nodes and billions of edges [161].
Thankfully, things are changing with the arrival of network traces from online
social networks (OSNs). We are taking advantage of this opportunity (and avail-
ability to large traces of network dynamics) to step back and reassess the space
of link prediction algorithms from an empirical perspective. We are motivated by
questions such as:
• How far have we come in understanding network growth and predicting the un-
derlying processes that drive it? How far do we have to go?
• What lessons can we draw from the successes (and failures) of existing algo-
rithms?
• Can we improve existing approaches by leveraging more data, e.g. detailed tem-
poral network history?
In this work, we perform an empirical study using large traces of network
growth from three large OSNs, Facebook, Renren (Facebook equivalent in China),
and YouTube. In each case, detailed timestamps capture the time when specific
edges were created between nodes (users) in the network. To the best of our
knowledge, these are the only publicly available datasets suitable for this study,
both sufficiently large and with sufficiently detailed timestamps to capture graph
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dynamics. These traces cover substantial subsets of users in each network, and
in the case of Renren, the entire user population at a time when the network
included 10 million users. We discretize these traces into numerous temporal
snapshots, and use them to drive the evaluation of 18 representative link prediction
algorithms. Finally, we use our lessons and observations from analyzing these
network dynamics to build “filters” that help prune the set of candidate nodes for
edge creation. By applying these filters before link prediction, we can reduce the
search space and focus on regions of likely growth.
To better understand and compare results across prediction algorithms, we
classify them into two groups. First, Metric-based prediction algorithms define
specific metrics that can be computed for all potential links, where a potential
link with a higher score on the metric indicates a higher probability of formation.
For our analysis, we implemented 14 distinct metrics that had scalable algorithms
in existing literature. In contrast, classification-based prediction algorithms uti-
lize machine learning classifiers that take multiple metrics as input features, and
produce a prediction of likelihood of formation for each potential link. Some
methods produce a detailed probability while others produce a binary result. Ex-
periments in our study cover support vector machines (SVM), logistic regression,
naive Bayesian networks, and random forests, each using all 14 metrics as in-
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put features. Our experiments show that more complex techniques, e.g. larger
ensemble methods do not produce noticeable improvements in accuracy.
As our first result, we find that link prediction performance remains poor in
absolute terms. Correctly predicting link formation within some timeframe is
difficult, and the problem only grows harder, as each new node brings ∼N more
potential links to a network of size N . Second, we find that for each of our traces,
metric-based prediction algorithms vary significantly in accuracy. In each case, a
small subset of metric-based predictors do as well as (and occasionally outperform)
the most accurate machine learning based classifier (SVM in all cases). We note
that while a few metrics perform consistently well, no single metric predictor
consistently performs as well as SVM across all networks. Instead, there appears
to be a strong correlation between network structure and the relative success
of specific metric-based algorithms. Machine learning methods do well in part
because they automatically adjust weights across different metrics, emphasizing
those that match the targeted network without a priori knowledge of its structure.
Without such knowledge, we can either achieve “good” accuracy by choosing a
consistently strong metric, or achieve “near optimal” accuracy by using a ML
classifier (at the cost of higher computational and training costs).
Finally, we revisit existing prediction algorithms with the goal of augmenting
them by leveraging knowledge of past network dynamics. Our insight is to provide
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“temporal filters” that significantly reduce the set of potential new links, reduc-
ing the search space and computational cost, while focusing predictors on more
probable link candidates. Our filters are focused around trends in node activity
and potential link d istances, both patterns observed in this and prior studies of
network dynamics. Applying these filters produce very encouraging results, in
many cases effectively doubling the predictive power of both metric-based and
classifier-based algorithms. Not only do these filters outperform recent methods
leveraging temporal information, but they can be combined with temporal meth-
ods to provide even better results.
In this chapter, we make three key contributions. First, we carry out a compre-
hensive analysis of a wide range of link prediction algorithms, studying not only
their performance but also possible causes of low prediction accuracy. We apply
decision tree classifiers to identify the best metric-based algorithms for different
networks.
Second, we compare the two categories of link prediction methods, i.e. metric-
based and classification methods, study their cost versus accuracy tradeoffs, and
identify strategies for choosing between them.
Finally, we leverage insights from analysis of network growth to design filters
that improve prediction accuracy by dramatically reducing the search space. In
our tests, these filters significantly improve prediction power across all methods.
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Further, they outperform recent proposals that integrate temporal information,
and can be combined with them to produce even better results.
3.2 Background: Link Prediction
Link prediction identifies new edges that will likely form in the near future, by
analyzing the structure of the current network [89]. Given a graph Gt =<Vt, Et>
observed at time t, it seeks to predict new edges to be created between nodes Vt
at time t′ (t′ > t).2 Note that we focus on predicting future links at some time
t, which is different from the detection of missing links, where given a partially
observed graph, it identifies link status for unobserved pair of nodes [66, 103].
Existing link prediction algorithms naturally fall into two categories, which we
refer to as metric- and classification-based. We list and classify all of the known
popular prediction algorithms in Table 3.1, which are algorithms we focus on in
this work, and their details will be introduced later in Table 3.3.
Metric-based algorithms estimate the likelihood of future connectivity between
unconnected nodes, by generating a numeric score based on some graph-based
heuristic [89] or models [32, 120]. All potential node pairs are sorted by score to
determine the most likely future edges.
2This is the most common form of link prediction. It does not consider edges created by new
nodes who join after t, which is referred to as the cold start link prediction problem [77], nor
edges that might disappear after their creation.
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Metric-Based Prediction Classification-Based Prediction
Heuristics Learning Models e.g., SVM,
e.g., CN, JC, AA, RA, Probabilistic Matrix/Tensor Logistic Regression,
LP, SP, PA, Katz, Models Based Naive Bayes,
LRW, PPR e.g., BCN, BAA, BRA e.g., Rescal Random Forest
Table 3.1: Summary of link prediction algorithms, with details listed in Table 3.3.
In contrast, classification-based algorithms treat link prediction as a classifi-
cation problem [11]. Using scores by metric-based algorithms and maybe other
information as training features, these classifiers then “separates” the node pairs
that will likely connect in the near future from those that will not. Some classifiers
also produce a granular similarity score, which can be used to rank node pairs.
Next, we describe these two categories of algorithms in detail and highlight
their differences.
Metric-based Prediction. Metric-based link prediction algorithms quantify
and rank node pairs by their likelihood of forming new edges, based on specific
metrics that capture similarity or proximity between nodes [89]. For simplicity,
we refer to the entire group as “similarity metrics,” and further divide them into
heuristics, or more complicated learning models, as shown in Table 3.1.
Many popular metric-based algorithms are heuristics based on common intu-
itions of graph formation [89], e.g., two currently unlinked nodes with the most
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commonly connected nodes are most likely to link in the future. Those hypothe-
ses are driven by graph structural properties and do not require metadata. They
generally focus either on node neighborhood information, where they capture
properties of the common neighborhood between nodes of 2-hop distance, e.g.
Common Neighbors [110] and Adamic Adar Index [7], or on path properties such
as shortest path length [69].
Link prediction can also be performed by inferring the likelihood of two nodes
forming an edge based on learning models. One way is to use probabilistic models
calibrated by measurements on Gt. For example, [32, 52] assume a specific under-
lying structure of hierarchies or communities exists in the graph Gt, and model
parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood.
Another approach is to extend the field of relational learning to link predic-
tion [142, 148]. However, these underlying models either do not scale to large
graphs (due to complexity in parameter learning) or rely on special conditions
that do not generalize to common networks such as social networks [148]). Only
the local naive Bayes model [95] meets the needs of large, generalized graphs.
Other metrics use matrix (tensor) techniques on matrix representations of
graphs. They capture node similarity in a latent space, defined by different mod-
els [111, 120]. Among them, only Rescal [111] has been shown empirically to scale
to large graphs of millions of nodes.
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Classification-based Prediction. While metric-based algorithms are known
for their simplicity [89], performance can vary significantly depending on the spe-
cific similarity metric used. Existing work has shown the best metric varies across
datasets and there is no unified solution [89, 90].
The alternative is what we call classification-based methods. Instead of using
a certain similarity metric, one can build automated classifiers to explore multiple
similarity features [90]. Compared to single metrics, classifiers face the challenge
of high computational complexity, (e.g. feature selection and training), especially
for massive OSNs [53].
3.3 Datasets and Methodology
We now describe the datasets used for our study and our experimental method-
ology.
3.3.1 Datasets
Our study uses large traces of dynamic network growth from three different
networks, Renren, Facebook, and YouTube. As far as we know, these are the
only publicly available large-scale datasets suitable for this study, which have
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Graph
Trace Start Trace End Time Snapshot # of
Date Nodes Edges Date Nodes Edges Granularity Delta (k) Snapshots
Facebook
09/05/06 48,969 339,098 01/21/09 63,731 817,090 Seconds 15K 31
(New Orleans) [147]
YouTube
02/09/07 1,406,188 3,466,440 07/23/07 3,223,589 9,376,594 Days 250K 21
(Snowball Crawl) [105]
Renren
01/01/07 1,413,731 13,616,792 12/31/07 10,572,832 199,564,006 Seconds 10M 17
(Non-sampled) [161]
Table 3.2: Statistics of the three OSN datasets.
sufficiently detailed timestamps to capture graph dynamics, i.e., the time when
each edge (link) was created between nodes (users).
The Renren [161] data includes creation of every edge in the entire Renren net-
work during a period of over 2 years (from its first edge, to 10 million users, 199
million edges when the trace ends). The Facebook trace [147] includes edges cre-
ated in the New Orleans regional network over 2+ years. The YouTube trace [105]
includes edges recorded from daily snowball crawls of a user community that grew
from 1 million to 3 million users over a period of 5 months. To avoid disruptions
from external events, i.e., the network policy changes in Youtube, and a one-time
network merge event for Renren (Renren merged with its largest competitor in
December 2006), we use continuous subtraces that do not include the external
events in question. Statistics on all three traces are summarized in Table 3.2.
We show each network’s daily growth in nodes and edges in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Daily new nodes and edges in the three networks.
While the three networks all continue on exponential growth trajectories (Face-
book has a number of 49K users at the beginning while the other two has 1.4M
users), we see Renren is on a much faster growing pace. This is because both the
Facebook and YouTube datasets are sampled networks, i.e., Facebook dataset is
a regional network and YouTube dataset depicts the growth of a user community.
Figures 3.2-3.4 provide a quick look at the change in basic network properties over
its evolution, including average node degree, path length, and clustering coeffi-
cient. Unsurprisingly, average node degree for all three networks grows over time.
In comparison, Renren and Facebook are much denser than YouTube. Unsurpris-
ingly, networks grow and densify over time, and their average path length shrinks.
YouTube has the largest path length due to its sparsity.
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Figure 3.2: Average node degree.
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Figure 3.4: Average clustering coefficient.
3.3.2 Methodology
Existing link prediction studies focus on predicting edges between two static
snapshots [89, 11, 45], and most do not capture the evolution of fast growing
networks such as OSNs like Facebook, LinkedIn and Renren. In contrast, our
work seeks to answer two key questions:
Q1: Can existing algorithms accurately predict the continuous edge (or link)
growth of today’s large, dynamic, online social networks?
Q2: Can we utilize temporal network data to improve prediction accuracy?
Evaluating Link Prediction on Graph Sequences. To answer these
questions, we apply a sequence-based framework to evaluate existing link prediction
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algorithms as the network grows. We process each dataset to generate a sequence
of graph snapshots (G1, G2, ..., GT ) while keeping the number of new edges created
in each snapshot constant. We refer to this number as the snapshot delta.
We run each algorithm in every graph snapshot Gt−1(1 < t ≤ T ) to predict
new edges (among existing nodes) that will appear in the next snapshot Gt, and
compare them to the ground truth, i.e. the actual new edges found in Gt. We
choose the snapshot delta value to ensure sufficient number of snapshots for anal-
ysis (> 15) while ensuring duration between two successive snapshots is not too
long (< 2 weeks). Specific values and the resulting number of snapshots for each
dataset are listed in Table 3.2.
To address Q1, we evaluate 14 different metric-based algorithms that can scale
to our large datasets, and 4 widely used classification-based algorithms. For each
algorithm, we study its prediction accuracy as the network grows and identify
potential causes for any loss of accuracy.
We answer Q2 by analyzing the temporal properties in edge creation to identify
and utilize trends as additional metrics to improve prediction accuracy.
Implementing Metric-based Algorithms. We first cover 10 most popular
heuristics: Common Neighbors (CN), Jaccard’s Coefficient (JC), Adamic/Adar
Index (AA), Resource Allocation Index (RA), which focus on capturing proper-
ties of the common neighborhood between nodes of 2-hop distance; Preferential
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Attachment (PA), which is based on node degree; Local Path (LP), Local Ran-
dom Walk (LRW), Shortest Path (SP), Personalized PageRank (PPR), and Katz,
which are driven by path properties. We also include 1 tensor-based algorithm,
i.e., Rescal [111], which works by condensing the interaction among nodes into a
latent space. And finally we implement 3 probabilistic algorithms [95], which ac-
count for different roles by different common neighboring nodes between node
pairs, i.e., Local Naive Bayes based Common Neighbors (BCN), Local Naive
Bayes based Adamic Adar (BAA), and Local Naive Bayes based Resource Al-
location (BRA). These cover the metric-based approaches (see Table 3.1), and we
summarize their detailed implementation in Table 3.3.
We also fine-tune our implementation by identifying the best parameters and
approximation methods (if any) based on results of our own experiments and
from prior studies. Specifically, LP requires a weight parameter  for 3-hop paths,
and  = 0.0001 provides the highest accuracy. For PPR, we configure the restart
probability α = 0.15 as suggested by prior work [16]. For Katz, we set β =
0.001 as suggested by [6], and implement two approximation methods: low rank
approximation (Katzlr) [6] and scalable proximity estimation (Katzsc) [137]. Our
experiments in §3.4 show that while more accurate than Katzsc, Katzlr does not
scale to larger networks, since it computes Katz score for all candidate node pairs3.
3Even using 8 machines with 192GB memory each, calculating Katzlr for a Renren snapshot
with 185M edges takes 27 days.
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Metric-based Algorithms Precise Formulation
CN (Common Neighbors) [110] |Γ(u) ∩ Γ(v)|
JC (Jaccard’s Coefficient) [89] |Γ(u)∩Γ(v)||Γ(u)∪Γ(v)|
AA (Adamic/Adar) [7]
∑
w∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v)
1
log(deg(w))
RA (Resource Allocation) [165]
∑
w∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v)
1
deg(w)
|Γ(u) ∩ Γ(v)| log(s) +∑w∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v) log(Rw),
BCN [95] where s = |V |(|V |−1)
2|E| − 1,Rw =
N4w+1
N∧w+1
N4u (N∧u): # of triangles (non-triangles) involving u.
BAA [95]
∑
w∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v)
1
log(deg(w))
(log(s) + log(Rw))
BRA [95]
∑
w∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v)
1
deg(w)
(log(s) + log(Rw))
Katz [67]
∑∞
l=1 β
l · |paths<l>u,v |
where β > 0, paths<l>u,v : all l-hop paths between u andv
LP (Local Path) [165] |paths<2>u,v |+  · |paths<3>u,v |
piu,v + piv,u
PPR (Personalized PageRank) [16] where piu,v: probability of a random walk
from u to v with a restart probability α ∈ [0, 1]
LRW (Local Random Walk) [94]
deg(u)
2|E| piuv(m) +
deg(v)
2|E| pivu(m)
where piuv(m): probability from u to v after m steps
SP (Shortest Path) # of hops on shortest path between u and v
PA (Preferential Attachment) [17] deg(u) · deg(v)
XRXT (u, v) +XRXT (v, u)
Rescal [111] where adjacent matrix A ≈ XRXT
X: a |V | × r matrix, R: a r × r matrix
Table 3.3: The 14 metric-based algorithms used for our study. Notations: given graph
G =< V,E >, u and v are two graph nodes, Γ(u) denotes the neighbors of node u, deg(u)
represents the node degree of u.
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Thus for Renren and YouTube, we terminate the Katzlr experiments at snapshots
of 65M edges and 5.5M edges, respectively.
In terms of computation cost, the local metrics (CN, JC, AA, RA, BAA,
BCN, BRA) are easy to compute since we only need to compute each node’s 2-
hop neighbors. PA is also fast because one can optimize the implementation to
only consider top-K node pairs. Even for our largest Renren graph, the computa-
tion for the above eight metrics finishes within a few minutes (we run the C++
implementation on 10 standard servers, each with 8 cores and 192GB RAM). The
next three metrics (LRW, PPR and LP) take a few hours to compute because
LRW and PPR require random walk computation while LP requires reaching 3-
hop neighbors. Finally, the most complex metrics (Rescal, Katz and SP) take a
few days to complete since they require node embedding. We also note that for
the classifier-based methods, the computation complexity is dominated by feature
calculation, i.e. computing the above similarity metrics.
3.4 Metric-Based Prediction
Our empirical evaluation begins with metric-based prediction algorithms. We
seek to understand their prediction accuracy, and the key factors that lead to
prediction errors.
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3.4.1 Experimental Setup
Given a sequence of snapshots {G1, G2, ..., GT}, we predict the new edges to
appear in Gt based on observed Gt−1. For each of the 14 metric-based algorithms,
we compute the similarity metric score for each unconnected node pair, and select
the top k node pairs with the highest score. While the choice of k may affect
prediction accuracy, we use the ground truth value, i.e. k equals the number of
new edges among Vt−1 nodes appeared in Gt but not in Gt−1. This allows us to
focus on the effectiveness of similarity metrics. As a baseline for comparison, we
also implement a random prediction algorithm, which uniform-randomly picks k
unconnected node pairs from Vt−1 as the predicted new edges in Gt.
Performance Metrics. We follow the established practice of evaluating each
link prediction algorithm by comparing results to those from random prediction,
i.e. in terms of the factor improvement over random [89]. Specifically, given a
similarity metric M , let EMt represent the set of correctly predicted node pairs
that become connected in Gt, i.e. the overlap between the predicted top k node
pairs to connect and those that actually connect in Gt. Let ERt be the set of
correctly predicted edges using random prediction, with an expected size of |ERt |.
Thus the performance metric is the improvement factor or accuracy ratio [89]:
|EMt |/|ERt | (3.1)
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If the ratio is larger than 1, prediction using metric M is more accurate than
random prediction (by predicting k edges). Note that we choose to use accuracy
ratio rather than the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC)
because AUC evaluates link prediction performance according to the entire list of
the predicted node pairs [97], while our goal is to evaluate the accuracy of top k
predicted node pairs. This allows us to focus on examining the effectiveness of
similarity metrics.
3.4.2 Metric-based Prediction Accuracy
Absolute Prediction Accuracy. We start by first looking at the raw pre-
diction accuracy results in absolute terms, i.e. ratio of correctly predicted edges
that match real new edges. For each consecutive pair of snapshots Gt−1 and Gt,
we apply each prediction algorithm on Gt−1 generate the next k links likely to
form, and compute the overlap in the result with the k links actually formed in
Gt:
|EMt |/k (3.2)
Prediction accuracy was quite low across the board, for all algorithms on all
snapshots across all of our datasets. To highlight these accuracy results, we show
in Table 3.4 the highest absolute accuracy results obtained by each algorithm over
any snapshot pair across our datasets.
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Network JC BCN BAA BRA LP LRW PPR SP Katzlr Katzsc Rescal PA
Renren 1.72 2.40 3.22 3.52 1.75 1.06 2.44 0.053 0.82 0.018 0.091 0.0068
Facebook 1.21 6.17 6.82 4.43 5.53 2.11 1.06 0.10 9.41 1.85 4.45 0.21
YouTube 0.22 0.59 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.58 0.23 0.0021 0.98 1.44 1.75 0.38
Table 3.4: Best possible absolute accuracy (%) of all prediction methods on each dataset.
It is clear to see that in absolute terms, link prediction performs poorly in
practice. While some methods consistently do better than others, the best they
can do is accuracy in the single digits in percentages, e.g. 5–6%. The best results
tend to come from the Facebook dataset, likely because it’s significantly smaller
(33 times fewer nodes) than the Youtube and Renren datasets. The single best
result is Katzlr, which reaches 9.41% on Facebook, but fails to reach even 1%
on the larger datasets. Note that our definition of “accuracy” is loose, in that it
only requires a predicted link to appear within some range of k new links (see
Table 3.2), where k represents all links created in a time period ranging from one
week (YouTube) to four weeks (Renren).
These numbers are likely to be significantly lower for real networks, which
contain orders of magnitude more nodes (and therefore many orders of magnitude
more potential new links) than our datasets, e.g. Facebook, WhatsApp, Pinterest
etc. While our results are limited by reliance on only network structure (existing
links), these results highlight the fact that link prediction is far from a solved
97
Reassessing Current Status of Link Prediction Chapter 3
problem. These results explain why link prediction literature typically uses the
accuracy ratio [89], which compares results to a purely random algorithm. We
will use the accuracy ratio metric for the rest of our analysis.
Accuracy Ratio Results. We present prediction results of our 14 metric-
based algorithms from Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.7, as the accuracy ratio over the
sequence of snapshots for each OSN (marked by their total edge count). We omit
the results of CN, AA and RA because they perform similarly (slightly worse)
than their Local Naive Bayes versions, i.e. BCN, BAA and BRA. We include two
implementations of Katz: Katzlr and Katzsc, where Katzlr almost consistently
outperforms Katzsc, but is difficult to scale on Renren and Youtube. For the rest
of the paper we only show analysis of Katzlr and refer to it as Katz.
We make two key observations from Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.7. First, as ex-
pected, all metric-based algorithms outperform random prediction over each en-
tire sequence of snapshots. The largest improvement on accuracy ratio is more
than 100,000 times for Renren and YouTube, and 6000 for Facebook. A major
contributor to this magnitude of differential is the large network sizes, where the
accuracy of random prediction quickly decreases as network size grows, resulting
in a much higher accuracy ratio.
Second, while the best algorithm varies across the three networks, there are
algorithms, i.e.,SP and PA, which consistently perform poorly. SP gives all 2-
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Figure 3.5: Link prediction performance for
Renren dataset.
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Figure 3.6: Link prediction performance for
Facebook dataset.
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Figure 3.7: Link prediction performance for YouTube dataset. From Figure 3.5 to
Figure 3.7 we show accuracy ratio of all metric-based prediction algorithms. We omit the
results of CN, AA and RA because they perform similarly (slightly worse) than their Local
Naive Bayes versions, i.e. BCN, BAA and BRA. The results for Katzlr in Renren and
YouTube are capped to 65M and 5.5M edges due to computation complexity.
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hop node pairs the highest score, thus its prediction is actually random choice
over all such pairs. PA tries to capture “the rich get richer” property, which is not
dominant in friendship creation networks (i.e., Renren and Facebook), where joint
efforts from both users are required [161]. PA achieves marginally better accuracy
ratio in YouTube, which is more of a subscription network where popular users
attract more followers.
Impact of Network Structures. As mentioned before, Renren and Face-
book are more similar in underlying structures since they are both traditional
social networks. Our results from Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.7 align with this obser-
vation that top algorithms are similar on Renren and Facebook, i.e., both include
common neighbor based algorithms BRA, BAA and BCN. Renren is slightly dif-
ferent from Facebook in that it is a non-sampled graph, and therefore captures
higher connectivity between nodes compared to the subsampled regional network
in Facebook. Thus Katz is hard to scale on Renren and JC and PPR perform
much better. JC and PPR prefer pairs with both low degree nodes, which are
usually inactive (more in Section 3.4.4) and are most common in the early phase
of our Facebook trace, and decrease as the Facebook network grows over time.
We can see their clearly increasing accuracy ratio in Figure 3.6.
In contrast, YouTube is more of a subscription network, where many super
nodes with extremely high degrees remain super active in link creation. Thus
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YouTube has much higher node heterogeneity and lower network assortativity.
We find that more than 40% new edges involve the top 0.1% nodes with highest
degrees in YouTube, while only less than 3% for Facebook and Renren. Also,
among edges created by super nodes, most are low degree nodes (80% with degree
< 20). We confirm this by measuring the assortativity for each network. It stays
consistently negative for YouTube, and generally positive for the other two.
The difference in network structures produces significantly different link pre-
diction results in YouTube. Because they prefer node pairs with both high degrees,
BRA, BAA and BCN do not rank highly amongst metrics (note that the y-axis
from Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.7 is in logscale). PPR and JC perform very poorly
because most nodes have very low degree (∼80% nodes with degree ≤ 3). The out-
performer is Rescal, which achieves extremely good performance. Rescal works by
condensing the interaction among nodes into a much smaller latent space, where
it models the interaction between latent components instead, and assigns nodes
corresponding weights for each latent component. Intuitively, super nodes are
critical in many roles thus have much higher weights, leading to a higher final
score. Our results also confirm that super nodes are weighted extremely highly
while the rest share similar weights. In this way Rescal best captures the negative
assortativity in YouTube.
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Correlation of Accuracy with 2-hop Edge Ratio. We observe that most
algorithms increase in accuracy ratio with network growth, but only for Renren
and YouTube, not Facebook. Our analysis shows that this could be explained by
a dependence on link creation between 2-hop neighbors, i.e. λ2, the percentage of
2-hop node pairs in Gt−1 who form edges in Gt. A plot of λ2 shows that it increases
with network growth in Renren/YouTube, but decreases (after a matching spike)
in Facebook. This is explained by the trend towards “densification” over time [81].
This is disrupted in the Facebook trace, because subsampling over the regional
network breaks an increasing number of cross-regional edges as the network grows.
We compute the average Pearson correlation of the top-performing 6 metrics for
each graph to λ2. The results are 0.95 for Renren, 0.83 for YouTube and 0.81 for
Facebook.
Summary. Our results produce two key takeaways. First, the underlying net-
work structure heavily impact prediction accuracy of metric-based algorithms (in
terms of accuracy ratio). The more similar network structures in Renren and Face-
book (links in which are both the abstraction of friendship between users, while
YouTube is more of a subscription network) means their prediction results show
consistent relative performance. Second, prediction accuracy of most metric-based
algorithms strongly correlate with the ratio of 2-hop edges in network evolution,
because their predictions are dominated by 2-hop edges.
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Figure 3.8: Visualization of classification results on choosing the best metric-based algorithm.
3.4.3 Choosing Metric-based Algorithms
Since network structures heavily impact the performance of metric-based al-
gorithms, a natural question is: “given a network, can one predict the best link
prediction algorithm?” And similarly: “given an algorithm, can we characterize
the kind of networks on which it provides the most accurate link prediction?”
We answer the first question by training a multi-class classifier (decision tree),
where the input features are the network properties and each class represents a
(winning) link prediction algorithm (14 classes in total). We treat each graph
snapshot as a data point, and create 69 data points across our three datasets.
We consider the following features (computed from each snapshot): node count,
edge count, node degree distribution (average, standard deviation, x-percentile),
clustering coefficient, average path length, and network assortativity.
Figure 3.8 shows the resulting decision tree, where Rescal, Katz and BRA
(RA) are among the best performing algorithms (consistent with Figure 3.5 to
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Figure 3.7). We see that the heterogeneity of node degrees in the network (cap-
tured as degree standard deviation) is the highest impact feature. It specifies that
networks with high node degree heterogeneity should use Rescal, which aligns
with our analysis in Section 3.4.2 that Rescal prefers node pairs with higher de-
gree heterogeneity. The next factor is the median node degree where lower values
(≤8) marks Katz due to its limited scalability and higher values points to BRA
(RA) which prefer high-degree node pairs.
Note that this result is not meant as a definitive guide to choosing link pre-
diction approaches for different types of graphs. Our training set for the decision
tree is relatively small, and only covers three distinct types of networks. A more
“robust” result would require data from a wide range of networks with varying
characteristics, with even more snapshots per network. We only use the results
here to demonstrate general trends between key features, which are consistent
with our detailed experimental results (Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.7).
To answer the second question, we train a binary classifier (decision tree) for
each algorithm where the inputs are the same set of network properties. We
consider an algorithm to provide “good” prediction (i.e. positive) if its prediction
accuracy ratio is within 90% of the optimal algorithm. The classification results
are shown as below: (we omit algorithms for which there are few or no positive
results):
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• Rescal: standard deviation of node degree> 60.3
• Katz: # of edges≤ 4.5M
• BRA (RA): median node degree> 7
The results are consistent: Rescal is best for networks with high node degree
heterogeneity, Katz is suitable for networks of limited scale and BRA (RA) is best
for high-density networks.
Summary of Observations. We train classifiers to explore the correlation
between the networks and metric-based link prediction algorithms. While we are
limited to our three large network traces, we believe our results do provide some
insights on today’s metric-based link prediction algorithms:
• On sparse and small networks, Katz is a good choice.
• On dense and large networks, BRA (RA) performs well.
• On networks with high node heterogeneity, Rescal is likely the best solution.
3.4.4 Sources of Low Prediction Accuracy
While metric-based prediction largely outperforms random prediction, accu-
racy is still low in absolute terms. For example, the best similarity metric (BRA)
on Renren boosts prediction accuracy over random prediction by more than 40,000
times (at 55M edges). Yet it only achieves 3% accuracy when predicting the next
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Figure 3.9: Degree distribution of nodes in predicted edges (Renren, 55M edges).
edge. To understand the key reasons behind such low accuracy, we investigate
both structural and temporal aspects of each metric-based algorithm, with the
exceptions of PA and SP, the worst performing metrics which we discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4.2. We later take our findings into account when designing complementary
prediction mechanisms in Section 3.6. Our analysis shows consistency over time
and across networks. For brevity we focus our discussion on a sample of results
(Renren, 55M edges).
Structural factors. We notice that all these similarity metrics are strongly
biased by node degree. Figure 3.9 plots the degree distribution of nodes associated
with the predicted edges (by each metric) and the ground truth distribution. We
see that PPR and JC are heavily biased towards low-degree nodes, while the rest
focus more on high-degree nodes. Such bias often comes from the construction of
the similarity metric. Take for example BCN (and CN). In a small-world network,
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Metric Predicted Edges Real Edges
Rescal 99.5% 0.5%
LRW 66.7% 0.6%
Katz 39.7% 0.6%
LP 33.3% 0.5%
BCN 24.2% 0.5%
BAA 16.4% 0.5%
BRA 4.7% 0.8%
Table 3.5: Ratio of predicted and actual created edges that involve 0.1% most frequently
predicted nodes (Renren snapshot with 55M edges).
two nodes with high degree likely share more common neighbors, and are more
likely to be chosen by the common neighbor algorithm.
We also observe that for metrics biased towards high-degree nodes, their re-
sults are dominated by a small number of nodes. To illustrate this, we find the
0.1% nodes most frequently predicted to create a new edge, and show their ratio
of predicted and real edges in Table 3.5. We see that except for BRA, all other
similarity metrics overpredict the involvement of a small group of nodes in edge
creation. It makes sense that the worst offender, Rescal, is much better suited
for a supernode-driven network like YouTube. There, its frequent link predic-
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Figure 3.10: CDF of node idle time in predicted edges (Renren, 55M edges).
tions around supernodes matches the network structure and produces much more
accurate results.
Temporal factors. Our analysis also shows that these metrics tend to predict
links between less active nodes. In particular, for each snapshot Gt, we measure
the idle time for a node v in Gt as the time gap between t and the most recent
time when v creates an edge. Figure 3.10 shows that the idle time of nodes in
predicted edges by all metrics are larger than that of ground truth, meaning that
they are all biased to nodes that are dormant recently, which are less likely to
form new edges.
3.5 Classification-based Prediction
Classification-based algorithms apply supervised learning to predict links using
multiple similarity metrics as features. The key challenge is how to scale to large
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OSNs, i.e. being able to predict edges among all possible node pairs. Prior
works limit the prediction coverage to a very small subset of node pairs [130,
137]. Another challenge is that social networks are highly sparse, translating
into highly “imbalanced” positive (connected) and negative (disconnected) subsets.
Prior work cites data imbalance as a major cause of low prediction accuracy [57].
In our 55M-edge Renren snapshot for example, the ratio of positive to negative
links is 1 : 179K, and decreases further as the network grows.
In this section, we evaluate classification-based link prediction in practical
scenarios, using our large OSN datasets with high data imbalance. To do so,
we develop a scalable measurement mechanism for implementing and evaluating
classification-based algorithms. We also study how they perform on imbalanced
data and compare their results to metric-based prediction algorithms.
3.5.1 Evaluation Configuration
Classification-based algorithms first train models (classifiers) using labeled
data and their corresponding features, then apply the trained classifiers to test
data to predict their labels. Link prediction only requires binary classification
(“+” for creating an edge and “-” for no edge).
The key challenge in evaluating these algorithms is how to train and make
prediction on all possible node pairs – this requires computing all the features for
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O(|V 2| − |E|) node pairs and making a classification decision ( |V | and |E| the
graph node and edge count). Even for a “small” Renren snapshot (2.3M nodes,
25M edges), it takes 88 days to compute features!
Snowball Sampling. To address this challenge, we consider limiting our eval-
uation using snowball sampling [49], which has been shown to effectively reduce
computation cost while preserving network structure and statistical representa-
tivity.
Specifically, for a snapshot Gt−2 = {Vt−2, Et−2} we first randomly select a node
v as the seed, then run a breadth-first-search from node v until a fixed percentage
p of nodes are visited. These visited nodes V St−2 are the sampled nodes in snapshot
Gt−2. We repeat the process on the next snapshot Gt−1 = {Vt−1, Et−1} using the
same seed v, producing V St−1. The choice of sampling percentage p must balance
between computation cost and data representativity. We configure p based on
the network size. Since our Facebook network is reasonably small, p=100%. For
Renren and YouTube, p=2%.
Next, we apply common classification methods on these sampled node sets.
During the training process, we measure the similarity features of all node pairs
among V St−2 in Gt−2, labeling each node pair as either positive or negative depend-
ing on whether they are connected in Gt−1, and training a classifier using this
labeled set.
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Graph
Gt−2 Gt−1 Snowball
Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Sampling p
Facebook
small 49K 345K 49K 360K
100%
large 56K 600K 57K 615K
YouTube
small 1.63M 4M 1.74M 4.25M
2%
large 2.63M 7M 2.70M 7.25M
Renren
small 2.3M 25M 2.7M 30M
2%
large 6.2M 95M 6.7M 105M
Table 3.6: Data instances for evaluating classification algorithms.
In the testing process, we collect features between node pairs among V St−1 in
Gt−1, feed them into the trained classifier to compute prediction scores, and then
choose the top k node pairs with the highest scores as the new edges for the next
snapshot Gt = {Vt, Et}. As in Section 3.4, we set k to the actual number of
new edges created among node pairs in V St−1 for Gt, and use the accuracy ratio
to evaluate prediction accuracy. To minimize the impact of seeds, we randomly
select 5 nodes as seeds, repeat classification methods on them, and measure the
average and standard deviation of prediction accuracy ratios.
Given the computation complexity, we limit our evaluation to two instances
(listed in Table 3.6) of different sizes (small and large) for all three networks.
Again, because these instances produce highly consistent results and space con-
straints, we only discuss the results for the large networks.
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Figure 3.11: Accuracy ratio of four classifiers with undersampling ratio θ 1:1 and 1:50
(Facebook, 345K edges).
Features and Classifiers. We use scores from all 14 similarity metrics listed
in Table 3.3 as features, and experiment with 4 well-known classifiers: Support
Vector Machine (SVM), Logistic Regression, Naive Bayesian (NB), and Random
Forests (RF)4. We also considered but ultimately rejected Decision Trees, because
they can only produce binary recommendations, and are effectively subsumed by
Random Forests.
We ran experiments on a wide range of network snapshots, and found the clas-
sifiers were consistent in their relative performance. RF and NB always performed
poorly, and LR performed generally on par with SVM. In addition, we found that
SVM outperformed LR with imbalanced training sets, which has been also shown
in prior work [57]. Since our data is highly imbalanced, SVM’s results are uni-
formly the best of the bunch, and we use SVM results for the remainder of our
4We use the implementation in an open source library [116] with default parameters for all
classifiers in this paper.
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discussion. As an example of the relative accuracy results, we plot in Figure 3.11
prediction accuracy ratio for all 4 classifiers on a Facebook network snapshot of
345K edges.
3.5.2 Link Prediction Accuracy
To evaluate classification-based prediction, we must first understand the im-
pact of data imbalance within training sets. Recall that link formations in social
networks are extremely imbalanced, i.e. far fewer connected node pairs than
disconnected. This imbalance has been shown to contribute to classification er-
rors [57].
To deal with challenges from data imbalance, we apply the well-known under-
sampling technique to build training data: keeping all positive node pairs while
varying the number of negative node pairs [57]. Here positive(negative) node
pairs refer to those which will(not) connect in the prediction timeframe. Fig-
ure 3.12 plots prediction accuracy ratio while varying the under-sampling ratio,
θ=(# of positive node pairs : # of negative node pairs), from (1:1) to (1:10000)5.
For our three OSNs, the true (unsampled) positive vs. negative ratio is around
(1:100000). Note that existing classification-based prediction algorithms generally
use balanced node pairs, or a ratio of (1:1).
5We stop at (1:10000) for YouTube and Facebook and (1:5000) for Renren because this is
the largest training size we can support on our memory-heavy servers (192GB RAM each).
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Figure 3.12: Performance of classification-based prediction as a function of the
under-sampling ratio θ used during classifier training.
These results show that classification-based prediction algorithms are signifi-
cantly better than random prediction for all 5 sampling ratios. For Renren and
Facebook, accuracy ratio improves as the sampling ratio θ approaches the ac-
tual positive vs. negative ratio (1:100000). Compared to conventional balanced
sampling (1:1), a lower under-sampling ratio produces significantly more accurate
results, and improvements in accuracy ratio, and also the accuracy, can be as high
as a factor of 5.
The above results confirm the effectiveness of classification-based link pre-
diction. More importantly, we show that the performance of these algorithms
depends on the configuration of training data. Conventional methods of using
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Figure 3.13: Comparing the prediction performance of metric- and classification-based
prediction algorithms.
balanced training data can lower prediction accuracy by as much as a factor of
5. To minimize such loss, we need to invest efforts on finding the right level of
undersampling ratio (θ).
3.5.3 Comparing to Metric-based Algorithms
For a fair comparison, we run the metric-based methods again on the same
sampled data (V St−1). We plot the accuracy ratio for each algorithm (blue circle
on the left) in Figure 3.13, and rank them in descending order from right to left.
We see that the top (most accurate) similarity metrics are generally consistent on
both the sampled data and the entire network (see Section 3.4) across different
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datasets. Also note that the test dataset V St−1 is smaller than Vt−1 and better
connected, the accuracy ratio of the metric-based algorithms is lower than results
previously shown in §3.4 (accuracy ratio is lower because random prediction does
better on this smaller dataset).
Comparing Accuracy. Figure 3.13 plots the accuracy ratio of SVM (red
cross on the right) and metric-based methods (blue circle on the left). With
a well-chosen θ, SVM consistently performs as well as, or outperforms the best
metric-based algorithms.
This outperformance stems from two factors: combining multiple similarity
metrics to broaden coverage, and using under-sampling to address the issue of
data imbalance. Overall, these results show that among existing algorithms, the
SVM classifier provides consistently strong results. However, we also note that
some similarity metrics, namely RA and BRA, provide consistently “good” results
across all of our networks. In scenarios where the computational or training costs
of SVMs were undesirable, RA and BRA provide reasonable alternatives with
much lower computational complexity.
Similarity Metric Ranking vs. SVM Feature Weight. We seek to un-
derstand whether a good similarity metric in the metric-based method (identified
from Figure 3.13) also becomes a dominant feature for the classification method.
For this we use the feature coefficient provided by SVM, where a larger abso-
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Figure 3.14: The relationship between top similarity metrics and top SVM features, shown as
the total normalized SVM coefficient of top N similarity metrics, N=1,2,...,14.
lute value means the feature is more important. To make a fair comparison, we
normalize the coefficients (using absolute values) within each classifier.
We take two steps to study the relationship between top similarity metrics and
top SVM features. First, we directly compare the rankings of the two. For both
Renren and Facebook, the rankings are very similar between the similarity metrics
and SVM features, i.e. top similarity metrics are also top features in SVM. For
YouTube, the orders are less consistent, except that Rescal always ranks first.
Next, we study how top similarity metrics contribute to SVM by compar-
ing their feature coefficients. Specifically, for each graph we pick the top N
similarity metrics and calculate their total normalized SVM coefficients, where
N = 1, 2, ..., 14. Figure 3.14 presents the results for the large data instance listed
in Table 3.6 with the largest θ. Results of small data instances and other values
of θ are consistent and omitted for brevity.
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We see that for Renren and Facebook the similarity metrics make similar
contributions to the machine learning process. The top 6 similarity metrics have
a slightly higher weight than the rest. For YouTube, the top first similarity metric
(Rescal) and a lower ranked metric (Katz) are the key contributors while the rest
make similar contributions.
Together, these results suggest that in general the metric-based and classifier-
based methods share similar preferences on similarity metrics. But the classifier-
based methods can combine prediction power of multiple metrics to achieve a
higher accuracy and robustness across different datasets. Finally, the difference
between Renren/Facebook and YouTube aligns with our earlier observation that
as a subscription network YouTube’s link prediction pattern differs from those of
Renren and Facebook.
3.6 Improving Link Prediction
While our results show that today’s prediction algorithms significantly out-
perform random prediction, they are still limited in their prediction accuracy.
A fundamental contributing factor is that current prediction algorithms take a
purely static approach to network analysis, and do not take in account temporal
patterns exhibited by an evolving network. While recent studies seek to extend
link prediction to support dynamic networks, they either do not scale [130], or
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are restricted to single model or metric [144] where performance vary significantly
across datasets.
In this section, we improve existing link prediction algorithms by integrating
them with dynamic network analysis. Specifically, we identify key patterns on
network dynamics, and use them to build temporal filters that drastically reduce
the search space for link prediction. Our proposed filters effectively augment
existing link prediction algorithms, providing a significant boost in prediction
accuracy. This is even true for algorithms that were already designed to capture
network dynamics, e.g. [37].
3.6.1 Temporal Properties on Edge Creation
Using our dynamic OSN datasets, we investigate how different properties of
network dynamics affect edge creation. These include node activeness, neighbor-
hood structure evolution, neighborhood activeness, and arrival of common neigh-
bor. We conclude that node activity and arrival of common neighbor are the key
factors for all three networks, and thus we omit analysis for other explorations
here. We have consistent observations across different snapshots and over different
networks, and due to space limitation we only show figures for Renren snapshot
at 55M edges in this subsection. We will briefly summarize our observations for
other networks in the next subsection.
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Figure 3.15: CDF of active node idle time in a Renren snapshot.
Node Activeness. Intuitively, a node that has recently actively created edges
is more likely to create edges in the near future. We validate this by measuring
node activity on both positive and negative node pairs (i.e. those with edges
and those without). For each node pair, we mark the node with longer idle time
(defined in Section 3.4.4) as the inactive node and the other as the active node.
We measure activity by the idle time of the active node, the idle time of the
inactive node, and the number of edges created by the active node in the past d
days.
We found that for positive node pairs, i.e. those who will connect in the pre-
diction timeframe, the idle times of both active and inactive nodes are significantly
smaller. Figure 3.15 plots the CDF of the active node’s idle time for the Renren
snapshot at 55M edges. More than 90% of positive node pairs have <3 days idle
time while only 40% of negative pairs do so. This 3-day threshold can effectively
distinguish positive and negative node pairs. Similar patterns can be found when
comparing the inactive nodes’ idle times, with a 20-day idle threshold.
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Figure 3.17: CDF of CN time gap of positive
and negative node pairs in a Renren snapshot.
Furthermore, active nodes in positive node pairs tend to create more edges in
a recent time. Using the same Renren snapshot, Figure 3.16 shows the CDF of
new edges in the past week for both positive and negative sets. For more than
60% of positive node pairs, the active node creates more than 3 edges while only
20% of negative node pairs do so. This “3-edge in past 7 days” can also be used
to help identify potential new links.
Arrival of Common Neighbor. We show in Section 3.4 that most similarity
metrics focus on predicting edge formation between 2-hop neighbors. For these,
the recent arrivals of common neighbors can often trigger the completion of a
triad [167] and thus be critical in predicting edges.
We test this hypothesis by measuring, for each node pair, the gap between
the most recent time when they connect to a common neighbor and the current
snapshot time, referred to as the CN time gap. Our results show that the CN time
gap of positive set is much smaller than that of negative set. Figure 3.17 shows
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the result for the same Renren snapshot, where more than 60% of positive pairs
create their last common neighbors in the last 10 days, while 20% of negative
pairs do so.
3.6.2 Temporal Filtering
We propose to use these observations, which are consistent across networks,
to develop “temporal filters” to drastically reduce the search space of new links
by filtering out node pairs that are unlikely to create edges. Specifically, we
remove any potential node pair from the candidate list if it fails to meet any of
the following four criteria:
• Idle time of active nodes < dact days.
• Idle time of inactive nodes < dinact days.
• d-day new edges ≥ Enew.
• CN time gap < dCN . 6
Our threshold values are listed in Table 3.7, which hold across different snap-
shots for each corresponding network. While each parameter is network specific,
the methodology to discover them is general.
Prediction Accuracy after Filtering. We now present the improvement in
link prediction accuracy (in terms of accuracy ratio) after adding temporal filter-
6For node pairs beyond 2 hops, we do not apply this criterion.
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Graph
Node Idle Time d-day New Edges dCN
dact dinact d Enew
Facebook 15 40 21 2 40
YouTube 3 30 7 3 20
Renren 3 20 7 3 10
Table 3.7: Parameters of the temporal filters.
Network JC BCN BAA BRA LP LRW PPR SP Katz Rescal PA 1:1 1:10 1:100 1:1000 1:10000
Renren 2.2 5.8 4.1 2.3 9.7 3.2 1.7 14.9 1.5 2.4 - 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8*
Facebook 5.7 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 5.3 4.4 1.3 1.2 2.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2
YouTube - 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 3.1 15.7 1.5 1.1 1.2 2.2 2.2 2 1.2 1.1
Table 3.8: Ratio of accuracy values after filtering vs. before filtering for all metric-based and
classification methods. Bold value in each row is the maximum improvement for that network;
“-” means the accuracy before filtering is “0”. *Ratio in Renren is 1:5000.
ing. We experiment with the same data instances used to evaluate classification-
based algorithms (see Table 3.6) and present the result for the large instance.
Results from the smaller instance show even more significant benefits and are
omitted for brevity.
Table 3.8 lists the normalized improvement from applying the filter, i.e. the
accuracy ratio of prediction with filtering divided by the accuracy ratio of pre-
diction without filters. The improvement is quite significant for many cases, and
somewhat incremental for others. For classification-based algorithms, our filtering
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raises the accuracy by 10%∼120%. For metric-based algorithms, the gain can be
as much as a factor of 15.7.
We observe that filtering affects certain algorithms more than others. For
metric-based algorithms, applying temporal filters changes the “best” prediction
algorithm. For example in Facebook, JC was the weakest metric before the fil-
ters, but becomes the best metric after filtering. This is because temporal filters
effectively identify and remove the unlikely-to-connect node pairs, i.e. inactive,
low-degree nodes that JC is unable to identify.
3.6.3 Comparing to Other Temporal Methods
Recent works have exploited temporal information to improve prediction ac-
curacy [27, 37, 144]. We compare our filtering design with the time series based
prediction [37], a popular method that can also scale to our network datasets. For
each potential node pair, this method computes its similarity metrics at multiple
past time points, and aggregates these scores to produce a final score of the pair.
We implement two aggregation approaches, Moving Average (MA) and Linear
Regression (LR), shown by [37] as the two best approaches, and perform aggrega-
tion on equally spaced past time points (the space equals to the number of days
between Gt and Gt−1). We observe that MA consistently outperforms LR, and
thus omit the LR result for brevity.
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Figure 3.18: Our proposed temporal filtering method outperforms time-based models.
Similar to Section 3.6.2, we also present the result for the large instance for
each network in Table 3.6 and ignore the similar results from the smaller instance.
Figure 3.18 shows prediction accuracy ratio for original similarity metrics (marked
as Basic) and those enhanced with MA (marked as Time Model), both with and
without our filtering method. For each metric, our filtering consistently improves
the accuracy far more than the time series based prediction, especially for Renren
and Facebook. Furthermore, even after applying the time series based prediction,
our filter can still consistently improve prediction accuracy.
Summary. We show that by leveraging temporal information on network dy-
namics, we can effectively improve link prediction accuracy. Using these temporal
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filters, we can prune the set of candidate node pairs for edge creation, allowing
link prediction algorithms to focus on regions of likely growth. By comparing to
other temporal methods, we further confirm the effectiveness and generality of
our filtering method.
3.7 Related Work
We perform an in-depth study on two types of link prediction algorithms
(metric- and classification-based). Prior works have evaluated metric-based algo-
rithms using co-author networks [89], classification-based methods using balanced
data [11, 45], and both methods using a small subset of Twitter (155K nodes) [23].
Our work differs by studying both methods using datasets of large, dynamic on-
line social networks that recently became available. By discretizing these datasets
into numerous temporal snapshots, we study the evolution of link prediction over
fine time intervals, identify potential factors behind prediction errors, and propose
filters that improve prediction power for all algorithms.
Recent studies have leveraged temporal information for link prediction. The
key approach is to extend existing algorithms in the temporal domain, e.g. adding
a temporal dimension [6], assigning more weights to new links [135, 144], integrat-
ing graph structure information over time [37]. Another approach applies past
observations for prediction [27, 130], by identifying subgraphs that are similar to
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the target subgraph and use their time-evolving behaviors to help predict the tar-
get. Unfortunately, each of these methods suffers from at least one of the following
limitations:
• The proposed approach is of high complexity and cannot scale to large networks
• The proposed approach is limited to a single model/metric, whose performance
varies significantly across networks
• The proposed approach does not capture (and leverage) temporal patterns of
the network
In contrast, our approach not only provides a general and scalable link pre-
diction solution that supports a wide variety of similarity metrics, classifiers and
network graphs, but also utilizes insights of network evolution to boost prediction
accuracy and reduce complexity.
Finally, our work targets link prediction that only require graph topology infor-
mation, i.e. nodes and edges. Additional information, such as edge weights [96],
node connections on other social networks [106], and link direction [158], can im-
prove prediction performance. We plan to consider these factors in future work.
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3.8 Summary and Discussion
Using real traces of large dynamic networks, our work in this chapter takes
a concrete step towards objectively quantifying the predictive power of today’s
link prediction algorithms. By implementing a wide range of algorithms, we have
already identified concrete challenges and issues with multiple algorithms, from
high computational complexity that limits scalability, to binary classification re-
sults that lack granularity.
For metric-based approaches, we have shown the futility of some metrics (short-
est path) and validated the scalability of others, e.g. scalable Katz heuristics [137].
At the same time, we have shown that it is indeed possible to scale some classi-
fiers to large, multi-million node networks, and that classifiers such as SVMs can
produce consistently strong results.
More surprisingly, we find that the best metric-based predictors (vary across
different networks) perform on par with the most accurate classifier (SVM in all
cases), and we derive potential guidelines for choosing metrics based on network
structure. We also take a deeper look at current link prediction algorithms for the
source of low accuracy, in terms of both structural and temporal aspects. Further-
more, we provide “temporal filters” that can greatly improve prediction accuracy
(across different methods and networks) by leveraging knowledge of prior network
dynamics, even for predictors that have already integrated temporal information.
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Finally, our results underscore the fact that current prediction algorithms still
perform poorly at the fine granularity of individual link predictions, even with our
proposed temporal filters. While this confirms link prediction is still an unsolved
problem, it is important to calibrate expectations depending on specific applica-
tions. For example, while current algorithms focus primarily on predicting nearby
neighbors, a significant number of new links connect “distant” nodes. Overcoming
these empirical limitations requires a better understanding of underlying network
structures and dynamics.
This work only scratches the surface of a much larger problem space. Using
datasets from just three networks, we already observe significant variance in ac-
curacy for single metrics across different networks. Much more experimental and
analytical work is necessary before we can identify specific properties of each net-
work that make them more or less predictable by certain metrics. Our evaluation
is limited by our reliance on network structural data, whereas deployed link pre-
diction systems are likely to combine multiple information sources [53], e.g., user
profiles and behavioral data, which can boost prediction accuracy empirically.
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Secure Graph Sharing System
4.1 Introduction
1 Graphs are capable to capture many of today’s most sensitive datasets, in-
cluding maps of autonomous systems in the Internet, social networks representing
billions of friendships, or connected records of patent citations. Privacy concerns
rise as controlling access to these datasets is a difficult challenge. More specifi-
cally, it is often the case that owners of large graph datasets would like to share
access to them to a fixed set of entities without the data leaking into the public
domain. For example, an ISP may be required to share detailed network topology
1 ©ACM, (2015). This is the authors version of the work. It is posted here by permission
of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. Abbreviated version of content in this
chapter can be found in “Towards Graph Watermarks” [162], Proceedings of the 2015 ACM on
Conference on Online Social Networks (IMC’15), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2817946.2817956.
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graphs with a third party networking equipment vendor, with a strict agreement
that access to these sensitive graphs must be limited to authorized personnel only.
Similarly, a large social network like Facebook or LinkedIn may choose to share
portions of its social graph data with trusted academic collaborators, but clearly
want to prevent their leakage into the broader research community.
One option is to focus on building strong access control mechanisms to prevent
data leakage beyond authorized parties. Yet in most scenarios, including both
examples above, data owners cannot restrict physical access to the data, and have
limited control once the data is shared with the trusted collaborator. It is also
the case that no matter how well access control systems are designed, they are
never foolproof, and often fall prey to attacks on the human element, i.e. social
engineering. Another option is to modify portions of the data to reduce the impact
of potential data leakages. This has the downside of making the data inherently
noisy and inaccurate, and still can be overcome by data reconstruction or de-
anonymization attacks using external input [107]. Finally, these schemes are hard
to justify, in part because it is very difficult to quantify the level of protection
they provide.
In this chapter, we propose a new alternative in the form of graph watermarks.
Intuitively, watermarks are small, often imperceptible changes to data that are
difficult to remove, and serve to associate some metadata to a particular dataset.
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They are used successfully today to limit data piracy by music vendors such as
Apple and Walmart, who embed a user’s personal information into a music file
at the time of purchase/download [13]. Should the purchased music be leaked
onto music sharing networks, it is easy for Apple to track down the user who
was responsible for the leak. In our context, graph watermarks work in a similar
way, by securely identifying a copy of a graph with its “authorized user.” Should
a shared graph dataset be leaked and discovered later in public domains (on
BitTorrent perhaps), the data owner can extract watermark from the leaked copy
and use it as proof to seek damages against the collaborator responsible for the
leak. While not a panacea, graph watermarks can provide additional level of
protection for data owners who want to or must share their data, and perhaps
encourage risk-averse data owners to share potentially sensitive graph data, e.g.
encourage LinkedIn to share social graphs with academic collaborators.
To be effective, a graph watermark system needs to provide several key prop-
erties:
• Graph watermarks should be relatively small compared to the graph dataset
itself. This has two direct consequences: the watermark will be difficult to
detect (and remove) by potential attackers, and adding the watermark to the
graph has minimal impact on the graph structure and its utility.
132
Secure Graph Sharing System Chapter 4
• Watermarks should be difficult to forge and should not occur naturally in graphs,
ensuring that the presence of a valid watermark can be securely associated with
some user, i.e. non-repudiation.
• Both the embedding and extraction of watermarks should be efficient, even for
extremely large graph datasets with billions of nodes and edges.
Since we also want to design a watermark system that works in any application
context involving graphs, we make no assumptions about the presence of meta-
data. Instead, our system must function for “barebones” graphs, i.e. symmetric,
unweighted graphs with no node labels or edge weights.
In this chapter, we present initial results of our efforts towards the design of
a scalable and robust graph watermark system. Highlights of our work can be
organized into the following key contributions.
First, we identify the goals and requirements of a graph watermark system.
We also describe an initial design of a graph watermark system that efficiently
embeds watermarks into and extracts them out of large graphs. Graph water-
marks are uniquely generated based on a user private key, a secure graph key, and
the graph they are applied to. We describe constraints on its applicability, and
identify examples of graphs where watermarks cannot achieve desirable levels of
key properties such as uniqueness.
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Second, we provide a strict proof of uniqueness of graph watermarks, showing
that it is extremely difficult for attackers to forge watermarks.
Third, we evaluate our watermarks in term of distortion, uniqueness, and
efficiency on several large graph datasets.
Fourth, we identify two attack models, describe additional features to boost
robustness, and evaluate them under realistic conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first practical proposal for
applying watermarks to graph data. We believe graph watermarks are a useful
tool suitable for a wide range of applications from tracking data leaks to data
authentication. Our work identifies the problem and defines an initial groundwork,
setting the stage for follow-up work to improve robustness against a range of
stronger attacks.
4.2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide background and related work on graph privacy and
watermark techniques in applications.
Graph Privacy. Graph privacy is a significant problem that has been mag-
nified by the arrival of large graphs containing sensitive data, e.g. online social
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graphs or mobile call graphs. Recent studies [14, 107] show that deanonymization
attacks can defeat most common anonymization techniques.
A variety of solutions have been proposed, ranging from anonymization tools
that defend against specific structural attacks, or more attack-agnostic defenses.
To protect node- or edge-privacy against specific, known attacks, techniques utilize
variants of k-anonymization to produce structural redundancy at the granularity
of subgraphs, neighborhoods or single nodes [91, 164, 56, 168]. Alternatively, ran-
domization provides privacy protection by randomly adding, deleting, or switching
edges [54, 160]. Others partition the nodes and then describe the graph at the
level of partitions to avoid structural re-identification [55]. Finally, a different
approach is taken by producing model-driven synthetic graphs that replicate key
structural properties of the original graphs [128]. One extension of this work
utilizes differential privacy techniques to provide a tunable accuracy vs. privacy
tradeoff [129].
Our goals are quite different from prior work on graph anonymization, meant
to protect data before its public release. We are concerned with scenarios where
graph data is shared between its owner and groups of trusted collaborators, e.g.
third party network vendors analyzing an ISP’s network topology, or Facebook
sharing a graph with a group of academic researchers. The ideal goal in these
scenarios is to ensure the shared data does not leak into the wild. Once data is
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shared with collaborators, reliable tools that can track leaked data back to its
source serve as an excellent deterrent. Watermarking techniques have addressed
similar problems in other contexts, and we briefly describe them here.
Background on Digital Watermarks. Watermarking is the process of
embedding specialized metadata into multimedia content [74]. The embedded
watermark is later extracted from the file and used to identify the source or owner
of the content. These systems include an embedding component and an extraction
component. The embedding component takes three inputs: a watermark, the
original data, and a key, aiming to embed the watermark with minimum impact
on the data. The key is used as a parameter to generate a unique watermark for
a specific user, and is kept confidential by the data owner. Extraction takes as
input the watermarked data, the key, and possibly a copy of the original data.
Extraction can directly produce the embedded watermark or a confidence measure
of whether it is present.
Watermarking is widely used today to protect intellectual property. Signifi-
cant work has been done in digital watermarking, particularly image watermark-
ing [138, 98, 19, 125, 156]. Watermark techniques [112, 113] have been studied
to protect the abuse of digital vector maps. Watermarks have also been used to
protect software copyrights [166, 33], by adding spurious execution paths in the
code that would not be triggered by normal inputs [146]. Moreover, watermark
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Ω
Figure 4.1: Embedding graph watermarks. Ω is a secret random generator seed produced
using the secure graph key and user’s private key.
algorithms have been proposed for relational datasets [8, 88, 63]. Much of this has
focused on modifying numeric attributes of relations, using the primary key at-
tribute as an indicator of watermark locations, assuming that the primary key at-
tribute does not change. Finally, watermarks, in the form of minute changes, have
been applied to protect circuit designs in the semiconductor industry [117, 154].
4.3 Goals and Attack Models
To set the context for the design of our graph watermark system, we need to
first clearly define the attack models we target, and use them to guide our design
goals.
Graph watermarks at a glance. At a high level, we envision the graph
watermark process to be simple and lightweight, as pictured in Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.2. Embedding a watermark involves overlaying the original graph dataset
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Figure 4.2: Extracting graph watermarks. Ωi is a secret random generator seed produced
using the secure graph key and the private key of user i.
(G) with a small subgraph (W ) generated using the original graph and a secret
random generator seed (Ω). Embedding the watermark simply means adding
or deleting edges between existing nodes in the original graph G, based on the
watermark subgraph W . Each authorized user i receives only a watermarked
graph customized for her, generated using a random seed Ωi securely associated
with her. The seed is generated through cooperation of her private key and a key
securely associated with the original graph.
If and when the owner detects a leaked version of the dataset, the owner takes
the leaked graph, and “extracts the watermark,” by iteratively producing all known
watermark subgraphs Wi associated with G and each of the seeds Ωi associated
with an authorized user. The “extraction” process is actually a matching process
where the data owner can conclusively identify the source of the leaked data, by
locating the matching Wi in the leaked graph.
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In our model of potential attackers and threats, we assume that attackers have
access to the watermarked graph, but not the original G. Clearly, if an attacker
is able to obtain the unaltered G, then watermarks are no longer necessary.
Attack Models.
The attackers’ goal is to destroy or remove graph watermarks while preserving
the original graph. Watermarks are designed to protect the overall integrity of the
graph data. Thus we do not consider scenarios where the attackers sample the
graph or distort it significantly to remove the watermark. Under these constraints,
we consider two practical attack models below.
• Single Attacker Model. For a single attacker with access to one watermarked
graph, it will be extremely difficult to detect the embedded watermark. Without
the key associated with another user, forging a watermark is also impractical.
Instead, their best attack is to disrupt any potential watermarks by adding or
deleting nodes or edges.
• Collusion Attack Model. If multiple attackers join their efforts, they can recover
the original graph by comparing multiple watermarked graphs, identifying the
differences (i.e. watermarks), and removing them.
Design Goals. The attack models help us define the key characteristics
required for a graph watermarking system.
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• Low distortion. The addition of watermarks should have a small impact on
overall structure of the original graph. This preserves the utility of the graph
datasets.
• Robust to modifications. Watermarks should be robust to modification attacks
on watermarked graphs, i.e. watermarks should remain detectable and ex-
tractable with high probability, even after the graph has been modified by an
attacker.
• Low false positives. It is extremely unlikely for our system to successfully identify
a valid watermark Wi in an unwatermarked graph or a graph watermarked by
Wj where i 6= j. When we embed a single watermark (Section 4.4), we also refer
to this property as watermark uniqueness.
Within the constraints defined above, designing a graph watermark system is
quite challenging, for several reasons. First, the subgraph that represents the wa-
termark must be relatively “unique,” i.e. it is highly unlikely to occur naturally,
or intentionally through forgery. A second, contrasting goal is that the watermark
should not change the underlying graph significantly (low distortion), or be easily
detected. Walking the fine line between this and properties of “uniqueness” likely
means we have to restrict the set of graphs which can be watermarked, i.e. for
some graphs, it will be impossible to find a hard to detect watermark that does
not occur easily in graphs. Finally, since any leaked graph can have all meta-
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data stripped or modified, watermark embedding and extraction algorithms must
function without any labels or identifiers. Note that the problem of subgraph
matching is known to be NP-complete [34].
4.4 Basic Watermark Design
We now describe the basic design of our graph watermarking system. The basic
design seeks to embed and extract watermarks on graphs to achieve watermark
uniqueness while minimizing distortion on graph structure. Our design has two
key components:
• Watermark embedding: The data owner holds a graph key KG associated
with a graph G known only to her. Each user i generates its public-private
cryptographic key pair < Kipub, Kipriv > through a standard public-key algo-
rithm [102], where Kipub is user i’s public key and Kipriv is its corresponding
private key. To share the graph G with user i, the system combines input from
user i’s digital signatureKipriv(T ) and graph keyKG to form a random generator
seed Ωi, and use Ωi to generate a watermark graph Wi for graph G. The system
embedsWi into G by selecting and modifying a subgraph of G that contains the
same number of nodes as Wi. The resulting graph GWi is given to user i as the
watermarked graph.
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• Watermark extraction: To identify the watermark in G′, we use Ωi to re-
generate Wi and then search for the existence of Wi within G′, for each user
i.
In this section, we focus on describing the detailed procedure of these two
components. We present detailed analysis on the two fundamental properties of
graph watermarks, i.e. uniqueness and detectability in Section 4.5.
4.4.1 Watermark Embedding
The most straightforward way to embed a watermark is to directly attach the
watermark graph to the original graph. That is, if Wi represents the watermark
graph for user i, and G represents the original graph, the embedding treats Wi
as an independent graph, and adds new edges to connect Wi to G. However,
this approach has two disadvantages. First, direct graph attachment makes it
easy for external attackers to identify and remove Wi from G without using graph
key KG and user i’s signature Kipriv(T ). New edges connecting Wi and G must
be carefully chosen to reduce the chance of detection, which is very challenging.
Second, attaching a (structurally different) subgraph Wi directly to a graph G
introduces larger structural distortions.
Instead, we propose an alternative approach that embeds the watermark graph
“in-band.” That is, the embedding process first selects k nodes (k is the number
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of nodes inWi) from G and identifies S, the corresponding subgraph of G induced
by these k nodes. It then modifies S using Wi without affecting any other nodes
in G. Because the watermark graphWi is naturally connected with the rest of the
graph, both the risk of detection and amount of distortion induced on the original
graph G are significantly lower than those of the direct attachment approach.
We now describe the details of “in-band” watermark embedding, which consists
of four steps:
1. Generating a random generator seed Ωi from user i’s signature Kipriv(T ) and
graph key KG
2. Generating the watermark graph Wi from the seed Ωi
3. Selecting the placement of Wi on G by picking k nodes from G and identi-
fying the corresponding subgraph S induced by these k nodes
4. Embedding Wi into G by modifying S to match structure of Wi.
We introduce each step in details in the following paragraphs:
Step 1: Generating a random generator seed Ωi. To generate an
unforgettable watermarked graph, we form a random generator seed Ωi [47] using
user i’s signature Kipriv(T ) and graph key KG.
Suppose the system intends to generate a watermarked version of graph G at
time T to share with user i. We begin by first sending user i with the timestamp
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T . User i responds with its signature Kipriv(T ), by encrypting the timestamp with
its private key Kipriv. Before proceeding further, we validate Kipriv(T ) to ensure it
is from user i, by decrypting it with user i’s public key Kipub. If the timestamps
match, we combine the signature Kipriv(T ) and the graph key KG to form the
random generator seed Ωi for user i. A mismatch may indicate that user i is a
potential malicious user.
Note that Ωi cannot be formed alone by the data owner who only holds the
graph key KG, or by user i who only owns its private key Kipriv. Thus, results
computed using Ωi, including the random graph Wi generated (Step 2) and the
choice of graph nodes to mark (Step 3), cannot be derived independently by the
data owner or identified by user i.
Step 2: Generating the watermark graph Wi. We generate Wi as an
Erdos-Renyi random graph with edge probability of p and node count k (k  n,
where n is the number of nodes in G). The random edge generator uses Ωi as the
seed [47]. The k nodes of Wi are ordered as {v1, v2, ..., vk}.
The key factor here is choosing the node count k and the edge probability p.
To ensure watermark uniqueness, Section 4.5.1 shows that the two parameters
must satisfy:
k ≥ (2 + δ) logq n (4.1)
where q = 1
max (p,1−p) , δ is a constant > 0.
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Furthermore, it is easy to prove that p = 1
2
minimizes the node count k and
the average edge count p · (k
2
)
of the watermark graph Wi. Intuitively, using a
compact watermark graph not only reduces the amount of distortion to G, but
also improves its robustness against malicious attacks. Thus, we configure p = 1
2
and therefore k = (2 + δ) log2 n. This produces a reasonably sized watermark
graph (k <100) even for extremely large graphs, e.g. the complete Facebook
social graph (∼1 billion nodes in 2014).
Step 3: Selecting the watermark placement on graph G. Next, we
identify k nodes fromG and its corresponding subgraph S to embed the watermark
graph. To ensure reliable extraction, we must choose these k nodes carefully,
meeting these two requirements. First, using Ωi generated in Step 1, the k nodes
must be chosen deterministically and remain distinguishable from the other nodes
of G. Second, the set of the k nodes chosen for different watermarks (or different
Ωi values) must be easily distinguishable from each other to reinforce watermark
uniqueness.
Our biggest challenge in meeting these requirements is that we cannot use
node IDs to distinguish nodes from each other. Node IDs or any type of metadata
can be easily altered or stripped by attackers before or after leaking G′, thereby
making extraction impossible.
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We address this challenge by using local graph structure around each node
as its “label.” Specifically, we define a node structure description (NSD) as a
descriptive feature of each node. A node v’s NSD is represented by an array of
v’s sorted neighbor degrees. For example, if node v has three neighbors with node
degrees 2, 6, 4, respectively, then v’s NSD label is “2-4-6.” We then hash v’s NSD
label into a numerical value using a secure one-way hash e.g. SHA-1 [123], and
refer to the result as node v’s NSDhash.
Next, we use Ωi as the seed to randomly generate k hash values, and use each
as an index (e.g. using a mod function) to identify a node in G. It is possible
that multiple nodes have the same NSDhash, i.e. a collision. If this happens, we
resolve the collision by using Ωi again as an index into a sorted list of these nodes
with the same NSDhash. The nodes can be sorted by any deterministic order,
e.g. node IDs in the original graph. Note that this process is only required for
embedding (and not extraction), so any deterministic order chosen by the graph
owner will suffice.
At the end of this step, we obtain k ordered nodes from G, X = {x1, x2, ..., xk},
and the corresponding subgraph S = G[X] induced by the node set X on G.
Step 4: Embedding the watermark graph Wi into graph G. In this
step, we embed the watermark graph Wi by modifying the subgraph S = G[X] to
match Wi. Specifically, we match each (ranked) node in Wi, {v1, v2, ..., vk} with
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the corresponding node in S (or X), {x1, x2, ..., xk}:
W → S, f(vi) = xi (4.2)
Once the nodes are mapped, we then apply an XOR operation on each edge of the
two graphs. That is, we consider the connection between (vi, vj) or (xi, xj) as one
bit, i.e. an edge between (vi, vj) or (xi, xj) means 1 and no edge between (vi, vj)
or (xi, xj) means 0. If an edge (vi, vj) exists in Wi, we modify the corresponding
edge value in S from (xi, xj) to (xi, xj)⊕ 1; and if no edge (vi, vj) exists in Wi, we
modify the edge value (xi, xj) to (xi, xj)⊕ 0. When the above edge modification
process ends, we also explicitly create edges between nodes xi and xi+1 to maintain
a connected subgraph. As a result, we transfer the subgraph S into SWi with the
watermark graph Wi embedded. The reason for choosing the XOR operation is
that it allows the same watermark to be embedded in the graph multiple times
(at multiple locations), thus reducing the risk of the watermark being detected
and destroyed by attacks such as frequent subgraph mining. We will discuss this
in more details in Section 4.6.
At the end of this step, we obtain a watermarked graph GWi for user i. Before
we distribute it to user i, we anonymize GWi by completely (randomly) reassigning
all node IDs. Such anonymization not only helps to protect user privacy, but
also minimizes the opportunity for colluding attackers with multiple watermarked
graphs to identify the embedded watermark (see Section 4.6).
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4.4.2 Watermark Extraction
The watermark extraction process determines if a watermark graph Wi is em-
bedded in a target graph G′. If so, then G′ is a legitimate copy distributed to
user i. The extraction process faces two key challenges. First, the target graph
G′ can easily be modified by users/attackers during the graph distribution pro-
cess. In particular, all node IDs can be very different from that of the original
G. Thus extraction cannot rely on node IDs in G′. Second, identifying whether
a subgraph exists in a large graph is equivalent to a subgraph matching problem,
known to be NP-complete. To handle large graphs, we need a computationally
efficient algorithm.
Our design addresses these two challenges by leveraging knowledge on the
structure of the subgraph where the watermark was embedded. This eliminates
the dependency on node IDs while significantly reducing the search space during
the subgraph matching process. We describe our proposed design in detail below.
Step 1: Regenerating the watermark. The owner performs the extrac-
tion, and has access to the original graph G, graph key KG, and user’s signature
Kipriv(T ). For each user i, we combine its signature Kipriv(T ) and graph key KG
to form its random generator seed Ωi. Then, we follow step 2 − 4 described in
Section 4.4.1 to regenerate the watermark graph Wi, identify the k ordered nodes
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from G and their NSD labels, and finally the modified subgraph SWi that was
placed on a “clean” version of the watermarked graph GWi .
Step 2: Identifying candidate watermark nodes on G′. Given the k
nodes X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} identified from the original graph G, in this step we
need to identify for each xj, a set of candidate nodes on the target graph G′ that
can potentially become xj. We accomplish this by identifying all the nodes on G′
whose NSD labels are the same of xj in the “clean” version of the watermarked
graph GWi . Since multiple nodes can have the same NSD label, this process will
very likely produce multiple candidates. To shrink the candidate list, we examine
the connectivity between candidate nodes of X on G′ and compare it to that
among X on GWi . If two nodes xm and xn are connected in GWi , we prune their
candidate node lists by removing any candidate node of xm that has no edge with
any candidate node of xn on G′ and vice versa. This pruning process dramatically
reduces the search space. After this step, we obtain for each xi the candidate node
list Ci on the target graph G′.
Step 3: Detecting watermark graph SWi on G′. Given the candidate
node list of each node in X, we now search for the existence of SWi on the target
graph G′. For this we apply a recursive algorithm to enumerate and prune the
combinations of the candidate sets, until we identify SWi or exhaust all the node
candidates. The detailed algorithm is listed below. In this algorithm, we use
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a node list Y to record the nodes in G′ which we have already finalized as the
corresponding nodes in SWi , i.e. Y = {y1, y2, ..., ym} (m ≤ k). When the process
starts, Y = ∅, m = 0.
Algorithm 4.1 Recursive Algorithm for Detecting SWi on G′.
1. Function: SubgraphDetection(G′, SWi , {C1, C2, ..., Ck}, Y , m)
2. Input: Graph G′, watermark graph SWi , candidate node list Ci for each
node xi in X, identified node list Y = {y1, y2, ..., ym} (m < k)
3. Output: Identified node list Y = {y1, y2, ..., ym+1}
4. for each node c ∈ Cm+1 do:
(a) if c 6∈ Y and each edge (c, yt) in G′ (t = 1..m) is the same as the edge
(xm+1, xt) in SWi (t = 1..m) then
(b) Y = Y ∪ c, m = m+ 1
(c) if m == k then
(d) Return Y
(e) else
(f) SubgraphDetection(G′, SWi , {C1, C2, ..., Ck},Y , m)
(g) end if
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(h) Y = Y \ c, m = m− 1
(i) end if
5. end for
6. Return Y
Discussion. The above design shows that our watermark extraction algorithm
simplifies the subgraph search problem by restricting it to a small number of
selected nodes from a graph, thus avoiding the NP-complete subgraph matching
problem.
To illustrate the efficiency of our algorithm, we now show an estimation of
the computational complexity. Assume that the number of candidates for each
watermark node xi is |Ci|, and the probability that an edge between node cim ∈
|Ci| and node cjn ∈ |Cj| is pij. Moreover, since we prove that the probability of an
edge between node xi and node xj is 12 in Section 4.5.1, the probability that the
connectivity between (cim, cjn) matches the connectivity between (xi, xj) is 12 ·pij+
1
2
·(1−pij) = 12 . We can show that to identify a node list withm nodes in Algorithm
4.1, we need to match
(
m
2
)
node pairs. Thus, the probability to identify a node list
with m nodes is 1
2
(m2 ), and the expected number of node combinations is
∏m
i=1 |Ci|·
1
2
(m2 ). Thus, the computational complexity of Algorithm 4.1 is proportional to the
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sum of node combinations at each step, i.e. O(
∑k
m=2
∏m
i=1 |Ci| · 12(
m
2 )). Note that
we do not consider the fixed k − 1 edges between (xi−1, xi) for simplicity.
This result shows that as more nodes are identified in Algorithm 4.1, fewer
node combinations exists, which approximates to 0 (as shown in Section 4.5.1).
This means the major computation cost of our algorithm comes from the initial
few steps and is dominated by the size of their candidates. Note that we target
real graphs with very high level of node heterogeneity, e.g. small-world, power-law
or highly clustered graphs, which leads to small candidate size in most cases. In
other words, the computational complexity of our algorithm is low in real graphs.
In practice, our system can efficiently extract watermarks from real, million-node
graphs, and do so in a few minutes on a single commodity server (Section 4.7.3).
4.5 Fundamental Properties
Having described the basic watermark system, we now present detailed analysis
on its two fundamental properties: watermark uniqueness where each watermark
must be unique to the corresponding user, and watermark detectability where the
presence of a watermark should not be easily detectable by external users without
the knowledge of the seed Ωi associated with user i.
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4.5.1 Watermark Uniqueness
As a proof of ownership, each embedded watermark should be unique for its
user. That is, given the original graph G and the seed Ωi associated with user i,
the embedded watermark graph SWi should not be isomorphic to any subgraph
of GWj (i 6= j) where GWj is the watermarked graph for user j. Meanwhile, SWi
should not be isomorphic to any subgraph of the original graph G. The following
proof shows that with high probability, our proposed graph watermark system
produces unique watermarks for any graph G.
Theorem 1. Given a graph G with n nodes, let k ≥ (2 + δ) log2 n for a constant
δ > 0. We apply the following process to create a watermarked graph GWi for user
i:
• We create k nodes, V = {v1, v2, ..., vk}, and generate a random graph Wi on V
with an edge probability of 1
2
.
• We randomly select k nodes, X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} from G, and identify the
subgraph corresponding to these k nodes S = G[X].
• Using Wi, we modify S as follows: we first map each node xi in X to a node vi
in V . Let e(u, v) = 1 denote an edge exists between node u and v and e(u, v) = 0
denote otherwise. We modify each e(xi, xj) in S to e(xi, xj)⊕ e(vi, vj). We then
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explicitly connect nodes xi and xi+1, i.e. e(xi, xi+1) = 1. The resulting S now
becomes SWi, and the resulting G becomes GWi.
Let GWl denote a watermarked graph for user l (l 6= i), built using a different seed
Ωl.
Then with low probability, any subgraph of GWl or G is isomorphic to SWi.
Proof. We first show that with low probability, any subgraph of GWl is isomorphic
to SWi . Let Y = {y1, y2, ...yk} be a set of ordered nodes in GWl , where each yi
maps to a node xi in X. We define an event EY occurs if the subgraph GWl [Y ] is
isomorphic to GWi [X] or SWi . Then the event E representing the fact that there
exists at least one subgraph on GWl that is isomorphic to SWi is the union of
events EY on all possible Y , i.e. E = ∪Y EY .
Next, we compute the probability of event E by those of individual event EY .
Specifically, we first show that the probability of an edge exists between node xi
and xj (j 6= i+ 1) in SWi = GWi [X] is 12 . This is because each edge in the random
graph Wi is independently generated with probability 12 . After performing the
XOR operation between Wi and S, the probability of an edge exists between xi
and xj (j 6= i+ 1) on Swi is:
1
2
· pij + (1− pij) · 1
2
=
1
2
(4.3)
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where pij is the probability that an edge exists between xi and xj on S. Thus the
result of XOR between Wi and S is also a random graph, and its edge generation
is independent of that in GWl , l 6= i. Furthermore, it is easy to show that our
design applies XOR operations on
(
k
2
) − (k − 1) node pairs on the k nodes, and
each node pair has an edge with a probability of 1
2
. Thus, the probability of a
subgraph GWl [Y ] being isomorphic to SWi is:
P (EY ) = 1
2
(k2)−(k−1) · β (4.4)
where β ≤ 1 is the probability that every (yi, yi+1) pair in GWl [Y ] is connected.
Thus P (EY ) ≤ 12(
k
2)−(k−1).
Since E = ∪Y EY and there are less than nk possible sets of k ordered nodes in
GWl , we use the Union Bound to compute the probability of event E as follows:
P (E) < nk · P (EY ) ≤ nk · 1
2
(k2)−(k−1)
= 2
k2
2+δ · 1
2
k2−3k
2
+1
=
1
2
δk2
2(2+δ)
− 3k
2
+1
(4.5)
The above equation shows that the probability P (E) reduces exponentially to 0
as k increases.
Finally, we can apply the same method to show that with low probability, any
subgraph of G is isomorphic to SWi . This is because the XOR operations between
Wi and S produce a random graph that is independent of G.
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4.5.2 Watermark Detectability
In addition to providing uniqueness, a practical watermark design should also
offer low detectability, i.e., with low probability each watermark gets identified by
external users/attackers. This means that without knowing the seed Ωi associated
with user i,
the embedded watermark graph SWi should not be easily distinguishable from
the rest of the graph GWi . Therefore, the detectability would depend heavily on
the topology of the original graph G, i.e. a watermark graph can be well hidden
inside a graph GWi if its structural property is not too different from that of G.
In the following, we examine the detectability of watermarks in terms of a
graph’s suitability for watermarking. This is because directly quantifying the de-
tectability is not only highly computational expensive2, but also lacks a proper
metric. Instead, we cross-compare the key structural properties of SWi and G, and
define G as being suitable for watermarking if its structure properties are similar
to that of SWi , implying a low watermark detectability.
Suitability for Watermarking. To evaluate a graph’s suitability for wa-
termarks, we first study the key structural property of the embedded watermark
graph SWi . To guarantee watermark uniqueness and minimize distortion, the wa-
2Each embedded watermark graph is similar to a random graph with 12 edge probability.
Thus the detectability is low if certain subgraphs of G are also random graphs with similar edge
probabilities. Yet identifying these subgraphs (and the embedded watermark graph) on a large
graph incurs significant computation overhead.
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termark graph SWi needs to be a random graph with an edge probability of 1
2
(ex-
cept for the fixed edges between xi, xi+1 node pairs), and include k = (2+δ) log2 n
nodes. Thus its average node degree is at least (k + 1)/2 and its average graph
density is (
(
k
2
)
+ k − 1)/2.
Given these properties of the embedded watermark, we note that watermark
node degree and density can be higher than those of many real-world graphs. In-
tuitively, to ensure low detectability of such a watermark graph, suitable graphs
should include a set of nodes (D) that are difficult to distinguish from the water-
mark nodes in term of node degree and subgraph density. Specifically, a suitable
graph dataset needs to contain a set of nodes D with degree comparable or higher
than the watermark graph node degree; and the density of the subgraph on D
is at least comparable to the watermark graph density. If these two properties
hold, the embedded watermark graph cannot be easily distinguished from D in
the graph, and therefore cannot be detected by attackers.
To capture the above intuition, we define that a graph G is suitable for wa-
termarking if its node degree and graph density satisfy the following two criteria.
First, the minimum and maximum node degree of G, denoted as Nmin(G) and
Nmax(G) respectively, need to satisfy Nmin(G) ≤ (k + 1)/2 ≤ Nmax(G). Second,
across all k-node subgraphs of G whose node degree expectation is greater than
(k + 1)/2, the minimum and maximum graph density need to satisfy Dmin(k) ≤
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(
(
k
2
)
+k−1)/2 ≤ Dmax(k) 3. Together, these two criteria ensure that the embedded
watermark graph can be “well hidden” inside GWi .
Table 4.1: Statistics of 48 of today’s network graphs. k is the
watermark size.
Graph Category Graph # of Nodes # of Edges Avg. Deg. k
Facebook
Russia 97,134 289,324 6.0 39
L.A. 603,834 7,676,486 25.4 45
London 1,690,053 23,084,859 27.3 48
Epinions (1) 75,879 405,740 10.7 38
Slashdot (08/11/06) 77,360 507,833 13.1 38
Twitter 81,306 1,342,303 33.0 38
Other Slashdot (09/02/16) 81,867 497,672 12.2 38
Social Slashdot (09/02/21) 82,140 500,481 12.2 38
Networks Slashdot (09/02/22) 82,168 543,381 13.2 38
GPlus 107,614 12,238,285 227.5 39
Epinions (2) 131,828 711,496 10.8 40
Youtube 1,134,890 2,987,624 5.3 47
Pokec 1,632,803 22,301,964 27.3 48
Flickr 1,715,255 15,555,041 18.1 48
Livejournal 5,204,176 48,942,196 18.8 52
Citation Patents 23,133 93,468 8.1 34
3 To avoid computationally prohibitive subgraph enumeration, we apply a sampling method
to estimate them with full details in [163].
158
Secure Graph Sharing System Chapter 4
Networks ArXiv (Theo. Cit.) 27,770 352,304 25.4 34
ArXiv (Phy. Cit.) 34,546 420,899 24.4 35
ArXiv (Phy.) 12,008 118,505 19.7 32
Collaboration ArXiv (Astro) 18,772 198,080 21.1 33
Networks DBLP 317,080 1,049,866 6.6 43
ArXiv (Condense) 3,774,768 16,518,947 8.8 51
Communication Email (Enron) 36,692 183,831 10.0 35
Networks Email (Europe) 265,214 365,025 2.8 42
Wiki 2,394,385 4,659,565 3.9 49
Stanford 281,903 1,992,636 14.1 42
Web NotreDame 325,729 1,103,835 6.8 43
graphs BerkStan 685,230 6,649,470 19.4 45
Google 875,713 4,322,051 9.9 46
Location based Brightkite 58,228 214,078 7.4 37
OSNs Gowalla 196,591 950,327 9.7 41
Oregon (1) 11,174 23,409 4.2 31
AS Oregon(2) 11,461 32,730 5.7 32
Graphs CAIDA 26,475 53,381 4.0 34
Skitter 1,696,415 11,095,298 13.1 48
Gnutella (02/08/04) 10,876 39,994 7.4 31
Gnutella (02/08/25) 22,687 54,705 4.8 34
P2P networks Gnutella (02/08/24) 26,518 65,369 4.9 34
Gnutella (02/08/30) 36,682 88,328 4.8 35
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Gnutella (02/08/31) 62,586 147,892 4.7 37
Amazon (03/03/02) 262,111 899,792 6.9 42
Amazon Amazon (2012) 334,863 925,872 5.5 43
Co-purchasing Amazon (03/03/12) 400,727 2,349,869 11.7 43
Networks Amazon (03/06/01) 403,394 2,443,408 12.1 43
Amazon (03/05/05) 410,236 2,439,437 11.9 43
Road Pennsylvania 1,088,092 1,541,898 2.8 47
Networks Texas 1,379,917 1,921,660 2.8 47
California 1,965,206 2,766,607 2.8 49
Table 4.2: Suitability of watermarking for 48 of today’s
network graphs, determined by comparing their node degree
distribution [Nmin(G), Nmax(G)] and k-node subgraph density
[Dmin(k), Dmax(k)] to those of the embedded watermark graphs.
35 out of these 48 graphs are suitable for watermarking.
Graph
Graph
Node Degree k-node Subgraph
Suitability
Criterion Density Criterion
Category (k + 1)/2
[Nmin(G),
Watermark
[Dmin(k),
Nmax(G)] Dmax(k)]
Facebook
Russia 20 [1, 748] 390 [45, 701] Yes
L.A. 23 [1, 2141] 517 [44, 975] Yes
London 24 [1, 1483] 588 [47, 1128] Yes
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Epinions (1) 19 [1,3044] 370 [47,649] Yes
Slashdot (08/11/06) 19 [1, 2540] 370 [38, 668] Yes
Twitter 19 [1, 3383] 370 [44, 703] Yes
Other Slashdot (09/02/16) 19 [1, 2546] 370 [38, 669] Yes
Social Slashdot (09/02/21) 19 [1, 2548] 370 [38, 669] Yes
Networks Slashdot (09/02/22) 19 [1, 2553] 370 [38, 673] Yes
GPlus 20 [1, 20127] 389.5 [53, 741] Yes
Epinions (2) 20 [1, 3558] 409.5 [51, 780] Yes
Youtube 24 [1, 28754] 563.5 [47, 815] Yes
Pokec 24 [1, 14854] 587.5 [47, 979] Yes
Flickr 24 [1, 27236] 588 [51, 1128] Yes
Livejournal 26 [1, 15017] 689 [51, 1326] Yes
Citation Patents 17 [1, 280] 297 [37, 373] Yes
Networks ArXiv (Theo. Cit.) 17 [1, 2468] 297 [36, 534] Yes
ArXiv (Phy. Cit.) 18 [1, 846] 314.5 [36, 544] Yes
ArXiv (Phy.) 16 [1, 491] 263.5 [45, 496] Yes
Collaboration ArXiv (Astro) 17 [1, 504] 280 [37, 528] Yes
Networks DBLP 22 [1,343] 472.5 [43,903] Yes
ArXiv (Condense) 26 [1, 793] 663 [50,1063] Yes
Communication Email (Enron) 18 [1,1383] 314.5 [43,515] Yes
Networks Email (Europe) 21 [1,7636] 451 [74,683] Yes
Wiki 25 [1, 100029] 612 [65, 1066] Yes
Stanford 21 [1,38625] 451 [66,861] Yes
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Web NotreDame 22 [1,10721] 472.5 [60,903] Yes
graphs BerkStan 23 [1,84230] 517 [79,990] Yes
Google 23 [1, 6332] 540 [72, 1033] Yes
Location based Brightkite 19 [1,1134] 351 [41,665] Yes
OSNs Gowalla 21 [1,14730] 430 [44,723] Yes
Oregon (1) 16 [1,2389] 247.5 [95,352] Yes
AS Oregon(2) 16 [1,2432] 263.5 [79,476] Yes
Graphs CAIDA 17 [1,2628] 297 [113,436] Yes
Skitter 24 [1, 35455] 588 [52, 1128] Yes
Gnutella (02/08/04) 16 [1,103] 247.5 [30,80] No
Gnutella (02/08/25) 17 [1,66] 297 [0,0] No
P2P networks Gnutella (02/08/24) 17 [1,355] 297 [0,44] No
Gnutella (02/08/30) 18 [1,55] 314.5 [35,70] No
Gnutella (02/08/31) 19 [1, 95] 351 [39,76] No
Amazon (03/03/02) 21 [1,420] 451 [88,132] No
Amazon Amazon (2012) 22 [1,549] 472.5 [0,0] No
Co-purchasing Amazon (03/03/12) 22 [1,2747] 472.5 [52,285] No
Networks Amazon (03/06/01) 22 [1, 2752] 473 [52, 333] No
Amazon (03/05/05) 22 [1,2760] 472.5 [50,333] No
Road Pennsylvania 24 [1,9] 563.5 [0,0] No
Networks Texas 24 [1,12] 563.5 [0,0] No
California 25 [1, 12] 612 [0, 0] No
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Suitability of Real Graph Datasets. We measure the suitability of water-
marks in 48 real networks graphs. These graphs represent vastly different types
of networks and a wide range of structural topologies with size ranging from 10K
nodes and 39K edges to 5M nodes and 48M edges. These graphs represent vastly
different types of networks and a wide range of structural topologies. They in-
clude 3 social graphs generated from Facebook regional networks matching Russia,
L.A., and London [153]. They include 12 other graphs from online social net-
works, including Twitter [87], Youtube [157], Google+ [87], Slovakia Pokec [139],
Flickr [104], Livejournal [104], 2 snapshots from Epinions [121], and 4 snapshots
from Slashdot [86]. We also add 3 citation graphs from arXiv and U.S. Patents [81],
4 graphs capturing collaborations in arXiv [81] and DBLP [157], 3 communi-
cation graphs generated from 2 Email networks [85, 86] and Wiki Talk [83], 4
web graphs [79, 12], 2 location-based online social graphs from Brightkite and
Gowalla [30], 5 snapshots of P2P file sharing graph from Gnutella [85], 4 Inter-
net Autonomous System (AS) maps [81], 5 snapshots of Amazon co-purchasing
networks [82, 157], and 3 U.S. road graphs [79]. We list statistics of all graphs in
Table 4.1, and their corresponding watermark statistics in Table 4.2.
For all graphs, we use δ = 0.3 to ensure a 99.999% watermark uniqueness,
and list their watermark size k in Table 4.1. We also show the two above criteria:
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node degree and k-node subgraph density in Table 4.2. If a graph satisfies both
criteria, our results will hold for any watermarks embedded on it.
We can make two observations from Table 4.2. First, 35 out of our 48 total
graphs are suitable for watermarking. Also note that graphs describing similar
networks are consistent in their suitability. For example, all 15 graphs from various
online social networks are suitable for watermarks! Second, all the 13 graphs
unsuitable for watermarks come from only 3 kinds of networks, i.e. copurchasing
networks, P2P networks, and Road networks. These results in each group are self
consistent. These results support our assertion that our proposed watermarking
mechanism is applicable to most of today’s network graphs with low detection risk.
In practice, the owner of a graph can apply the same mechanism to determine if
her graph is suitable for our watermark scheme.
Table 4.3: Size and density of subgraph on nodes with degree >
(k+1)/2 in each graph. Size is the number of subgraph nodes, and
density is quantified as average edges each node having inside the
subgraph.
Graph
Subgraph Watermark Graph
Suitability
Node # Avg. Deg. k Avg. Deg.
Russia 4,794 22.2 39 20.0 Yes
L.A. 196,174 49.2 45 23.0 Yes
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London 562,075 56.1 48 24.5 Yes
Epinions (1) 7,083 68.7 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (08/11/06) 9,908 53.4 38 19.5 Yes
Twitter 34,014 60.5 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (09/02/16) 10,065 53.0 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (09/02/21) 10,105 53.2 38 19.5 Yes
Slashdot (09/02/22) 10,605 53.4 38 19.5 Yes
GPlus 68,828 347.1 39 20.0 Yes
Epinions (2) 10,363 83.5 40 20.5 Yes
Youtube 31,720 45.1 47 24.0 Yes
Pokec 564,001 53.0 48 24.5 Yes
Flickr 136,202 174.5 48 24.5 Yes
Livejournal 945,567 57.5 52 26.5 Yes
Patents 2,370 15.6 34 17.5 Yes
ArXiv (Theo. Cit.) 12,054 43.4 34 17.5 Yes
ArXiv (Phy. Cit.) 14,785 37.9 35 18.0 Yes
ArXiv (Phy.) 2,860 62.5 32 16.5 Yes
ArXiv (Astro) 6,536 42.9 33 17.0 Yes
DBLP 15,004 17.3 43 22.0 Yes
ArXiv (Condense) 178,455 16.0 51 26.0 Yes
Email (Enron) 3,481 48.2 35 18.0 Yes
Email (Europe) 1,779 44.0 42 21.5 Yes
Wiki Talk 21,253 83.1 49 25.0 Yes
Stanford 35,600 42.1 42 21.5 Yes
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NotreDame 16,831 38.7 43 22.0 Yes
BerkStan 110,202 57.0 45 23.0 Yes
Google 55,431 14.8 46 23.5 Yes
Brightkite 4,586 30.8 37 19.0 Yes
Gowalla 17,946 39.3 41 21.0 Yes
Oregon (1) 264 17.1 31 16.0 Yes
Oregon(2) 579 31.0 32 16.5 Yes
CAIDA 575 16.0 34 17.5 Yes
Skitter 146,601 50.0 48 24.5 Yes
Gnutella (02/08/04) 796 5.2 31 16.0 No
Gnutella (02/08/25) 499 2.0 34 17.5 No
Gnutella (02/08/24) 709 2.7 34 17.5 No
Gnutella (02/08/30) 1,001 3.8 35 18.0 No
Gnutella (02/08/31) 1,276 3.6 37 19.0 No
Amazon (03/03/02) 3,727 2.8 42 21.5 No
Amazon (2012) 5,318 2.5 43 22.0 No
Amazon (03/03/12) 25,717 6.7 43 22.0 No
Amazon (03/06/01) 28,081 7.3 43 22.0 No
Amazon (03/05/05) 28,044 7.5 43 22.0 No
Pennsylvania 0 0 47 24.0 No
Texas 0 0 47 24.0 No
California 0 0 49 25.0 No
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To understand key properties determining whether a graph is suitable for wa-
termarking, we measure various graph structural properties, including average
node degree, node degree distribution, clustering coefficient, average path length,
and assortativity. We also consider the size and density of subgraphs on nodes
with degree more than watermark minimum average degree (k + 1)/2. Our mea-
surement results show that the size and density of subgraphs on nodes with degree
> (k+ 1)/2 are the most important properties to determine suitability. Here, the
size of these subgraphs is the number of nodes in the subgraph, and the density
of the subgraph is measured as the average edges each node has inside the sub-
graph, i.e. average degree inside the subgraph. As shown in Table 4.3, unsuitable
graphs do not have subgraphs with density to comparable to watermarks, while
subgraphs with the desired density can be found in graphs deemed suitable. These
results are consistent with our intuition on quantifying suitability of watermarks.
Summary. Since the average watermark subgraph has high node degree and
density, a graph suitable for watermarking must include a set of nodes, whose
degree and subgraph density are comparable or even higher than watermark sub-
graphs. We propose two criteria targeting at node degree and subgraph density
respectively to quantify whether a graph is suitable for watermarking. We col-
lect a large set of available graph datasets and find 35 out of 48 real graphs are
suitable. We expect similar suitability results in other real network graphs.
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4.6 More Robust Watermarks
Our basic design provides the fundamental building blocks of graph water-
marking with little consideration of external attacks. In practice, malicious users
can seek to detect or destroy watermarked graphs. Here, we first describe ex-
ternal attacks on watermarks, and then present advanced features that defend
against the attacks. Note that these improvement techniques aim to increase the
cost of attacks rather than disabling them completely. Finally, we re-evaluate the
watermark uniqueness of the advanced design.
4.6.1 Attacks on Watermarks
As discussed earlier, our attack model includes attacks trying to destroy water-
marks while preserving the topology of the original graph. Based on the number
of attackers, attacks on watermarks fall under our two models: single attacker
and colluding attackers. With access to only one watermarked graph, a single at-
tacker can modify nodes and/or edges in the graph to destroy watermarks. With
multiple watermarked graphs, colluding attackers can perform more sophisticated
attacks by cross-comparing these graphs to detect or remove watermarks.
Single Attacker Model. The naive edge attack is easiest to launch, and
tries to disrupt the watermark by randomly adding or removing edges on the
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watermarked graph. For the attacker, there is a clear tradeoff between the severity
of the attack (number of edges or nodes modified), and the structural change or
distortion applied to the graph structure.
At first glance, this attack seems weak and unlikely to be a real threat. The
probability of the attacker modifying one edge or node in the embedded watermark
graph Wi is extremely low, given the relatively small size of Wi compared to the
graph. As shown later, however, this attack can be quite disruptive in practice.
By modifying a node ni or an edge connected to ni, the attack impacts all of
ni’s neighboring nodes, since their NSD labels will be modified. These NSD
label changes, while small, are enough to make locating nodes in the watermark
graph very difficult. This effect is exacerbated in social graphs that exhibit a
small world structure, since any change to a supernode’s degree will impact a
disproportionately large portion of nodes in the graph.
Some versions of this attack would either release a partial subgraph of the
watermarked graph, or merge multiple watermarked graphs. In both cases, this
destroys the embedded watermarks, but also significantly distorts the graphs and
reduces their usability. We do not consider these disruptive attacks in our study,
and target them for future work.
Collusion Attacks. By obtaining multiple watermarked graphs, an attacker
can compare these graphs to eliminate watermarks. Since we anonymize each
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watermarked graph by randomly reassigning node IDs (see Section 4.4.1), attack-
ers cannot directly match individual nodes across graphs. To compare multiple
graphs, we apply the deanonymization methods proposed in [107, 108]. Specifi-
cally, we first match 1000 highest degree nodes between two graphs based on their
degree and neighborhood connectivity [108], and then start from these nodes
to find new mappings with the network structure and the previously mapped
nodes [107].
Using deanonymization techniques, attackers can then build a “clean” graph,
where an edge exists if it exists in the majority of the watermarked graphs. Since
embedded watermark graphs are likely embedded at different locations on each
graph, a majority vote approach effectively removes the contributions from wa-
termark subgraphs, leading to a graph that closely approximates the original G.
4.6.2 Improving Robustness against Attacks
The attacks discussed above can disrupt the watermark extraction process in
two ways. First, adding or deleting nodes/edges in G′ changes node degrees, and
therefore nodes’ NSD labels, thereby disrupting the identification of candidate
nodes during the second step of the extraction process; second, adding or deleting
nodes/edges inside the embedded watermark graph SWi can change the structure
of the watermark graph, making it difficult to identify during the third step of the
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extraction process. To defend against these attacks, we propose five improvements
over the basic extraction design to produce an improved watermark generation
algorithm.
Improvements #1, #2: Addressing changes to node neighborhoods.
Extracting a watermark involves searching through nodes in G′ by their NSD
labels. By adding or deleting nodes/edges, attackers can effectively change NSD
labels across the graph. To address this, we propose two changes to the basic
extraction design.
First, we bucketize node degrees (with bucket size B) to reduce the sensitivity
of a node’s NSD label to its neighbors’ node degrees. For example, with B = 5, a
node with degree 9 will stay in the same bucket even if one of its edges has been
removed (reducing its node degree to 8).
Second, when selecting a watermark node’s candidate node list, we replace the
exact NSD label matching with the approximate NSD label matching. A match
is found if the overlap between two bucketized NSD labels exceeds a threshold θ.
For example, with θ = 50%, a node with bucketized NSD label “1-2-3-4” would
match a node with label “1-2-3” since the overlap is 75% > θ.
These changes clearly allow us to identify more candidates for each watermark
node, thus improving robustness against small local modifications. On the other
hand, more candidates lead to more computation during the subgraph matching
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step (step 3 in Section 4.4.2). Such expansion, however, does not affect watermark
uniqueness and detectability, since they are unrelated to the size of candidate
pools.
Improvement #3, #4: Addressing changes to subgraph structure. Ran-
dom changes made to G′ may directly impact a node or edge in the embedded
watermark. To address this, we propose two techniques.
First, we add redundancy to watermarks by embedding the same watermark
graph Wi into m disjoint subgraphs S1, S2, ...Sm from the original graph G. This
greatly increases the probability of the owner locating at least one unmodified copy
of Wi during extraction, even in the presence of attacks that make significant
changes to nodes and edges in G′. Note that since we embed watermarks on
disjoint subgraphs, this does not affect watermark uniqueness 1 − P (E). While
embedding m watermarks will impact false positive, which is 1− (1− P (E))m.
Second, it is still possible that all the watermark graphs are “destroyed” by the
attacker and there are no matches in the extraction process. If this happens, we
replace the exact subgraph matching in the step 3 of the extraction process with
the approximate subgraph matching. That is, a subgraph matches the watermark
graph if the amount of edge difference between the two is less than a threshold
L. By relaxing the search criteria used in step 3 of the extraction process, this
technique allows us to identify “partially” damaged watermarks, thus again im-
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proving robustness against attacks. However, it can also increase false positives in
watermark extraction, reducing watermark uniqueness. We show in Section 4.6.3
that the impact on watermark uniqueness can be tightly bounded by controlling
L.
Improvement #5: Addressing Collusion Attacks. Recall that for pow-
erful attackers able to match graphs at an individual node level, they can leverage
majority votes across multiple watermarked graphs to remove watermarks. To
defend against this, our insight is to embed watermarks that have some portion
of spatial overlap in the graph, such that those components will survive majority
votes over graphs.
We propose a hierarchical watermark embedding process to defend against
collusion attacks. To build watermarked graphs forM users, we uniform-randomly
divide the M users into 2 groups (a1 and a2) and associate each group with a
public-private key pair < Ka1pub, K
a1
priv > or < K
a2
pub, K
a2
priv >, which is generated
and held by the data owner. We repeat this to randomly divide M users into
another 2 groups (b1 and b2) associated with group key pairs < Kb1pub, K
b1
priv > and
< Kb2pub, K
b2
priv > separately. After this step, each user is assigned to two groups 4.
For example, a user i is assigned to groups a1 and b2.
4More details about the group assignment are in [163].
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For user i, we then follow step 2-4 in Section 4.4.1 to embed the two group wa-
termarks and its individual watermark. Specifically, by receiving user i’s signature
Kipriv(T ), we first generate three seeds: Ωi by combining Kipriv(T ) and KG, Ωa1 by
combining Ka1priv and KG, and Ωb2 by combining K
b2
priv and KG, where KG is graph
key for graph G. With the two group seeds Ωa1 and Ωb2 , we generate and embed
two non-overlap group watermarks. Then we use user i’s individual seed Ωi to
embed an individual watermark without overlapping with either of the embedded
group watermarks. Note that because the group and individual watermarks are
generated with different seeds, this hierarchical embedding process does not affect
watermark uniqueness.
Under this design, a collusion attack can successfully destroy all the water-
marks only if the attacker can perfectly match each individual node, and the
majority of the graphs come from different groups. Otherwise, the majority vote
on raw edges will preserve the group watermark. We can compute the upper bound
of the attack success rate by Equation 4.6, i.e. the probability that the majority
of the graphs obtained by the attacker come from different groups:
λ(Ma, J) =
1− J Ma∑
i=dMa+1
2
e
(
Ma
i
)
· ( 1
J
)i · (J − 1
J
)Ma−i
2 (4.6)
where Ma is the number of watermarked graphs obtained by the attacker and J
is the number of groups in each group partition. The above design chose J = 2
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because it minimizes λ(Ma, J),∀Ma. Furthermore, whenMa is odd, λ(Ma, 2) = 0;
and whenMa is even, λ(Ma, 2) is at most 0.25 whenMa = 2. Note that in equation
(4.6) the operation (.)2 is due to the fact that we group the users twice into two
different group classes: a1, a2 and b1, b2. If we only perform the group partition
once (e.g. dividing the users into a1, a2), then λ(2, 2) = 0.5. In practice we can
further reduce λ by performing multiple rounds of group division (2 in the above
design) and adding more group watermarks.
Note that group watermarks contain much less information than single user
watermarks. In fact, the more robust a group watermark, the larger granularity
(and less precision) it will provide. Our proposed solution is to extend the system
by using additional “dimensions,” e.g. go beyond the two dimensions of a and b
mentioned above. Combining results from multiple dimensions will quickly narrow
down the set of potential users responsible for the leak. However, since a collud-
ing attack requires the involvement of multiple leakers, even identifying a single
leaker is insufficient. Developing a scheme to reliably detect multiple (ideally all)
colluding users is a topic for future work.
4.6.3 Impact on Watermark Uniqueness
To improve the robustness of our watermark system, we relax the subgraph
matching criteria from exact matching to approximate matching with at most L
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edge difference. Such relaxation does not affect watermark detectability because
it does not change the embedding process. However, it may affect watermark
uniqueness, which we will analyze next.
Consider two watermarked graphs GWi and GWj that were independently gen-
erated for user i and j following the three steps defined in Theorem 1. Let SWi
and SWj represent the embedded watermark graph in GWi and GWj , respectively.
To examine the watermark uniqueness, we seek to compute the probability that
a subgraph in GWj differs from SWi by at most L edges.
Our analysis follows a similar structure of Theorem 1’s proof. Let EY denote
the event where a subgraph of GWj built on k nodes Y = {y1, y2, ..., yk} only
differs from SWi by ≤ L edges. Our goal is to calculate the probability of the
event E = ∪Y EY , which is the union on all combinations of k nodes.
We first compute the probability of individual EY . Recall that the edges be-
tween
(
k
2
)− (k − 1) node pairs in SWi are generated randomly with probability 1
2
and are independent of GWj , while the rest k−1 edges (< xl, xl+1 >, l = 1...k−1)
are fixed. Thus we can show that the probability that a subgraph GWj [Y ] differs
from SWi by h edges is upper bounded by 1
2
e−k+1 ·(e
h
)
where e =
(
k
2
)
. Therefore, we
can derive the probability of EY as P (EY ) ≤ 12
e−k+1 ·∑Lh=0 (eh). And consequently,
we have Equation 4.7
176
Secure Graph Sharing System Chapter 4
P (E) ≤ nk · 1
2
e−k+1
·
L∑
h=0
(
e
h
)
(4.7)
where e =
(
k
2
)
, k = (2 + δ)log2n, and n is the node count of GWj .
Next, given the probability of uniqueness 1 − P (E), we compute the upper
bound on L to ensure 1 − P (E) ≥ 0.99999 for all the graphs in Table 4.1 except
Road graphs, Co-purchasing graphs, and P2P network graphs. Again we set
δ = 0.3. The result is listed in Table 4.4, where the maximum limit of L varies
between 0 and 12. In general, the larger the graph, the higher the upper bound
on L.
4.7 Experimental Evaluation
We use real network graphs to evaluate the performance of the graph wa-
termarking system in three key metrics: false positives, graph distortion and
watermark robustness. Having analytically quantified watermark uniqueness in
Section 4.5 and Section 4.6, we focus on examining graph distortion and water-
mark robustness while ensuring ≤ 0.001% false positive rate. We also study the
computational efficiency of the proposed watermark embedding and extraction
schemes.
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Graph Oregon (1) Oregon (2) CAIDA
Email arXiv
(Enron) (Theo. Cit.)
L Bound 0 1 1 1 1
Graph
arXiv arXiv arXiv
Patent
Slashdot
(Phy. Cit.) (Phy.) (Astro) (08/11/06)
L Bound 1 1 1 2 3
Graph Twitter
Slashdot Slashdot Slashdot
Brightkite
(09/02/16) (09/02/21) (09/02/22)
L Bound 3 3 3 3 3
Graph Russia Epinions (1) Google+ Epinions (2) Standford
L Bound 4 4 4 5 5
Graph
Email
Gowalla BerkStand DBLP NorteDame
(Europe)
L Bound 5 5 6 7 7
Graph L.A. London Flickr Wiki Google
L Bound 8 8 8 8 8
Graph Skitter Youtube Pokec
arXiv
Livejournal
(Condense)
L Bound 8 9 9 11 12
Table 4.4: Upper bound of L for the 35 network graphs.
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Experiment Setup. Given the large number of graph computations per data
point, we focus our experiments on two larger network graphs in Table 4.1, i.e.
the LA regional Facebook graph and the Flickr graph. The two graphs have very
different sizes and graph structures. To guarantee ≤ 0.001% false positives, we use
δ = 0.3, k = 45 for the LA graph, and δ = 0.3, k = 48 for the Flickr graph. For
our basic design, we generate 1 watermark per graph. For our advanced design,
we set L to 8, the degree bucket size to 10, and the NSD similarity threshold
to θ = 0.75. For each user, we embed 5 watermarks in its graph, 3 individual
watermarks and 2 group watermarks. We chose these settings because they work
well in practice. We leave the optimization of these parameters to future work.
Next, we present experimental results on graph distortion, robustness against
attacks, and computational efficiency.
4.7.1 Graph Distortion from Watermarks
We consider three metrics to measure graph distortion.
• Modifications to the raw graph.We count the number of nodes/ edges mod-
ified by embedding watermarks. More modifications to the graph introduce
higher distortion.
• dK-2 Deviation. dK-2 series, i.e., joint degree distributions, are an impor-
tant graph structural metric [128]. We quantify graph distortion using the nor-
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malized Euclidean distance between the dK-2 series of the original and of the
watermarked graphs 5. Larger dK-2 deviation implies higher distortion to the
graph structure.
• Graph metrics with and without watermarks. We measure the widely
used graph metrics before and after the watermarking, including degree distri-
bution, assortativity (AS) [128], clustering coefficient (CC) [128], average path
length, and diameter. Large deviation in any of the metrics indicates large
distortion.
We have examined the distortion introduced by both the basic and advanced
designs. We only show the results of the advanced design because it adds more
watermarks and thus leads to higher distortion. For LA and Flickr graphs, we
generate 10 different watermarked graphs (using 10 different seeds) and present
the average result across these graphs. Because computing shortest paths on
the large graphs is highly computational intensive, we compute the average path
length and diameter among 1000 random nodes [153].
Table 4.5 shows the percentage of modified nodes/edges by watermarking.
Even after embedding 5 watermarks, the modification for both graphs is less
than 0.04%, implying little distortion on the watermarked graphs. This is further
confirmed by the average dK-2 distances.
5The Euclidean distance between dK-2 series is normalized by the number of tuples in the
dK-2 series.
180
Secure Graph Sharing System Chapter 4
Graph Nodes (%) Edges (%) dK-2 Deviation
Watermarked LA 0.037% 0.033% 0.0008
Watermarked Flickr 0.014% 0.019% 0.0001
Table 4.5: Percentage of modified nodes/edges after embedding 5 watermarks into a graph
and dK-2 Deviation.
We also compare the original and watermarked graphs using 5 graph met-
rics: AS, CC, degree distribution, average path length, and diameter. Similarly,
the metrics remain the same before and after watermarking, and we found no
difference between the statistical distributions of each metric in the graphs.
Together, this indicates that embedding watermarks produces negligible im-
pact on graph structure. Thus we believe watermarked graphs can replace the
originals in graph applications and produce (near-)identical results.
4.7.2 Robustness against Attacks
Next, we study the robustness of the watermarking system under the attacks.
For each of the two attacks discussed in Section 4.6.1, we vary the attack strength,
repeat each experiment 10 times, and examine the following two metrics:
• Robustness. In the single attacker model, the robustness is the ratio of graphs
from which we can successfully extract at least one of the 3 individual water-
marks. In the collusion attack, in addition to this ratio, we also measure the ratio
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of graphs where we can extract at least one of the 5 watermarks (3 individual
+ 2 group watermarks).
• Cost of the attack. The normalized distortion on the attacked graphs. It
represents the dK-2 deviation between the attacked graphs and the original
graph, normalized by that between the “clean” watermarked graphs and the
original graph. If the normalized distortion is > 1, the attack introduces more
distortion than embedding watermarks.
Results on the Single Attacker Model. For the single attacker model,
we quantify the attack strength by the number of modified edges. The robustness
and the cost of the attack are measured as a function of the number of modified
edges.
We first evaluate the robustness of the basic watermark. Figure 4.3 and Fig-
ure 4.4 show that randomly modifying a small number of edges disrupted the
extraction process. For example, in LA, our basic design cannot recover the wa-
termark with 100% probability when we only modify 20 edges. In each case, at
least one of the nodes in the watermarks had a modified NSD label (one of its
neighbors’ degree changed), and it could not be located in the extraction process.
We show the distortion on the attacked graphs separately in Figure 4.5 and
Figure 4.6. As expected, the small number of modifications causes small distor-
tions in graph structures. Still in LA, when the robustness is 0, the distortion is
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Figure 4.3: Robustness of basic design
against single attacker model, LA.
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Figure 4.4: Robustness of the basic design
against single attacker model, Flickr.
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Figure 4.5: Distortion caused by single
attacker model in the basic design, LA.
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Figure 4.6: Distortion caused by single
attacker model in the basic design, Flickr.
around 3x more than that the watermarked graphs. Both results show that the
basic watermark scheme is easily disrupted by small, single user attacks.
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 show that robustness of the improved scheme de-
creases with attack strength, since more edges are modified to “destroy” water-
marks. Like in Flickr, the system can handle attack strength up to 933K modified
edges, which is > 400x stronger than the maximum attack strength in the basic
design.
On the other hand, Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show that the cost of these
attacks is large. For Flickr, with more than 1.4M modified edges, an attack leads
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Figure 4.7: Robustness of the improved
design against single attacker model, LA.
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Figure 4.8: Robustness of the improved
design against single attacker model, Flickr.
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Figure 4.9: Distortion caused by single
attacker model in the improved design, LA.
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Figure 4.10: Distortion caused by single
attacker model in the improved design, Flickr.
to 800x more distortions over that caused by embedding 5 watermarks. Our
improved watermark is highly robust against single user attacks.
Results on Collusion Attacks. To implement the collusion attack de-
scribed in Section 4.6.1, we first generate 10 watermarked graphs and randomly
pick Ma graphs from them as the graphs acquired by the attacker. We vary the
number of graphs obtained by the attacker Ma between 2 to 5. For each Ma value
we repeat the experiments 10 times and report the average value. Since basic wa-
termarks are easily disrupted by the collusion attack, we focus on the robustness
of the improved mechanisms.
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Figure 4.11: Robustness of the improved
design against collusion attacker model, LA.
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Figure 4.12: Robustness of the improved
design against collusion attacker model,
Flickr.
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Figure 4.13: Distortion caused by collusion
attacker model in the improved design, LA.
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Figure 4.14: Distortion caused by collusion
attacker model in the improved design, Flickr.
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show the robustness of the watermarked LA and
Flickr graphs against the collusion attack. Figure 4.11 shows that in LA, by
applying majority votes on raw edges, the collusion attack can effectively remove
all 3 individual watermarks. However, the attack is ineffective in removing both
group watermarks: we can extract at least one group watermark in more than
60% of the attacked graphs. Here the robustness values deviate slightly from that
projected by Equation (4.6) because we limit the number of statistical sampling
to 10 runs. Unlike LA, Figure 4.12 plots that the collusion attack cannot remove
185
Secure Graph Sharing System Chapter 4
all the individual watermarks in Flickr when using 2 or 3 watermarked graphs.
This is because the deanonymization method causes a large portion of nodes
mismatched in Flickr ( 30% nodes). Finally, Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 show
that the collusion attacks also introduce larger distortions in graph structure.
These results show that even a powerful collusion attack is ineffective in re-
moving all embedded watermarks. Moreover, the potential inaccuracy of the
deanonymization method makes the attack even weaker in removing individual
watermarks. Of course, the attackers will eventually succeed in disrupting water-
marks if they are willing to modify and sacrifice the utility of the graph. While we
provide a robust defense against attackers with low level of tolerance for graph dis-
tortion, we hope follow-on work will develop more robust defenses against higher
distortion attacks.
4.7.3 Computational Efficiency
We measure the efficiency of embedding and extracting watermarks, including
the time to select candidates (step 2) and to identify watermarks (step 3). We
accelerate the extraction process by parallelizing the key steps across servers.
Specifically, in candidate selection, any available server is assigned an unchecked
watermark node to find its candidates. In watermark identification, each available
server will be assigned to search one watermark from one candidate of watermark
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Graph Embedding (s)
Basic Extraction Improved Extraction
Single(s) Parallel (s) Single (s) Parallel (s)
LA 40 270 39 310 42
Flickr 80 767 195 776 197
Livejournal 695 2568 310 2605 317
Table 4.6: The efficiency of the watermarking system, including watermark embedding time
on one server, the extraction time on one server and the parallel extraction time across 10
servers.
node x1. When a watermark is found or no more candidates are unchecked, the
extraction process stops (for that user).
We perform measurements to quantify impact of parallelizing extraction over
a cluster. All system parameters are the same as previous tests, except that we
embed 1 watermark into a graph. We compare the improved watermark extraction
method to the basic extraction method. In addition to Flickr and LA graphs, we
also measure the efficiency on Livejournal graph [104], a larger graph with 5.2M
nodes, 49M edges. We parallelize watermark extraction across 10 servers, each
with 192GB RAM, and report the average times from 10 different watermarked
graphs.
Table 4.6 shows that our system is efficient in embedding and extracting wa-
termarks. Embedding one watermark into a graph is very fast, e.g. average
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embedding time for the largest graph, Livejournal, is around 12 minutes. Even
using one server to extract watermarks, the computation time is small, e.g. 13
minutes in Flickr using both the basic and improved schemes. Time to identify
the watermark graph on the candidate subgraphs (step 3) is much less than the
time required to find candidates (step 2), which corresponds to 99% of total com-
putation time. Since finding candidates takes O(kn) computational complexity
and k = (2 + δ) log2 n, the complexity to extract a watermark from a real-world
graph is O(n log2 n). Here k is node number in the watermark graph and n is
nodes in the total graph.
Second, we find that distributed extraction produces good speedup, 8 over 10
servers for Livejournal and 7 for LA (for both extraction methods). The speedup
for Flickr is only around 4 using both methods, because one of the watermarked
graphs takes much longer time than others in finding candidates, 4x longer. With-
out this outlier, the average parallel extraction time on Flickr is around 2.5 minutes
for both methods, 5x faster than using single server.
Finally, there is no significant difference between computation time for the two
extraction methods.
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we take a first step towards the design and implementation of
a robust graph watermarking system. Graph watermarks have the potential to
significantly impact the way graphs are shared and tracked. Our work identifies
the critical requirements of such a system, and provides an initial design that
targets the critical properties of uniqueness, robustness to attacks, and minimal
distortion to the graph structure. We also identify key attacks against graph wa-
termarks, and evaluate them against an improved design with additional features
for improved robustness under attack. Finally, we show the watermarking system
is efficient in both watermark embedding and watermark extraction.
Our evaluation shows that our initial watermarking system modifies very few
nodes and edges in a graph, i.e. less than 0.04% nodes and edges in a graph with
603K nodes and 7.6M edges. Results also demonstrate extremely low distortion,
i.e. the watermarked graphs are highly consistent with the original graph in all
graph metrics we considered. Empirical tests on several real, large graphs show
that our robustness features dramatically improved our resilience against both
single and multi-user collusion attacks. Finally, we show that the embedding
process and the extraction process are efficient, and the extraction process is
easily parallelized over a computing cluster.
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While our proposed scheme achieves many of our initial goals, there is signif-
icant room for improvement and ongoing work. One focus is developing stronger
redundancy schemes to protect against attackers with a greater tolerance for graph
distortion, i.e. willing to make a greater number of node/edge changes. Another
is to develop alternate schemes that can recover more information about multiple
attackers in the colluding attack model. We will discuss more in Section 5.3 in
Chapter 5.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have taken the new opportunities for graph analysis by
having access to large traces of graphs, and we have also faced the challenges from
scalability, dynamics, and data privacy. Our methodology is data-driven, where
in Chapter 2 we address problems that have been first considered, in Chapter 3 we
revisit fundamental graph problem, and in Chapter 4 we provide new alternatives
for existing problems. We believe that our methodology is general and can be
applied to both research in graph analysis, and also various other fields.
In this chapter, we summarize our work on data-driven graph analysis. We also
share what we have learnt and lessons through the research process, in the hope
that they may provide useful guidance for data-driven analysis or graph analysis.
Finally, we discuss future work to conclude the chapter.
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5.1 Conclusion
Thanks to the proliferation of networks, having access to large traces of graphs
is becoming possible. Compare to graphs studied in prior research works, those
graphs may be several orders of magnitude larger, have much higher volumes
of dynamics, and represent much more private information. They are bringing
great opportunities as well as new challenges. In this dissertation, we look at
graph problems from a data-driven perspective, where we explore dynamic graph
analyzing and modeling in terms of absolute time, we revisit fundamental graph
problem and try to improve current solutions, and we provide new alternatives
to securely share graph datasets. In all the problems we have looked at, we
provide novel solutions and validate their effectiveness with various large-scale
graph datasets.
We first seek to analyze and model graph dynamics. Starting from the explo-
ration of self-similarity properties, which is critical of determining how to model
network dynamics, our work takes a concrete step towards studying the detailed
dynamics of social networks. We focus on “ time-stamped” traces of network
growth, i.e., network includes detailed timings of when nodes arrive and edges
are created. By performing empirical studies of network dynamics, we find that
the edge creation process in social graphs is consistent with self-similarity scaling,
once we account for periodic user activity that makes edge creation process non-
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stationary. We leverage these findings to build a complete model of social network
dynamics that combines temporal and spatial components. Specifically, the tem-
poral behavior of our model reflects the coexistence of long-term non-stationary
periodic structure, e.g. diurnal or weekly patterns, and properties consistent with
self-similarity at shorter time scales. The spatial side accounts for a dynamic
graph model that simulates edge creation process driven primarily by existing
users, and captures graph densification, shrinking network diameter, and decreas-
ing local clustering. We validate our model against network dynamics in Renren
and Facebook datasets, and show that it succeeds in producing desired properties
in both temporal patterns and graph structural features.
We then revisit the fundamental graph problem, i.e., link prediction, from an
empirical perspective. We use different real traces of large dynamic networks,
and take a concrete step towards objectively quantifying the predictive power
of today’s link prediction algorithms. We implement 18 algorithms, including
both metric-based and classification-based approaches. We find that the best
metric-based predictors (vary across different networks) perform on par with the
most accurate classifier (SVM in all cases), and we derive potential guidelines
for choosing metrics based on network structure. We also take a deeper look at
current link prediction algorithms for the source of low accuracy, in terms of both
structural and temporal aspects. Furthermore, we provide “temporal filters” that
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can greatly improve prediction accuracy (across different methods and networks)
by leveraging knowledge of prior network dynamics, even for predictors that have
already integrated temporal information.
Finally, we study graph privacy problems, i.e., how to securely share graph
datasets. We take a first step towards the design and implementation of a robust
graph watermarking system. Graph watermarks have the potential to significantly
impact the way graphs are shared and tracked. Our work identifies the critical
requirements of such a system, and provides an initial design that targets the
critical properties of uniqueness, robustness to attacks, and minimal distortion to
the graph structure. We also identify key attacks against graph watermarks, and
evaluate them against an improved design with additional features for improved
robustness under attack. Finally, we show the watermarking system is efficient in
both watermark embedding and watermark extraction.
5.2 Lessons
With the efforts to study graph problems from data-driven perspective, we
have accumulated rich experience and learned various lessons. In the following we
summarize these lessons.
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Data-Driven Studies is Critical. Data-driven analysis is a very useful
tool in graph analysis, where it helps researchers understand what the real data
look like, clear confusions, and provide insights on how we should build mod-
els/systems/algorithms. It is especially powerful to correct invalid assumptions
with synthetic datasets that are often much smaller and less dynamic.
One prominent example is our revisit to link prediction problem (Chapter 3).
As the basis for social recommendations in a wide range of social networks and
applications, the link prediction problem is believed by many people to be well
solved due to the success of these social sites, and the large number of literature.
However, there has been little opportunity to study these link prediction proposals
from an empirical perspective. With the access to large traces of social graph
growth, we reassess this problem and find current link prediction performance
remains poor in absolute terms. We then take a deeper look for the source of low
accuracy, and propose an effective filtering mechanism that can greatly improve
prediction accuracy based on our insights from data.
Another example is analyzing and modeling social network dynamics (Chap-
ter 2). We start from understanding large-scale social network traces, from the
perspective of self-similarity. Using our findings from both temporal patterns and
graph structural features, we build a complete model which can more accurately
capture important properties in social network dynamics, compared to traditional
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graph models that based on assumption that are likely invalid for large and dy-
namic graphs.
The findings and insights from empirical measurements and analysis can often
act as guidance when we try to design solution to meet challenges from real world
problems. They are powerful tools that are not only applicable in graph analysis,
but also useful in other research fields.
Tradeoffs Based on Priority of Goals. Designing algorithms and systems
for large-scale real graphs often face challenges from tradeoffs among different
goals, e.g., accuracy, scalability and robustness. The efforts to achieve all goals
usually fail because they often naturally conflict with each other. Then researchers
need to prioritize various goals, which is challenging and decisions should be made
based on specific application scenario.
For instance, in the design of graph watermark system (Chapter 4), we want
the system to have less distortion on graph structure, and also the watermarked
graph be robust against potential attacks. There inherently conflicts with each
other: strong robustness guarantee indicates more distortion of the graph, which
leads to low utility of graph structure, and vice versa. In a graph sharing scenario,
we think system robustness is preferred to guarantee graph privacy. So we add
a hierarchical watermark embedding process on the basic system design to fight
agains potential collusion attacks.
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Also when we evaluate existing approaches for link prediction, we often face
the challenges from scalability versus prediction accuracy. A detailed example
is Katz, a widely used metric-based algorithm. Since Katz is proved to be not
scalable, we adopt two approximation methods, i.e., Katzlr [6] and Katzsc [137].
Katzlr has less approximation in mechanism, and almost consistently outperforms
Katzsc. However, it is difficult to scale on larger datasets such as Renren and
YouTube. As a result, from the empirical view we think Katzsc is better for larger
and denser graphs while Katzlr remains a good choice for smaller and sparser
graphs.
Emphasizing on one goal is usually at the cost of some other goals, and to
provide a reasonable priority list of goals requires a thorough understanding of
both the problem and the scenario. Often this is not an easy task, but it is a must
for elegant algorithm/system design.
Apply Lessons/Wisdom from Other Fields. Lessons and wisdom from
other research fields are often generic to inspire ideas in one’s focused area. To
make them more helpful, one needs to deeply understand his/her own problem,
the specific background, and identify new challenges, if any.
We have learned this lesson from detecting the existence of self-similarity in
dynamic graph analysis (Chapter 2). Before we start modeling, we are reminded
lessons from traffic modeling, where the discovery of self-similarity in traffic pro-
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cess defines hard limits on how traffic dynamics can be models using traditional
means, e.g., Poisson models. Therefore, we start from the measurement of self-
similarity property using traditional tools by traffic modeling, i.e., Variance anal-
ysis and R/S analysis. However, we find both tools are unable to produce reliable
results because of underlying deterministic trends in the process, caused by hu-
man behaviors. We then apply a more advanced tool, i.e., wavelet analysis, to
fight against such underlying trends. This example shows how lessons from traf-
fic modeling inspired us, and how we need to face specific challenges from social
graphs.
In addition, we introduce the idea “watermark” into graph privacy since we
see watermarking technique is widely used to protect intellectual property, e.g.,
in digital watermarking, relational datasets, and there are lots of stories on how
they have successfully limited data piracy. Unlike digital or relational datasets
watermarking, graph watermarking is quite challenging. We cannot have any
labels or identifiers, and can work only on graph structures since any leaked graph
can have all metadata stripped. This requires us to deeply understand graph
structural properties.
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5.3 Future Work
In this dissertation, we introduce our efforts for research in graphs from an em-
pirical lens. Looking forward, there are many interesting problems left unexplored
in broader graph contexts. In this section, we discuss three potential directions:
studying more categories of graphs, securely sharing graphs, and online user be-
havior analysis.
5.3.1 Studying More Categories of Graphs
As fundamental abstraction for networks, there are many different categories
of graphs. Many graph models and systems focus on ongoing networks and graph
structure only. While today’s complex networks continue to develop, there is
increasing need for research in more general topics for graphs. Here we target two
basic graph types: declining networks, and graphs with meta information.
Networks in decline. Unlike ongoing networks, which are growing and the
main focus in today’s research, networks in decline can be characterized as net-
works experiencing a sustained reduction in demand [40]. For example, according
to [1], in just three years (from 2009 to 2012), the former social network giant
MySpace has gone from around 20 million daily visitors to around 2 million. This
is not the only example. Social websites like Friendster and Orkut have also expe-
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rienced great loss. Even Twitter is reported [4] to struggle with growing its user
base and face a fairly flat growth in the following several years. In those situation,
edges and nodes may disappear and reappear, and the whole networks may have
different properties in terms of both graph structures and temporal patterns. This
brings us new opportunities and challenges to revisit many graph problems. For
example, the measurement, analysis and modeling of dynamic traces in declining
networks, prediction for both appearing and disappearing links, etc.
Graphs with meta information. Graph meta information may include
node-related information like user profiles, and also edge-related information like
the type and strength of social links. Those are rich information which are of-
ten combined with network structural data in deployed systems/algorithms in
real world application. For example, Twitter’s user recommendation service WTF
(“Who to Follow”) [53] combines user profiles and behavioral data, shared in-
terests, common connections and other information sources to largely boost pre-
diction accuracy empirically. Also, there are research focuses on graphs with
additional information besides graph topology, such as edge weights [96], node
connections on other social networks [106], and link direction [158], they all prove
to have impact on graph problems. We plan to consider these factors in future
work, e.g., evaluate link prediction in graphs with meta data.
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5.3.2 Securely Sharing Graphs
Graph sharing is critical to both the research community, where they can
have access to more real large graph datasets, and also the industry, where com-
panies can get cooperation chances for better facilities and be free from scan-
dals/lawsuits caused by graph leakage. A variety of solutions have been pro-
posed, ranging from anonymization tools that defend against specific attacks, like
k-anonymization [91, 168], or more attack-agnostic defense, like graph random-
ization [56], graph generalization [55], differential privacy [43] and cryptography
approaches [28]. However, most of the studies focus on static graphs, which fail
to meet challenges from high volume of dynamics from today’s network graphs.
Here we identify one future direction as securely sharing dynamic graphs. Also,
in our dissertation we provide initial work for applying watermarks to graph data,
which sets the stage for follow-up work.
Further exploring graph watermarks. One direction is to improve robust-
ness against a range of other attacks. For example, in the single attacker model,
there might be more disruptive attack versions. The attacker may either release
a partial subgraph of the watermarked graph, or merge multiple watermarked
graphs. In both cases, this destroys the embedded watermarks and how to defend
against them is an interesting topic. Another example is for the collusion attack.
Using our proposed hierarchical watermarking technique, we can combine results
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from multiple dimensions and quickly narrow down the set of potential users re-
sponsible for the leak. However, since a colluding attack requires the involvement
of multiple leakers, even identifying a single leaker is insufficient. Developing a
scheme to reliably detect multiple (ideally all) colluding users is a topic for future
work.
Another potential problem is the optimization of parameters in our watermark
system. In the advanced design, we need to set degree bucket size, the NSD simi-
larity threshold, edge difference threshold L, and number of embedded individual
and group watermarks. We hope to give both experimental evaluation for different
parameter settings, and also theoretical proof for the accuracy boundary.
Sharing dynamic graphs. In dynamic network traces, there might be new
privacy breaches, e.g., information of the networks’ own formation, and dynamic
processes on top of networks like diffusion. We want to ask the following questions:
• What are the new challenges in dynamic graph sharing ?
• How do we quantify graph utility in terms of dynamic graphs ?
• Can current approaches be adapted for sharing dynamic graphs ?
• Can we propose new approaches by leveraging network dynamics ?
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5.3.3 User Studies in Graph Analysis
Many network services are driven by user behaviors, e.g., Facebook has 1.79
Billion users in 2016 [3], and Google search has more than 2.2 Billion users [132]
who consume over 3.5 Billion searches per day [2]. To get a deeper understanding
of network graphs, especially social network graphs, analyzing online user behavior
is indispensable.
Most of current graph solutions are either based on assumptions, or measure-
ment results from networks, and lack insights for user inner motivations and latent
behaviors. Even those do focus on user behavior analysis, they often study from
an aggregate behavioral level in terms of graph structural changes [42, 124], still
deficient in direct understanding of motivations underlying behaviors. For ex-
ample, the link prediction problem itself is closely related to user motivations to
build connections, whereas most of current algorithms are based on graph struc-
tural intuitions, or classification methods. Doing user studies like surveys [159] or
interviews [26] will help us better understand this problem and ourselves.
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